श्री :

तद्दिव्यमव्ययं धाम सारस्वतमुपास्महे ।
यत्प्रसादात्प्रलीयान्ते मोहान्धतमसच्छटाः ॥

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ĀNANDAVARDHANA'S

DHVANYĀLOKA

OR

Theory of Suggestion in Poetry

(Translated into English with Notes)

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FOREWORD

In acceding to Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy's request for a Foreword to his English translation of the *Dhvanyāloka*, I am not claiming any special knowledge of Sanskrit poetics or even a general acquaintance with Sanskrit, that may entitle me to speak with authority. I have known Dr. Krishnamoorthy rather intimately, and I have followed his career of scholarship with pride and admiration; and having for many long years pursued with indifferent success the profession of literary criticism, I am greatly interested in studies on the Sanskrit schools of poetics, and more particularly in the attempts of savants to trace the filiations between Western and Indian canons of aesthetic criticism. A new literature is invariably the product of a cross-fertilization of apparently alien cultures, as, for example, Elizabethan drama derived as much from the indigenous tradition as from the impact of classical literature, generally through translations. Indian literature today cannot deny the imperatives of our national tradition, which from Vedic times has run as a continuous stream, howbeit the stream might have been, now broad and deep, now no more than a tenuous trickle,—at times, indeed, but a pure spring flowing under the sandy soil, invisible to the man who is in a hurry. On the other hand, the introduction of Western education into India in the 19th century opened new possibilities to the Indian writer, and accordingly new forms of literature, new modes of expression, new currents of ideas have been explored during the last hundred years in almost all our regional literatures. Even as the contemporary Indian creative writer is thus the heir to the two great traditions, the indigenous and the Western, the present-day critic too—if he is to prove worthy of his vocation and rise to the height of his opportunities – must needs drink deep in the springs of both the Indian and Western traditions in criticism. A succession of great writers—Bharata, Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa, Jagannā-

tha—have given us a body of critical thought as impressive in volume as it is invaluable as a guide to literary appreciation. The theories, evolved at first with reference to classical Sanskrit literature, were taken over by the critics of many of the new regional literatures, and so in course of time came to have a general currency. In the appreciation of literature, *Rasa* or communicated sensibility is the deciding factor and *dhvani* or the richness of the undertones is the soul of poetry. Such in a nutshell was the *Rasa-dhvani* theory, perhaps the most rewarding peak of all the Himalayas of Sanskrit treatises on poetics. No less rewarding to the modern Indian critic is the Western tradition in criticism beginning with Aristotle and, notwithstanding diversions and periods of suspended animation, presisting till our own day when T. S. Eliot is the reigning colossus of poetry and criticism. The modern Indian critic should be ready to draw upon both these wells of living tradition, for only thus can he achieve a vigorous and fruitful play of his critical powers. There is here a great opportunity for him, and he can make the two opulent traditions of critical thought, the Indian and the European, meet in a new synthesis that shall reveal the incandecent unity of human aspiration and achievement through the ages.

There are, however, the usual difficulties incident to any new adventure, whether in the material world or in the more elusive world of ideas. Of the classics of Western criticism we have both definitive editions and also reliable translations in almost all European languages. Aristotle, Longinus, Horace, Dante, Boileau, Lessing, Coleridge, Arnold, Croce, I.A. Richards, Eliot—they are easily accessible to us, and competent historical surveys of European criticism as well as monographs on individual critics are also available. As regards Indian poetics, the monumental labours of Dr. S. K. De and Mahāmahopādhyāya P. V. Kane and the occasional illuminating studies of scholars like the late M. Hiriyanna and Mahāmahopādhyāya Kuppuswami Sastri, and the more recent work of Drs. Raghavan and Sankaran, have revealed to our gaze vista upon vista of critical inquiry and exegesis, and we still suffer as it were from a feeling

of awe ond bewilderment at the variegated richness of the prospect. Yet more needs to be done. The classics of Sanskrit criticism must be made available to the 'common reader' through translations in English and in the major regional languages of India. Comparative studies of the Indian and Western schools of criticism, whether on a comprehensive scale or governed by a principle of resolved limitation to particular facets, would be no less welcome and would help to stimulate critical activity on the right lines. It is thus a matter of very real gratification to me that my young friend, Dr. Krishna moorthy,—like another of my friends, Mr. K. Visvanatham, my colleague in the English Department of the Andhra University, has canalized his erudition and industry towards these essentially fruitful fields of activity.

In his still largely unpublished thesis, *The 'Dhvanyāloka' and Its Critics*,—which, although completed when he was hardly twentyfive without effective guidance froma teacher was approved *cum laude* for the Ph. D. degree of the Bombay University by two such savants asMahamahopadhyaya P.V.Kane and Professor H. D. Velankar—Dr. Krishnamoorthy adroitly, though not without ample justification, gave Ānandavardhana the central place in the history of Sanskrit poetics. Besides outlining an account of the life and life-work of Ānandavardhana set in relation to his age and also the wider background of Sanskrit poetics, Dr. Krishnamoorthy drew pointed attention to suggestive parallels between Indian and European critical thought. Self-contained chapters from Dr. Krishnamoorthy's thesis have already appeared in learned journals, but I wish some enterprissing publisher will bring it out in full and thereby win the gratitude of students of Indian critical thought the world over. Of not less importance are Dr. Krishnamoorthy's Kannada renderings of the *Dhvanyāloka*, *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, *Kāvyādarśa* and *Kāvyaprakāśa*, as also his monograph on Ānandavardhana's poetics in Kannada and his Sanskrit essay entitled Alaṅkāra-Śāstre Kāvya-Vaividhya-Vāda-Vimarśaḥ which was awarded the Navinam Ramanujacharya prize and has just been published by the Mysore University—a considerable body of work that

has elicited high praise from scholars. Now comes his English translation of the *Dhvanyāloka*, which I have no doubt will receive a ready welcome from the students of Indian and Western literature. Although others have written about the *Dhvanyāloka* or translated it in part, it is to Dr. Krishnamoorthy that we owe both the complete English translation of the *Kārikās* as well as the *Vṛtti*, and an orderly account of its current of ideas and an appreciation of the abiding value of its critical canons.

In his preface, Dr. Krishnamoorthy has pointed out that whereas in his Kannada version of the *Dhvanyāloka* he translated verse into verse, here in the English version he has attempted merely a faithful prose rendering of the verse portions of the original, though by resorting to italics and indented spacing they are set strikingly apart from the main prose commentary. With a text like the *Dhvanyāloka* teeming with subtleties and intricacies and numerous illustrative quotations, what is needed is not a merely facile or free or readable paraphrase but a scrupulously exact translation, a version that reproduces with absolute fidelity the original text in its entirety. This ideal Dr. Krishnamoorthy has steadily kept before him, and it is all the more to his credit that his rendering of the *Dhvanyāloka* is fairly free from clumsy, knotted or twisted phrases or sentences, and thus raises no barrier between itself and the reader.

This is not, of course, the place to enter into a detailed discussion on Sanskrit poetics or on the particular topics covered by the *Dhvanyāloka*. Even as, try as we might, we cannot empty life of its mystery, we cannot, for all our analytical categories, explain away the whole mystery of poetic creation. Life is a complex of fact and fancy, logic, meaning and mystery: and poetry as it were pierces life where it is most sensitive, and seeks to pluck the heart of the mystery—yet the mystery, something of it at least, must remain to tantalize or to silence us. What we ordinarily see of life is the veil of appearance, and to the extent we penetrate through it and touch the hidden centre, our aprehension is complete or final. The poet uses words in a metrical order to convey somethings of the mystery-the deeper significance—of life. But words too are mere appearance and words have to be so charged with significant undertones that the poet may be able to convey through appearances the reality that lies behind them. We often refer to the poet's inspiration, the divine afflatus that is like a sudden surge of primordial poetic energy. But inspiration has to be turned into the currency of language before it can become poetry. We may likewise describe poetry at its purest as a "mystic incantation allied to prayer", or as soul communing with soul. When poetic expression approximates to the *mantra*, the effect on the hearer is far more profound than the mere words would seem to warrant: it is as though, leaping over the physical boundaries or the coils of intellectual cognition, the meaning intended by the poet lodges directly in the reader's soul. Words, gramatical organization, rhythmic arrangement, jugglings with sound, figures of speech, the operations of the intellect, the emotional excitement, the rule of current fashions and the pull of tradition—all have their part to play in determining the composition of a poem; yet without the soul-quality there is no poem, only a life-less mass of words, a temple without the installed deity, a statue without life. *Dhvani* in poetry is really this soul-quality which is at once the excuse and the explanation of the rest. Not the outer habiliments of form and diction, the riot of *śabdālaṅkrāas*, and *arthālaṅkāras*, not the stern logic of the plot or the innate worth of the sentiments, but this reality within, the soul-quality, this undertone of significant suggestion, that constitutes the utter uniqueness of poetry.

Sanskrit rhetoricians mention the basic categories of *vastu* (matter, plot or form), *alaṅkāra* (embellishment, fullness of detail or diction) and *rasa* (sentiment, sensibility or emotional intensity): but Ānandavardhana rightly urges that in respect of all these, the reality within is of far greater consequence than the outer appearance. Not until the story or the plot is seized in terms of universality does it become poetic: nor until verbal expression becomes a new way, the only satisfying way in the context, of adequately conveying the writer's individual vision of life or character does such expression become poetic: and likewise, not until the communicated sensibility is so laden with

the undertone of significance as to kindle the soul to a new awareness of life's "deep magic" can such sentiment or sensibility be called truly poetic. In a word, only when a poem, instead of imprisoning or suffocating the reader within the granite walls of precise meaning, proves rather to be a magic casement opening on the foam of the endless oceans of ambrosial significance can it deserve the name of poetry. What we seek in a scientific statement is the sufficiency of the statement: in poetry we seek to pierce the *māyā* of visible or cognizable picture or statement, and touch or apprehend the intangible reality within. It would not do to apply to poetry the categories of analysis that might be valid with regard to a science or to a prose treatise. It would be like judging men—a Buddha, a Christ, a Gandhi, or even imaginative characters like Hamlet, Stavrogin and Tess—in terms of poundage, colour or height. Poetry not only tells us something, but *does* somtehing to us. Tragedy effects the katharsis of the emotions of pity and terror, said Aristotle; great poetry *transports* us, said Longinus; and Ānandavardhana said–if not in so many words as Abhinavagupta did—that poetry is a means of cultivating the double vision so that we may be enabled to pass the visible and invade the invisible, mark the immediate contours of Appearance, yet peer beyond them and see the very image of splendorous Reality.

There is, then, the element of *pleasure* in poetry: and there is pleasure even in tragedy, even in Vālmīki's description of Rāma's banishment or Kālidāsa's presentation of the rejection of Śakuntalā. Pleasure, certainly, but of what kind? "A superior amusement...not an amusement for superior people", says T. S. Eliot. The pleasure that the sensitive reader—the *Sahṛdaya* derives from poetry is not the sort of amusement or pleasure that is meant merely to "kill time": on the contrary, it works almost a sea-change, and leaves a permanent effect. We are not the same people after reading the poem that we were before. The words of the poet are verily like a dance of creative life, they are like unto a racing squadron of the spirit, and whereas the five senses open *without*, the sixth sense that poetry gives us opens *within*, and the undertones of *Dhvani* carry us almost to

the threshold of Reality. The pleasure is not denied, it is only transformed into a discipline in awareness, a deepening of consciousness, a realization of things undreamt of before. The *Rasa-Dhvani* theory of poetry is thus naturally affiliated to the main Vedantic tradition in philosophy, although the encrustation of multiple categories and hair-splitting differentiations may tend to obscure this fact. But that is no reason why, at this distance of time, we should miss the quintessential aspect of the *Rasa-Dhvani* theory being preoccupied with the burden of detail and the controversial fog, which have more a historical than an integral relation to the theory.

Be that as it may, Dr. Krishnamoorthy deserves to be congratulated on his meritorious English translation of the *Dhvanyāloka*, which is a fitting climax to his varied labours in the field of Sanskrit poetics. There has in recent years been a revival of Sanskrit studies in the country. It is a happy augury for the future that young men like Dr. Krishnamoorthy are dedicating themselves wholeheartedly to the study, interpretation and popularization of Sanskrit literature. With the habits of the cloistered scholar, unattached to coteries or groups, undaunted by difficulty or even the lack of right recognition or encouragement, Dr. Krishnamoorthy has gone his lone way and achieved a position of authority in the world of Sanskrit scholarship. I do earnestly hope that his brilliant academic record and his standing as a scholar and researcher will soon win for him the Sanskrit Chair of a premier Indian or foreign University.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

ANDHRA UNIVERSITY
WALTAIR
15—12—1955

PREFACE

ध्वनिनातिगभीरेण काव्यतत्त्वनिवेशिना।
आनन्दवर्धनः कस्य नासीदानन्दवर्धनः॥

The *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana is the most outstanding work in the history of Indian literary criticism. It represents the highest watermark reached by Indians in their speculations about Poetry. This work of the 9th century A. D. hails from Kashmir, the veritable abode of the Goddess of Sanskrit Poetry according to ancient tradition. The *Dhvanyāloka* is an epoch-making work since it holds a mirror in a characteristically Indian fashion to the profound and fundamental principles of literary criticism discovered by Indian genius in an age that historically marked the close of the most creative period in the history of Sanskrit Poetry. It notes with regret the growing decadence in the literary taste of poets as well as critics and endeavours to educate both by setting forth scientifically the principles of aesthetic criticism for the first time.

All the predecessors of Ānandavardhana wrote only treatises on rhetoric. They gave classified schemes of several tropes and figures, of different qualities and styles ; they enumerated different types of composition and enunciated normative rules governing each of them. They were so much concerned with the trees that they missed the picture of the wood as a whole. They often illustrated individual poetic turns by short verses composed for the purpose and did not bother themselves to go to current literature for examples. In a word, though they might have been vaguely aware of the general problems relating to literature, they never tried to propose any solutions for these ; their treatises were meant to serve more as guide-books to poets who already possessed the gift of creative genius, than as so many cut-and-dry rules which would make one a poet by instruction despite his want of genius. These treatises on rhetoric by Bhāmaha,

Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa and Vāmana were misused by persons who practiced poetry as a trade ; and as their number increased, the taste of the public also became corrupt. Poetry came to be made to order and persons sought nothing more than strict conformity to rules of rhetoric. What was only a guiding hint was invested with inviolable authority and the result was extreme artificiality in poetry. No student of Sanskrit literature can fail to notice this feature of artificiality which is ever on the increase after the epoch of earliest poets like Vālmīki, Vyāsa and Kālidāsa. The first Indian critic who took this into account and sounded a timely warning was Ānandavardhana. Had his warning been heeded, the course of Sanskrit literature would have been entirely different. It is a pity that his warning was eclipsed by the schools of conservative opinion and that the aesthetic theory of *dhvani* was accorded only lip-sympathy by later writers like Ruyyaka and Jagannātha who took greater pains to render the concept of figures very scientific.

Even this brief survey of the background against which the *Dhvanyāloka* appeared, will be enough to indicate its importance to a modern student of literary criticism. We take pride in the fact that ours is an age of science and that we do not blindly swear by any kind of orthodoxy. The fundamental problems of literature, however, have yet remained unsolved and are still being subjected to the most searching analyses. The Indian contribution to this most interesting branch of study has not been adequately appreciated by modern writers though the need for a systematic study of the contributions of ancient thought is never denied today. While hundreds of new commentaries on Aristotle, Longinus and Horace have appeared in various languages of the world in the last and the present century, the number of works which take into account Indian thought is extremely small. Truth is no monopoly of one nation and the Indians have approached it in their own way and according to their own light. Yet the neglect of Indian thought needs no better illustration than the fact that even in the year of grace 1951, there is no complete English translation of even the *locus classicus* of Indian aesthetic

criticism, the *Dhvanyāloka*. But the onus of blame for this unmerited neglect rests upon Indian shoulders alone. While in traditional schemes of Sanskrit study, the *Dhvanyāloka* is neglected in preference to compendiums like the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, *Sāhityadarpaṇa* and *Pratāparudrīya* which are all eclectic in character, Sanskrit scholars trained along Western lines have addressed themselves more to the solution of problems like the duality or identity of authorship of the verse and prose portions in the *Dhvanyāloka* than to the task of interpreting the text itself.

The first notice of the Mss. of the *Dhvanyāloka* was made in 1877 by G. Biihler in his detailed ***Report*** of a tour in search of Sanskrit Mss. The ***editio princeps*** of the text with the commentary of Abhinavagupta thereon was issued by the Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay in 1891 and it was edited by Pt. Durgaprasada. In 1902, it was first completely translated into German by that great savant Hermann Jacobi of Bonn and appeared serially in volumes LVI and LVII of the *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesselschaft* during the years 1902-1903. In the old volumes of the *Indian Thought*, Prof. Rama Pisharoti began on a very ambitious scale an English translation of the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Locana* but it is found to stop with the first few *Kārikās* of the text. Hence up to the present time, the only knowledge of the *Dhvanyāloka* one can get in English is from the admirable accounts of Dr. S. K. De and Dr. P. V. Kane from their *Studies in Sanskrit Poetics* and *History of Alaṅkāraśāstra* respectively besides Dr. Sankaran's *Theory of Rasa and Dhvani* and Dr. V. Raghavan's Studies which contain much useful material. Regarding the editions of the text of the *Dhvanyāloka*, there has been remarkable progress. We owe the first critical edition of Abhinavagupta's *Locana* on the fourth chapter of the *Dhvanyāloka* to Dr. S. K. De who published it in the *Journal of the Department of Letters* of the Calcutta University. The ***editio princeps*** issued in the Kāvyamāla series of the Nirnayasagar Press was so uncritical and full of lacune and errors that it was difficult of correct construing; scholars all over the world have been laid under a deep debt of gratitude by Hermann Jacobi who first proposed alternative readings, most

of which have since been proved correct by fresh manuscript evidence. Among the subsequent Indian editions of the *Dhvanyāloka* which have appeared in the present century, mention might be made of one *Chowkhāmbā* Edition with a modern commentary by Badarīnātha (1937), another Kāshī Sanskrit Series Edition with generally correct readings of the text, the *Locana*, and a modern commentary on the latter called *Bālapriyā* (1940), the Calcutta Sanskrit Series Edition No. 25 B with a modern commentary by Madhusudana Mishra (1938), and last but not least, the edition of the first Chapter of the *Dhvanyāloka* with *Locana* and an old commentary *Kaumudī* on the above, and with *Upalocana* by Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, issued by the K. S. R. Institute, Madras (1940). A scholar in 1951 is thus better equipped for the purpose of translating the *Dhvanyāloka* than one a few decades ago.

The present translator has been actively engaged in a study of the *Dhvanyāloka* for the last ten years. He first studied it as a text for his M. A. Degree Examination and subsequently wrote a thesis upon the subject—"The *Dhvanyāloka* and its Critics" which was approved for the Degree of Ph. D. by the University of Bombay in 1947. The thesis has been published in parts in various Oriental journals and it seeks to give a systematic idea of the theory of *dhvani* in all its bearings. During the last three years, the writer has brought out in Kannada his studies in the theory of *dhvani* as also a complete translation of the *Dhvanyāloka* into Kannada through the ***Prabuddha Karnāṭaka***, the Kannada journal of the Mysore University. A list of these published articles is given at the end of this translation as an appendix. In writing out the translation, all controversy has been eschewed scrupulously and only a faithful rendering of the original *Karikās* and ***Vṛtti*** has been attempted. The *Dhvanyāloka* is admittedly an advanced text though it may not be "ein schwerer Text" as Jacobi said. It presupposes on the part of its reader a complete mastery of the earlier treatises on rhetoric on the one hand and a familiarity with the language of philosophical discussion on the other. It would be impossible to do full justice to all the points that

require comment and are of a controversial nature in the limits set for the translation. It was feared that the notes might take away twice the space allotted to the translation of the text itself. Hence the notes that have been given mainly indicate known references to other works and those of a critical or explanatory character are but few. But it is hoped that a perusal of all the articles of the present writer enlisted in the appendix will supply the necessary information regarding the doubts and controversial issues that might arise while studying the *Dhvanyāloka* as also the available information about its author—Ānandavardhana.

A word might now be said about the considerations that have been kept in mind while writing out this translation. It is no doubt best to translate illustrative verses into verse; but that is an ideal which is often difficult of attainment. In my Kannada rendering of the *Dhvanyāloka* already referred to, I could attempt to keep up to this ideal since the tradition of Sanskrit Poetry and that of Poetry in other Indian languages approximate to each other very much. But this is much more difficult when two widely different verse traditions as that of English and Sanskrit are involved and hence I have confined myself to a faithful prose rendering of the illustraive verses printed however with indented spacing. Even when translations of other writers on particular verses were available, I have felt that the particular word or words on which Ānandavardhana would concentrate his comment were not conspicuous enough. Hence I have mostly given my own translations of the verses from the standpoint of *dhvani*.

Regarding the translation of the theory portion of the text, I felt that the usual way of retaining all technical terms in their original form without proposing equivalents would prove so many stumbling blocks to readers unacquainted with Sanskrit and would be intelligible only to Sanskrit-knowing readers. Once again, since the same words are often used in different senses in different treatises even in Sanskrit, a precise indication of the sense in which they were used in the particular text on hand, would be found necessary. So I have carefully avoided

the use of Sanskrit words in the course of the English translation and contented myself with English equivalents. It is indeed difficult to coin exact equivalents which are also elegant. I have preferred to be exact even at the cost of elegance. Uncouthness of phrasing is inevitable when rendering a long Sanskrit compound such as *śabdaśaktimūlānuraṇanarūpavyaṅgya* into a language like English which does not admit of compound words. But no pains have been spared to make the rendering intelligible. In a way I felt that the equivalents proposed here would in themselves serve as short explanatory notes to the technical words. All these have been enlisted in the *Glossary*. In a word, I have tried to make the translation as much intelligible to the general reader as informative to the scholar.

So far as the interpretation of the text is concerned, I might only say that I have very strictly attempted to preserve an impartial outlook. Whenever I got a doubt I have tried to derive guidance invariably from the other remarks of Ānandavardhana himself and I have never failed to get the light I sought. In this connection, I might add that I strongly believe in the identity of authorship of both the *Kārikā* and *Vṛiti* portions of the *Dhvanyāloka*. I have, of course, read and re-read Abhinavagupta's masterly exposition of the doctrine but sometimes I get the impression that he too read his own meaning into the words of Ānandavardhana though the text was quite intelligible as it was. As an example, I refer the reader to my note on *Kārikā* I, 5. (No. 13)

The value of Abhinavagupta's commentary in our study of the *Dhvanyāloka*, is not minimised on that account. He belonged to a family in which the study of the *Dhvanyāloka* was traditional (in view of the fact that one of his ancestors wrote a commentry called the *Candrikā* on it, which is now lost) and he was a brilliant writer himself. He was not far removed in date from Ānandavardhana himself (his age being the 11th century A.D.) and he also belonged to Kashmir, the home of Ānandavardhana's activity. For all these reasons, his commentary is invaluable in itself; but in this translation meant alike for the layman and the scholar, I have desisted from giving

prominence to problems of interpretation. Similarly the leanings of scholars towards duality of authorship of the *Kārikā* and *Vṛtti* portions of the text have led them to various interpretations (vide my article in I. H. Q. Vol. XXIV Nos. 3-4). I have tried my best to avoid such fancied difficulties.

The most striking features of Ānandavardhana's style are his fondness for elegant variation on the one hand and partiality to laconic brevity on the other. He avoids banality by using several equivalent expressions in referring to the same idea (e. g. *artha*, *abhidheya*, *vācya*, *pratipādya*, *viṣaya*, *vastu*, etc., to mean '*sense*' and achieves brevity by using an identical expression to stand for different ideas, e.g. the word *dhvani* used in the sense of Poetry with principal suggestion, the process of suggestion, the suggestive word, the suggestive sense and the suggested content. While I have tried to retain the first feature of using variant expressions as indicated in the Glossary, I have abandoned the second and used different words to indicate the different ideas.

The readings adopted while writing this translation remain to be stated. I have not followed the readings in any single edition from beginning to end; but compared all the readings before accepting any one as plausible. However, I might say that the translation of the first chapter is mostly based on the readings in the KSRI Edition while that of the other chapters is mainly based on the texts of the Kashi Sanskrit Series Edition; and the Calcutta Sanskrit Series Edition.

In conclusion, I thank the Oriental Book Agency, Poona for undertaking this publication and the Mysore Printing and Publishing House for their excellent work.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

MYSORE
1—6—1951

P. S.—It was at the instance of my beloved teacher and friend, Dr. H. L. Hariyappa that I completed this work and as Editor of the Poona Oriental Series he looked into the proofs of

the first eight formes. Also, he is no more to see the fruition of his plan. I dedicate the work his memory.

I am grateful to Dr. K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar of the Andhra University for writing the foreword and encouraging me.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

KUMTA
26—10—1955

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THE THEORY OF SUGGESTION

THE FIRST FLASH

May Lord Hari's claws preserve you
In his Lion's form self-chose ;
They outbeat the moon in their luminous light,
And cut asunder the devotees' woes.[1]

I

Though learned men of yore had declared positively that the soul of Poetry is suggestion, others affirmed its non-existence ; some others regarded it as something indicated and still others spoke of its essence as being beyond the scope of words. We shall, therefore, explain its nature and delight the minds of cultured critics.

The word *learned men* has the sense of *those who know the truth about poetry*. Through an unbroken tradition, these have taught that the soul of poetry deserves the designation of Suggestion. Although it is so felt by cultured critics in their minds (even to-day), others affirmed its non-existence. The following are the different views of those who believe in its non-existence[2] :

1. Some might say : 'In fact poetry is that whose body is constituted by sound and sense. Sources of charm in sound, such as Alliteration, are quite well-known. And so are the sources of charm in sense such as Simile. Qualities of composition like Sweetness are also familiar to us[3] ; and we have heard too of dictions like *the Cultured*, propounded by some,[4] though in truth their characteristics are not different from those. We have heard of styles like *Vaidarbhī* also. But what could this "Suggestion" be, which is different from everything ?'

2. Others might aver as follows : 'Suggestion does not exist indeed ; for a species of poetry opposed to all well-known canons will necessarily cease to be poetry. Poetry can be defined only as that which is made up of such sound and sense as will delight the mind of the critic. This (definition) will not

hold good to a procedure which deflects from all the well-known canons mentioned. Even if the designation of poetry were brought into currency to denote *dhvani* on the strength of unanimity of opinion in a coterie of critics self-constituted, still, it could never win the universal acceptance of the learned.'

3. Some others might explain its non-existence in a different way: 'It is indeed impossible that Suggestion can be something unknown before. Since it is not distinct from a source of charm, it naturally comes under the causes of charm already enumerated. Just by coining a novel designation to one of them only, something of no note will have been declared at the most. Moreover, since the ways of speech are endless, even if there should be an insignificant element left unexplained by the famous framers of the rules of Poetry, we cannot understand the reason why persons should close their eyes under the self-assumed illusion of being 'cultured critics' and dance about with joy saying that they have discovered 'Suggestion' therein. Thousands of other great men have expounded, and are still expounding, figurative elements (of speech). But we do not hear of any such state about them. Therefore, Suggestion is only a supposition; and it would be impossible to demonstrate any truth about it which can bear scrutiny. In fact, a gentleman[5] has already composed a verse to this effect:

> *Poetry in which there is nothing to delight the mind and no embellishment, which is destitute of florid words and devoid of artful turns, is praised so warmly by the dunce as being associated with dhvani (Suggestion). But we are at a loss to imagine what answer he will make when put a straight question by an intelligent critic about the nature of dhvani itself!'*

Some others mentioned it as something Indicated. (To put it differently), others declared that the soul of poetry, designated by the term Suggestion, was the same as Secondary Usage of words. Although it is true that no law-giver of poetry (i.e. writer on Poetics) has ever shown any element like Secondary Usage of Words as being identical with Suggestion (in so many explicit words) by mentioning the word 'Suggestion'

itself, we have noted here such a view because we can conclude that he who has pointed out the Secondary Usage of words in Poetry has slightly touched the fringes of the doctrine of Suggestion, though he is not defining it.

Still others, whose minds were not astute enough to frame a definition, simply gave out that the true nature of Suggestion was beyond all words and that it was discernible only to the minds of cultured critics.

In view of the prevalence of so many conflicting opinions, we propose to elucidate the nature of Suggestion for the delight of cultured critics. The nature of Suggestion is at once the quintessence of the works of all first-rate poets and most beautiful, though it eluded detection by even the subtlest minds of the rhetoricians of the past. However, critics of culture are certainly alive to its primary presence in literary works like the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*; and with a view to placing their delight on a secure footing, we shall explain its nature (in detail).

The following is meant to serve as a groundwork to Suggestion which has been taken up for a detailed definition:—

2

That meaning which wins the admiration of cultured critics is decided to be the soul of Poetry. The 'Expressed' and the 'Implied' are regarded as its two aspects.

That meaning which wins the admiration of cultured critics and which is of the very essence of poetry, even as the soul is of a body which is naturally handsome by the union of graceful and proper limbs, has two aspects, viz., the Expressed and the Implied.

3

Of these, the Expressed is commonly known and it has been already set forth in various ways through figures such as the Simile by other writers; hence it will not be discussed here at length.

The expression, *other writers*, alludes to writers on Poetics like Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa.[6] '*Hence it will not be discussed here at length*'

should be taken to imply that the conclusions of earlier writers will be freely quoted whenever a need arises for them.

4

But the Implied aspect is quite different from this. In the words of master-poets, it shines out supreme and towers above the beauty of the well-known outer parts even as charm does in ladies.

The Implied aspect is entirely different from the Expressed aspect and it is found in the words of master-poets. It is most familiar to the minds of cultured critics and it shines out as being over and above the 'well-known' parts. The expression 'well-known' connotes not only what is 'adorned with figures' but also what is 'perceptible to the senses'. Charm in ladies is a simile in point. Just as charm in ladies exceeds the beauty of all the individual parts observed separately, and delights the eyes of the passionate onlooker in a most unique fashion like the veritable nectar of gods, so also does this Implied meaning. It will be shown in the sequel that this meaning embraces various divisions such as the bare Idea, Figures and Sentiments etc.,—all implied by the inner power of the Expressed. In all these varieties, it will be seen to differ from the Expressed. To illustrate, even the first variety itself differs very widely from the Expressed. Sometimes it will be of the nature of a prohibition when the Expressed is of the nature of an injunction. e.g.,

Ramble freely, pious man !
That dog to-day is killed
By the fierce lion that dwells
In Godā river dells.[7]

Sometimes, though the Expressed is of the nature of a prohibition. the Implied will be of the nature of an injunction. e.g.,

Mother-in-law lies here, lost in sleep ;
And I here ; thou shouldst mark
These before it is dark.
O traveller, blinded by night,
Tumble not into our beds aright.[8]

Sometimes, though the Expressed may be of the nature of an injunction, the Implied may be neither a definite prohibition nor a definite injunction. e.g.,

Get thee gone ! I pray
May all sighs and tears be mine, I say.
Let them not be thine also
By parting thee from her
For show of false courtesy (unto me)[9] *!*

Sometimes, though the Expressed is of the nature of a prohibition, the Implied is neither a prohibition nor an injunction. e.g.,

Humbly I beg thee, please go back ;
Indeed, O sweet, thou drivest all gloom
By the bright light of your moon-face
A pity it is that thou dost harm
Other wantons too
Hurrying to their lover's bower.[1]

Sometimes, the Implied will relate to something entirely different from that to which the Expressed is related. e.g.,

Who is there that will not be enraged
At the sight of his beloved's lip wounded ?
Thou didst smell the lotus with a bee inside
Not heeding our warning forsooth ;
Suffer now (for your obstinacy) ![11]

There are various other forms besides these in which the varieties of the Implied appear distinct from the Expressed. What has been demonstrated above should be taken only as a pointer in that direction.

That the second class of the Implied (viz., Figures) too differs from the Expressed will be demonstrated in detail in the sequel.[12]

But the third class of the Implied, viz., Sentiments etc., is seen to shine out as a result of the latent power in the Expressed. It never becomes an object of direct verbal denotation and hence it is decidedly distinct from the Expressed. If at all it could be an object of the Expressed, it might be so alleged

either as being directly denoted by its proper names or as being denoted through the delineation of Setting, etc. If the first alternative were true, there would be no possibility of an experience of Sentiments etc., in instances where their proper names are not employed. Never are they so denoted directly by their proper names. Even when proper names are present, the experience of Sentiments etc., is not due to them but only due to the delineation of a proper setting etc. The experience of sentiments etc., is only given a designation by the proper name and is not at all conditioned by it. In fact we do not have the experience (of sentiments etc.) in all the instances where proper names are used. Indeed, there is not even the slightest experience of the presence of Sentiments in a composition which contains only their proper names such as the *Erotic* and which is destitute of all delineation of the Setting and so forth. Since we can have the experience of Sentiments etc. only through the Setting etc., irrespective of their proper names and since we cannot have the experience only by the use of proper names, we may conclude on the basis of these considerations, both positive and negative, that Sentiments etc., are only implied by the latent power of the Expressed, and in no way denoted explicitly. Thus it is established that even the third class of the Implied is quite distinct from the Expressed. It will be shown in the sequel, however, that its experience will appear to be almost simultaneous with the Expressed.

5

That meaning alone is the soul of Poetry; and so it was that of yore, the sorrow of the First Poet (i.e. Vālmīki) at the separation of the curlew couple took the form of a distich.

That meaning alone happens to be the quintessence of Poetry whose outward charm is secured by the combination of varied and uncommon expressed meanings, expressions and art of composition. That is why the sorrow of the First Poet on hearing the wail of the he-curlew afflicted with separation from its dead mate, transformed itself into a distich. Sorrow indeed is the abiding emotion which is at the basis of the

Sentiment of Pathos. As already explained, it is only of the nature of the Implied. Though one can discern other sub-species of the Implied, they can all be understood by the synecdoche of sentiments and emotions since these happen to be the most important representatives of the rest.[13]

6

The speech of master-poets streaming forth that sweet content reveals clearly their extraordinary genius which is as supernatural as it is ever bright.

The speech of master-poets which streams forth such subjects as are full of the said meaning will reveal most clearly the extraordinary genius of the poets; a genius which not only appears supernatural but also ever-bright. Hence it is that though the world of traditionally accepted poets is very wide and varied, only two to three or at the most five to six amongst them, such as Kālidāsa, are counted as Master-Poets.

Here is another evidence to prove the existence of the Implied meaning:

7

It is not understood by a mere learning in Grammar and in Dictionary. It is understood only by those who have an insight into the true significance of Poetry.

By a mere learning in rules of Grammar and meanings recorded in lexicons, that meaning cannot be grasped; for it can be grasped only by those who have an insight into the true significance of Poetry. In case this meaning too were the same as the Expressed, then it should have been quite possible to understand it merely by a knowledge of the nature of expressed meanings and expressions. But the fact is that the meaning (i.e. Implied meaning) remains beyond the understanding of persons who have had merely a grinding in the sciences of meanings and words if they are averse to aesthetic contemplation of the intrinsic significance of Poetry, even as the true appreciation of notes and tones of music will remain beyond the reach of

even knowers of the science of music if they are not good songsters.[14]

The existence of the Implied meaning as distinct from the Expressed has been established above. Now the fact that it is also very important is set forth in what follows :

8

That meaning, and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it, only these two deserve careful scrutiny of a Master-poet.

'*That meaniug*' refers to the Implied and '*that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it*' points out that it is not any and every word (recorded in the dictionary). Such a word and such a meaning—only these two deserve the careful recognition of a master-poet. The status of master-poets is achieved by them only by their proper usage of suggested meanings and suggestive expressions and not by a mere composition of conventional meanings and conventional words.

It is shown below that poets are justified in availing themselves, at the very outest, of the conventional meaning and conventional word though the suggested meaning and suggestive word happen to be far more important :

9

Just as a man interested in perceiving[15] objects (in the dark) directs his efforts towards securing the flame of a lamp since it is a means to realise his end, so also does one who is ultimately interested in the suggested meaning first evince interest in the conventional meaning

Even though a man may ultimately be interested only in the perception of objects, he will (first) direct his efforts towards securing the flame of a lamp as it serves as a means to achieve his end. In fact, without the flame of a lamp, there could be no perception possible. So also a man who is ultimately interested only in the suggested meaning will first direct his efforts towards conventional meaning. By this, it is pointed out how all the activity of a poet busy with his work is directed towards the Suggested meaning.

That this is true of the reader also is shown below :

10

Just as the purport of a sentence is grasped only through the sense of individual words, the knowledge of that sense is got at only through the medium of Expressed sense.[16]

Just as the purport of the sentence as a whole is known only through the medium of word-import, so also the knowledge of the Suggested sense is gained only through the medium of conventional sense.

Even though the knowledge of the Suggested sense is thus invariably preceded by a knowledge of the conventional sense, it is shown below how its importance does not grow less on that account :

11

Though by its own power the word-import conveys the sentence-import, just as it escapes notice once its purpose is served,—

While it is true that word-import itself conveys sentence import through its own power, just as it does not at the same time appear as distinct from sentence import once this latter has been conveyed ;—

12

So also that Suggested meaning flashes suddenly across the truth-perceiving minds of cultured critics when they are indifferent towards the conventional meaning

So far, the existence of Suggested meaning apart from the Expressed has been set forth ; and now it is made to serve the purpose on hand in the following verse.

13

That kind of poetry, wherein either the (conventional) meaning or the (conventional) word renders itself or its meaning secondary (respectively) and suggests the Implied meaning, is designated by the learned as DHVANI or 'Suggestive poetry'.[17]

The kind of poetry wherein both meaning, i.e. specific meaning and word, i.e. specific word, go to suggest only the said (i e. Implied) meaning, is signified by the name *Dhvani* or Suggestive poetry. By this it is shown how the province of Suggestive Poetry is quite distinct from that of the sources of charm in explicit meaning, such as the Figure Simile, on the one hand, and from that of the sources of charm in distinctive word, such as the Figure Alliteration, on the other.

The *prima facie* view already mentioned, viz., " Suggestion does not exist indeed; for, a species of poetry opposed to all well-known canons will necessarily cease to be poetry ", is unsound. The reason is that it is unfamiliar only to writers on poetics and if one were to examine the best specimens of literature, it alone would emerge as the most intrinsic principle of poetry, delighting all cultured critics. We shall show in the sequel that all else is only Pictorial.

The other objection, viz., " since it is not distinct from a source of charm, it naturally comes under the causes of charm already enumerated ", is also fallacious. How can Suggestion which is grounded on the relation of the suggested sense to the suggesting word be ever comprehended by a doctrine which is based on the relation of only the conventional sense to the denotative word? It will be expounded in the sequel that the sources of beauty in conventional meanings and expressions can only be its ancillaries but never its aggregate. Here is a verse[18] which gives the idea succinctly:

Suggestion, indeed, is conditioned by only the relation between the Suggested and the Suggester; when such is the case, how can it ever be subsumed by sources of beauty in the Expressed and the Expressions?

Perhaps some might argue in the following strain: ' such instances (of Figures of Speech) wherein no Implied meaning is clearly discernible may by all means be regarded as incapable of subsuming Suggestion. But Suggestion can certainly be subsumed under such Figures of speech as Condensed Metaphor, Paraleipsis, Metonymy, Periphrasis, Fancied Denial, Ellipsis implying a Simile, and Merging of Figures, since we have a

clear perception of the Implied meaning in these! It is in order to refute such an argument that the words, ' renders itself or its meaning secondary ', have been included in the Verse Text. The idea is that when in a work of poetry an explicit meaning renders itself secondary or when a word renders its own denotative meaning secondary and each of these suggests another sense, we call it Suggestive Poetry. How can this suggestion be brought under the said Figures? Suggestion is possible only when the suggested element is exclusively important. This is not so in Condensed Metaphor and the like. In an instance of Condensed Metaphor such as—

The twilight (the heroine's face) with twinkling stars (shining pupils) was illumined (was kissed) by the moon (the hero) glowing red (overcome by emotion) so suddenly (with such love) that the entire mass of darkness (black garment) disappearing in the east (slipping even in front), due to illumination (love) was not at all noticed.[19]—

it is the Expressed meaning alone which appears as prominent and the Suggested sense is only secondary to it. The main subjects of description are the night and the moon. And the behaviour of a heroine and that of a hero are attributed to them (only secondarily).

Even in Paraleipsis, we find beauty more in the Expressed than in the particular idea it hints at. That the Expressed is relatively more important than the Implied in this figure is brought out even by its title—the *Indicator*. In an instance of Paraleipsis in poetry, that which stands out as the chief element is the act of hinting itself and it will be of the nature of a disavowal serving the purpose of conveying speciality; and it will be found expressed openly, in so many words, though all the while it will be hinting at the Suggested idea. Between the Expressed and the Suggested, which of them is intended to be relatively more important can be settled only by determining the relative excellence of charm. For example—

Twilight is full of love (also, red colour),
And the day is moving in her front;
But oh, look at the decree of Fate—
The twain do never meet![20]

Though a suggested idea is understood here, charm is felt to exist only in the Expressed. Hence that alone should be taken to be primarily intended. Just as in figures like Ellipsis implying a Simile and Fancied Denial, although we find a Suggested Simile, we do not designate the figures by that name because the Expressed aspects in them are intended to be more important, so also in Paraleipsis, the same consideration should be kept in sight.

The same is true of Metonymy in which (the effect alone is mentioned and) the cause is omitted ;

Though called by friends,
Though he says ' I am coming '
And has awoken from sleep,
And though he has a mind to move out,
The traveller doesn't slacken his sloth.[21]

In instances like this, we simply get at the Suggested idea by force of context and we do not come across any charm therein. Hence the Suggested idea is not of primary importance.

So also in Periphrasis, if the Suggested idea were to be regarded as primarily important, it might by all means be brought under Suggestion; but Suggestion will not be subsumed by it. For not only the province of Suggestion is wider but its importance also is greater (than that of the Expressed) as it will be explained in the sequel. In the figure Periphrasis as illustrated by Bhāmaha, we do not have at all any exclusive importance attached to the Suggested idea, since the Expressed one isnot intended there to be secondary.

So far as Fancied Denial and Ellipsis implying a Simile are concerned, it is well known that the Expressed element alone is primary therein and that the Suggested element is secondary to it.

In Merging of Figures too, when one figure favours the shade of another figure, the suggested alone is not primarily intended and hence it cannot be reckoned to subsume Suggestion. In instances where two Figures may be said to exist simultaneously, the Expressed and the Suggested get equal importance. If in an instance the Expressed is secondary and the

Suggested has primary importance, then it might, of course, be brought under Suggestion. But it is not possible to say even then that it is itself identical with Suggestion. The argument given in connection with Periphrasis is appliacable here also. What is more, the very expression we use to signify this figure, viz., ' Merging of Figures ', prevents often even our imagining that it might be the same as Suggestion.

So also in the figure, Indirect Expression,[22] in instances where the Expressed extraneous idea and the Implied contextual idea are related to each other either as universal and particular or as the cause and the effect, the Expressed and the Implied get equal importance, of course. To explain : when the Expressed extraneous idea is a universal and it is related to the Implied contextual idea which happens to be its particular, the universal itself gets equal importance since its relationship with the particular is one of inseparable inherence. Similarly even when the extraneous particular happens to be related to the contextual universal, notwithstanding the importance accruing to the universal (by its sheer relevancy), the particulars are comprehended by the universal. The same logic applies also to instances where the Expressed and the Implied are related to each other as the cause and the effect. Even in instances of Indirect Expression where the extraneous and the contextual are related to each other by the relation of similarity, in case the extraneous Expressed idea bearing similarity is not indended as primarily important, it comes, of course, under the category of Suggestion. Otherwise (i.e. in case it is intended as primarily important), it will just be one of the figures.

The following verses sum up the position (in a nutshell).

1. *Wherever we find the Implied meaning unimportant and merely an ancillary to the Expressed, we should clearly conclude that such instances contain only figures like the Condensed Metaphor.*
2. *In places where we have just a glimmer of the Implied or where the Implied is just a handmaid to the Expressed, or where its primary importance is not clearly discernible, there is no **Suggestive Poetry**.*

3. *Only those instances wherein we find both the word and the meaning solely directed towards the Implied meaning should be regarded as real instances of Suggestive Poetry admitting of no confusion whatever.*

It is thus established that Suggestion cannot be subsumed under other heads.

Another reason why it cannot be so subsumed is the statement that 'it is only the full-limbed species of poetry which gets the disignation of *Dhvani* or Suggestive Poetry! It will be explicated hereafter that the limbs (of poetry) are figures, qualities and varieties of Diction. Looking upon each separate part (of a united whole) as the whole itself is quite unheard of. When considered collectively, it will be but a part of the whole and never identical with the whole. Even if identity were possible in some instances, Suggestive Poetry cannot be looked npon as conditioned by its limbs mentioned, since its sphere is very extensive.

The expression, "is designated by the learned" brings out the fact that this designation was first devised by the learned[23] and that it has not gained currency in a haphazard fashion. The foremost among the learned are grammarians because grammar lies at the root of all studies. They indeed refer to articulate letters by the term *Dhvani* or Suggester. In the same way, since the element of suggestion was common (to both), not only the word and its meaning but its essential verbal power and also that which is usually referred to by the term poetry, was given the same designation, viz., *Dhvani* by other learned men whose insight into the fundamental truth about Poetry was profound and who were followers of the principles laid down by grammarians. A treatment, then, of such a comprehensive concept as Suggestion, with all its divisions and subdivisions yet to be explained in the sequel, is not at all on a par with the enumeration of well-known, specific figures of speech and hence the enthusiasm of persons imbued in their minds with the value of Suggestion is quite proper. None need

get busy in his jealousy to show somehow that they were all men of deranged minds.[24]

The advocates of the view that Suggestion is non-existent have been thus refuted. Suggestion does exist.

Broadly considered, it will be two-fold: (1) With unmeant Expressed sense and (2) With meant but further extending Expressed sense. The following is an example of the first kind:

Persons three will reap the earth
That yields flowers of gold—
He who is bold,
He who is learned
And he who knows how to serve.[25]

The following illustrates the second:

On which mountain and for how long
Did this one perform penance?
And what might be the name of that penance too?
For, the young parrot is able to peck
At the fruit so red as your lips.[26]

The counter view that Indication itself is Suggestion is answered in what follows:

14 (*a*)

Suggestion does not bear identity with Indication because there is difference in nature between the two.

Suggestion which has been explained above does not bear identity with Indication since the two have different natures. Suggestion is the unidirectional communication of a sense other than the Expressed sense by both the Expressed sense and the Expression while at the same time the sense Implied will be exclusively important. But Indication is merely metaphorical application.

One might perhaps urge—"Indication may not be identical with Suggestion; but it can at least be regarded as a definition of the latter". This view is countered below:

14 (*b*)

Nor is this defined by that as both the fallacies of Too Wide and Too Narrow would result (if one were to hold such a view).

Nor is Suggestion defined by Indication. 'Why'? 'Because of the fallacy of Too Wide and also of the fallacy of Too Narrow'. The fallacy of Too Wide is there inasmuch as Indication can exist even in such instances as are devoid of Suggestion. Even in instances where no excessive charm due to Suggestion is present, poets are seen to employ words with metaphorical applications in pursuance of established usage as in the following example:

This bed of lotus leaves bespeaks
The torment of the damsel that slept thereon.
Faded at its two ends with the pressure
Of her buxom breasts and burly hips.
The part that spanned her slender waist
Remains green without such pressure.
And here it is in disorder
By the movements of her tense creeper-like arms.[27]

To take another example:

The beloved one is kissed for the hundredth time,
Is embraced for the thousandth time,
And with but a brief pause, is bedded all again;
Yet there is no repetition for lovers.

Here is another example:

Angry or pleased, in tears or in smiles,
In whatever state they are caught,
Wanton women steal one's heart.

This is also an example:

Though it was but a mild blow
Which the husband gave
On the bosom of his youngest wife,
It became a smarting blow as it were
On the hearts of his other wives.

The following is still another example:

If that which suffers pain for others' sake
And remains sweet though broke in twain,
If that whose various deformities too
Are held to be ever pleasing,
Falls on a barren soil and fails to grow,
Is it the mistake of the sugar-cane,
And not at all of the worthless desert?[28]

In this last example, the word *suffers* is an instance of Indication. Such instances can never be regarded as instances of Suggestion. For—

15

Only that word, which conveys a charm impossible of communication by any other expression and which is pregnant with suggestive force, becomes a fit instance for the title "Suggestive".

In the illustrative examples given above, word does not become a source of suggesting any charm uncommunicable by other expressions. Moreover—

16

Words which signify by common usage meanings other than what they primarily denote, as for instance the word lāvaṇya,[29] *do not become instances of Suggestion.*

But in such words anyway, there is metaphorical application. Even if the title 'Suggestion' should be possible of application towards them, it would be on the basis of an entirely different consideration. Words of the kind mentioned will have nothing to do with it.

17

If one gives up the primary denotative power of a word and understands a sense (secondarily conveyed by it) through its indicative power, it is because of a purpose. In conveying this purpose, the word does not move falteringly at all (as it moves falteringly when indicating a meaning secondarily).

In order to justify secondary usage, one will have to posit a purpose, namely, the communication of a meaning imbued with great charm. If the word were to convey this purpose too in a secondary way only, then the very employment of the word would be fallacious. But it is not so in fact.

Therefore—

18

The fact is that Indication is grounded on the primary denotative force of words. How can it ever be a definition of Suggestion whose sole support is suggestivity?

Hence, Suggestion is one thing and Indication another.

The definition (that Suggestion is Indication) contains the fallacy of *Too Narrow* also. Indication does not cover instances of Suggestion like 'that with meant but further extending expressed sense' as also numerous other instances. Hence, Indication cannot be a definition of Suggestion.

19 (*a*)

(*At the most*), *it might serve as a pointer to one of the species of Suggestion.*

One could only fancy that Indication might serve, if at all, as a pointer to just a single species from among the numerous varieties of Suggestion pointed out in the sequel. With all this, if one were to assert dogmatically that Suggestion is indeed defined by Indication, at that rate, one might say that the act of defining individual figures is an utter waste since the primary denotation of words defines the entire group of all individual figures. What is more,

19 (*b*)

If one were to say that the definition of Suggestion has already been propounded by others, it would only substantiate our own doctrine.[31]

Even if it be true that the definition of Suggestion has already been propounded by earlier writers, it would only mean a substantiation of our own doctrine. For, our doctrine

is that Suggestion exists; and in case it has been established already, we should consider ourselves to be extremely fortunate inasmuch as our object will have been realised without any labour at all on our own part.

Even those, who declare that the nature of Suggestion is only within the experience of cultured critics and that it is inexpressible, betray only their lack of discernment. (The reason is not far to seek). We have already propounded the general definition of Suggestion; and definitions of its several varieties will be set forth in the sequel. If inspite of all these, it should be thought of as "inexpressible", then this would be true of everything in the world. If, on the other hand, they are only giving expression to the all-surpassing nature of Suggestion by means of this exaggeration, then they also might be regarded as stating the truth itself.

———

THE SECOND FLASH

Thus far, two varieties of Suggestion, viz., 'that with unmeant expressed sense' and 'that with meant but farther-extending expressed sense' have been mentioned. Now the sub-varieties of the first are set forth in what follows :—

I

'Merged in the other meaning' and 'Completely lost'—these are the two kinds of the Expressed in 'Suggestion with unmeant expressed sense'.

It is only the Suggested which is coloured by these two forms of the Expressed.

The first, viz, 'Merged in the other meaning' is instanced in the following :—

The quarters all are painted deep
With the glistening black of clouds,
And the cranes in circles fly (with excitement);
The breezes are moisture-laden
And these friends of clouds, the peacocks,
Send their joyous notes in the wind.
Let them all confront me !
I shall bear them all, as I am Rāma
Whose heart is adamant to be sure.
But how will Sītā fare !—
Alas ! Alas ! My dear queen !
Be bold, I beseech thee.[32]

The word *Rāma* in this example carries the suggestive force mentioned. The word does not merely denote an individual with that proper name but conveys the sense of a person endowed with various qualities by the force of suggestion.
An illustration is also found in my own work, *Viṣamabāṇalīlā* :—

Merits become merits indeed
When critics of culture receive them so.
Lotuses will be lotuses
Only when sunshine shelters them.

The word '*lotuses*' repeated a second time is an instance in point.

We can cite the following verse of the First Poet, Vālmīki, to illustrate the second variety, viz., 'Suggestion with completely lost expressed sense :—

All his charm to the sun hath fled
And his orb is hid in snow ;
Like a mirror by breath blinded,
The moon now does not glow.[33]

Here the word '*blinded*' contains the said suggestion. So also in the following verse.

The sky with dizzy cloud,
The woods with rain drops dripping loud,
And nights with moons not proud,
Though black in hue,
They capture you.

The words '*dizzy*' and '*not proud*' are full of Suggestion.

2

The soul of Suggestion 'with meant expressed sense' is also twofold: (1) 'of unnoticeable sequence' and (2) 'of noticeable sequence.'

The soul of Suggestion is the implied sense which is communicated prominently. A variety of it is grasped simultaneously with the expressed, since the sequence existing between the two is not noticeable. Another variety of the same comes about when the sequence is noticeable. Of these two,

3

Sentiment, emotion, the semblance of sentiment or mood and their (rise and) cessation etc., are all of 'unnoticeable sequence'. It is settled that when we have the prominent presence of this variety, we are having the very soul of Suggestion.

Categories like sentiment shine out alone with the expressed. If they should shine with prominence also we have the very soul of Suggestion.

It will be shown in what follows that the sphere of this Suggestion 'with unnoticeable sequence' is quite distinct from that of the figure of speech called *Rasavadalaṅkāra*[34] or Figurative Sentiment :—

4

Only that, wherein all the several beautifiers of the expressed sense and the expression exist with the single purpose of conveying sentiment and so forth, is to be regarded as coming under the scope of Suggestion.

The poem in which the chief category is of the nature of sentiment, emotion, their semblance or their cessation and wherein all figures, both of sound and of sense, and qualities come in only as handmaids of the chief category and remain as much distinct from what is suggested as from one another, gets the designation of Suggestive Poetry.

5

But if in a poem the chief purport of the sentence should relate to something else, and if sentiment and so forth should come in only as auxiliaries to it, it is my opinion that sentiment and so forth are figures in such a poem.

Although others[35] have explained the scope of Figurative Sentiment (in quite a different way), still it is my view that only such sentiments etc., are to be regarded figures as become auxiliaries to some other purport of the sentence which happens to be much more important. For instance, one can easily see how in hymns of praise, sentiments etc., appear as auxiliaries though they are generally regarded as instances of the figure of Sweet Flattery.[36]

The Figurative Sentiment according to our view may be either Pure or Mixed. The following is an illustration of the first kind :—

'Why this joke ?
Thou shalt not certainly part again from me,
Having returned after so long.
O ruthless one ! whence this flare for travel ?—

Thus in dreams do the wives of your enemy speak,
Clasping fast the necks of their beloved lords ;
But soon they awake
Only to find their arm-rings empty
And to so lament loud.[37]

In this example the pure sentiment of Pathos is an auxiliary (to the praise of the king) and hence it is clearly Figurative Sentiment.

The mixed variety of auxiliary sentiment is instanced in the following :—

Let the fire of Śiva's shaft burn down our sins, a shaft that conducted itself in the manner of a lover who has given offence afresh to his beloved :—Though shaken off by the wives of Tripura with tearful eye-lilies, it would cling fast to their hands ; though forcibly pushed out, it would hold on to the ends of their skirts ; though violently thrust aside by the hair (of its feather), it would fall at their feet and yet remain unnoticed because of their agitation; and though pushed back, it would hug them verily.[38]

Here, the main purport of the sentence is the extraordinary glory of Śiva. The sentiment of Love-in-separation due to jealousy is conveyed by *double entendre* and this is made auxiliary to it (i.e. praise of glory). Only such instances are proper illustrations of Figurative Sentiment. Hence it is that though the sentiments of Love-in-separation due to jealousy and of Pathos are mutually opposed, since they have been both rendered auxiliary (to the main purport), their inclusion in the same place does not become a defect. But in instances where sentiment itself happens to be the main purport, how can it ever be a figure ? It is well-known that a figure is (nothing but) an enhancer of charm. It is indeed impossible that a thing can become an enhancer of its own charm.

The following verse sums up the position :—

It is only the employment of figures, one and all, in view of the main purport of sentiment, emotion, etc., that really justifies their being regarded as sources of charm.

Therefore, none of those cases where sentiment etc., happen to be the main purport, become instances of Figurative Sentiment. On the other hand they will only form a species of Suggestion. Simile etc. are all enhancers of its charm alone. But in cases where the main purport happens to be some other meaning and when its beauty is enhanced by sentiment etc., we get proper instances of Figurative Sentiment etc.

Thus understood, the distinct spheres of Suggestion, figures like Simile and Figurative Sentiment become clearly demarcated.

If one were to assert[39] that the treatment of sentient subjects alone serves to exemplify Figurative Sentiment, it would mean that figures like Simile would either be left with very little scope or no scope at all. For even when the theme happens to be the behaviour of an insentient object, the behaviour of a sentient object also will in one way or another be superimposed upon it. Again, even when such a superimposition is present, one would have to say that it is not an instance of Figurative Sentiment in case the insentient ones alone form the main theme of description. And this would be tantamount to an assertion that the vast bulk of literature which happens to be really the golden treasury of sentiments is without any sentiment. Here is an example :

> ' *Frowning with its waves as with brows,*
> *Girdled with the line of fluttering birds,*
> *Throwing off its foam as a garment slipped in anger,*
> *Hurrying in devious ways with far too tumbling steps;*
> *Surely, here is my jealous beloved,*
> *Changed into the form of the stream.*'[40]

This is another example :

> ' *There standest thou, creeper,*
> *All slender, thy poor sad leaves are moist with rain.*
> *Thou silent, with no voice of honey–bees*
> *Upon the drooping boughs; as from thy lord*
> *The season separated, leaving off*
> *Thy habit of bloom. Why I might think I said*
> *My passionate darling sitting penitent*
> *With tear-stained face and body unadorned*
> *Thinking in silence how she spurned my love* '.[41]

Or to take a still another example :

> *How do they do, those bower-huts, O friend,*
> *On the bank of the river Jumna ?*
> *—those companions of the sports of cowherdesses*
> *And those witnesses of Rādha's amours ?*
> *Now that none will pluck them soft*
> *To turn them into beds of love,*
> *I am afraid that all those fresh-green leaves*
> *Do lose their greenness and become old.*

In these examples, though insentient objects happen to be themes of description, the attribution of sentient behaviour to them is quite obvious. Perhaps it might be argued that one may accept the presence of Figurative Sentiment in instances of this type wherein one finds attribution of sentient behaviour. At that rate figures like Simile will be left with no scope at all, or at the most with very little scope. For, there is no such insentient theme at all in which the attribution of sentient behaviour is wholly absent ; it will be found at least in the form of (a sentimental description of) the setting. Hence, only sentiments that are secondary in importance should be regarded as figures. If one finds a sentiment or emotion with absolute importance, it will serve only as the object for beautification by other figures etc., and is of the very essence of Suggestion.

Furthermore,

6

Those which inhere in this principal element are regarded as qualities. And figures are to be known as those that are associated with its parts even like ornaments such as the bracelet[42]

Those that ever inhere in the principal element (of poetry) viz. sentiment etc., are qualities like the quality of valour and so forth (in the world). On the other hand, those that

relate to its parts only viz., the expressed sense and the expression, are to be regarded as figures or ornaments like the bracelet and so on (in the world).

Moreover,

7

The Erotic, indeed, is the sweetest and the most delectable of all sentiments. The quality of sweetness is grounded securely on poetry which is full of this sentiment.

The Erotic shines indeed as a sweeter and more delectable one than every other Sentiment. 'Sweetness' is a quality which relates to word and meaning of compositions (imbued with this sentiment) and not to mere word-harmony.[43] For, sound-harmony is found alike in Floridity too (and is not a differentia of sweetness).

8

In sentiments viz., Love-in-separation and the Pathetic, Sweetness will be uppermost. It is so because the mind is moved very much in such instances.

The quality of sweetness alone is uppermost in the sentiments of Love-in-separation and the Pathetic as it causes great delectation in the minds of cultured critics.

9

Sentiments like the Furious are characterised by great exciting power in Poetry. The quality of floridity is that which inheres in sound and sense which produce this effect.

Indeed sentiments like the Furious produce excessive excitement (in the readers). Hence by Indication one might refer to the Sentiments themselves by the term 'excitement'. The sound which produces this effect is none other than a sentence adorned by lengthy compound-constructions. As for instance :-

Cañcad-bhuja-bhramita-caṇḍa-gadābhighāta-
sañcūrṇitoru-yugalasya Suyodhanasya |
Styānāvanaddha-ghana-śoṇita-śoṇa-pāṇi-
ruttaṁsayiṣyati kacāṁstava devi Bhīmaḥ[44] ||

(O Queen ! this Bhīma shall himself bind
Your scattered curls with his hands
Reddened by the profuse and coagulated puddles
Of Suyodhana's blood as he lies low
With thighs pulverised by hard blows
From this terrible mace
Swung by these redoubtable arms of mine.)

The sense which produces this effect of floridity does not stand in need of lengthy compound-constructions ;[45] it may contain simple constructions only. As for instance :—

Yo yaḥ śastraṁ bibharti svabhujagurumadaḥ pāṇḍavīnāṁ camūnām
Yo yaḥ pāñcālagotre śiśuradhikavayā garbhaśayyāṁ gato vā |
Yo yas tatkarmasākṣī carati mayi raṇe yaśca yaśca pratīpaḥ
Krodhāndhas tasya tasya svayam api jagatām antakasyāntako'ham[46] ||

(Whosoever with over-weening pride of his strong arms,
Bears weapons in Pāṇḍavas' battalions,
Whosoever is sprung from Pāñcāla clan —
Whether child, grown-up or embryo,
Whosoever has been a silent witness of that ghastly deed,
And whosoever will cross my way as I move in the battle-field,
I, in my blinding rage, shall prove a Destroyer
Of each one of them and of even Death himself !)

Thus sound and sense can both become imbued with floridity.

10

That quality in Poetry by which Poetry throws itself open to the entry of all sentiments, may be taken as perspicuity. Its applicability is universal.

Perspicuity is just the lucidity in sound as well as sense. It is a quality common to all sentiments and all kinds of composition. Hence this quality should be understood as primarily relating to the suggested sense only.

11

Defects like 'Indecent Sound'[47] *which have been shown to be impermanent (by the ancient writers) have been in fact illustrated as blemishes only with reference to the erotic sentiment when its soul is Suggestion.*

Impermanent defects like 'Indecent Sound' which have been mentioned by earlier writers do not become defects at all, when they are found in instances of expressed sense only, or even in instances of suggested erotic sentiment, if the suggested sentiment is also not of the utmost importance therein, or in instances of sentiments other than the erotic. That the defects are to be avoided as such only when it happens to be principally suggested, becomes clear by the illustrations given (by the ancient writers themselves).[48] If this were not so, they would not at all be impermanent defects.

So far we have explained in general terms the nature of Suggestion 'with unnoticeable sequence'.

12

The sub-divisions of its parts and its own sub-divisions become endless indeed if one were to take into account their mutual permutations also.

It has been pointed out that the soul of Suggestion with 'meant but further extending expressed sense' is such sentiment etc. as is principally suggested. The external parts of this suggestion are the figures which relate to sound and sense. Now if the endless subdivisions of these figures and the divisions of its intrinsic soul, viz., sentiment, abiding emotion, the semblance and cessation of these—which once again become endless by contact with different stimuli of setting, responses, and passing moods—and all the mutual relationships possible between each other amongst them be added up and reckoned, it would be clear that the entire varieties of even a single sentiment will baffle all counting, not to mention the impossibility of counting all varieties of all the sentiments. We may thus take the instance of the erotic sentiment which happens to be principally suggested in a sentence. First of all, it falls under a two-fold division;—1. Love-in-union and 2. Love-in-separation.

Love-in-union can be further divided into i. Exchange of love-glances. ii. Dalliance. iii. Honeymoon and so forth. So also Love-in-separation embraces such classes as i. Desire. ii. Jealousy. iii. Separation. iv. Journey and so forth. Every one of these classes will get different associations of stimuli of setting, emotional responses, passing moods and so on. These sub-classes too become still more different by differences of circumstances such as place and time. Thus it will be impossible to count exhaustively all the varieties and sub-varieties of a single sentiment itself. What need we say then of counting exhaustively all varieties of Suggestion when we take into account the different varieties of its external parts also? And if we should set about considering the permutations and combinations of each of the varieties of the external parts with each of the varieties of intrinsic sentiments too, there can be no doubt at all that their number will be limitless.

13

Hence their direction only will be pointed at here. But it should be enough to educate the cultured critics. Their minds will have received the light which would enable them to guess aright everywhere.

Cultured critics can indeed be educated even by a mere indication of the direction. If their mind has been illumined in such a way that it can correctly discriminate between what is extrinsic and what is intrinsic when they are to employ figures to beautify a single sentiment even, the mind will certainly be able to judge properly in every other instance too.

The point is this:—

14

In none of the varieties of the principal erotic sentiment does Alliteration become a source of Suggestion; for it involves great effort at achieving similarity.[49]

In none of the varieties mentioned above of the principal erotic sentiment does Alliteration become a partaker of suggestion, because it will proceed with the exclusive purpose of achieving similarity (in sound). The employment of the adjective

'principal' in the text serves to point out that when the erotic sentiment is only secondary in importance, the use of such alliterations abounding in similarity of sounds is left to the option of the writer.

15

Even if the poet should be an expert in the use of figures like Rhyme, his employment of them in the erotic sentiment which is the soul of Suggestion, and particularly in that of Love-in-separtion, would amount only to a lapse on his part.

In instances where we find the erotic sentiment as the soul of Suggestion, i.e. as that which is principally suggested by both sound and sense, it would be a lapse indeed on the part of a poet if he were to employ various kinds of rhymes and difficult verbal puns involving the splitting of words in different ways, however skilful he might be in devising these. The following is the point made out by the expression—"would indicate only a lapse on his part":— Though rhymes etc., can be used once or twice in an accidental way, they should not be pressed into the service of sentiments quite in the same profusion as one might turn the other Figures of Speech to such use. The expression, "particularly in that of Love-in-separation," explains the excessive tenderness of that sentiment and when it is to be delineated, Rhymes etc., should never be employed as a rule.

The reason for this is given below :—

16

Only that is admitted as a figure of Suggestive Poetry whose employment is rendered possible just by the emotional suffusion of the poet and which does not require any other extra effort on his part.[50]

Though in the result it might appear very amazing, that figure, whose employment is due only to the emotional suffusion of the poet, is regarded as a figure of Suggestive Poetry 'with unnoticeable sequence'. The idea is that it alone serves as the best vehicle of sentiment.

For example :—

The painting on the cheeks are faded
By the pressure from the palm of your hand ;
This juice of your lips, so sweet as nectar,
Is quaffed by your sighs ;
The tear that clasps the neck so often
Has made the edge of your bosom throb.
O Hard-hearted one !
Anger has your Lover become ;
But certainly not I ![51]

The figure which can be a promoter of sentiment usually bodies itself forth in all its completeness without any extra effort on the part of the poet. Hence if one were to find that the figure indicates an extra effort of the poet in its employment, rather than his concentration in the sole delineation of sentiment though this latter alone is his avowed object, one can conclude that it cannot serve as a promoter of sentiment. In the pertinacious and deliberate employment of Rhyme on a poet's part, one can see invariably his extra effort in the choice of select words.[52] If one were to state that this fact is equally applicable to other figures too, it would be wrong. The other figures will come (spontaneously) swarming at the beck and call of a poet concentrated upon sentiment and gifted with (a rich) imagination and will compete with one another for their first preference at his hands, though outwardly they might appear to involve great labour on his part. We may cite as instances the description in *Kādambarī* of the moment of Kādambarī's sight (by the hero) and the description of the vexed Sītā at the sight of the severed head of Māyā-Rāma in the poem *Setubandha*.[53] Indeed it is quite natural this should be so. For, sentiments have to be conveyed only by way of particular expressed senses. And figures like Metaphor are just the kind of expressed senses that serve to convey sentiments by means of their own expressive words. Hence they are never extraneous to the delineation of sentiment. But a *tour de force* such as rhyme can never be anything but an extraneous element to it. Even in stray instances of rhyme which show a touch of

sentiment, the sentiment should be regarded only as subsidiary and it is the rhyme alone which is primary in importance. But so far as suggested sentiment is concerned, these can never become its vehicles since they invariably acquire greatest prominence for themselves by reason of the extra effort necessitated in their employment.

This idea is summed up in the following verses :—

1. *Most emotional themes are adorned with figures also by a single effort of the master-poet.*

2. *However proficient a poet might be in the employment of figures, extra effort on his part will be called forth in devising Rhyme, etc. Hence they cannot serve as vehicles of sentiment.*

3. *This does not, however, prevent Rhyme etc., from being made vehicles of semblance of sentiment. But in the Erotic Sentiment, which is the veritable soul of Suggestion, they cannot be regarded as accessaries.*

The group of figures that enters into the suggestion of the Erotic Sentiment, the very soul of highest poetry, will be set forth below :—

17

The galaxy of figures like Metaphor becomes truly significant (i.e. will be real ornaments) when they are employed in instances of the Erotic Sentiment which is the soul of Suggestion, with great discrimination.

An *alaṅkāra* (lit. 'ornament') or figure is regarded as a beautifier of the principal element (in poetry, in the same way as an external ornament is regarded as a cause of beauty in one's whole personality. The principal element of poetry is Suggestion 'with unnoticeable sequence' and all the figures of speech defined by the ancients such as Metaphor and even the figures yet to be defined, since the number of figures is legion—will serve as promoters of its beauty if they are employed with proper discrimination.

The following is the nature of discrimination to be exercised by the poet in the employment of figures :—

18 & 19

The sole consideration that it is only a means to the delineation of sentiment and that is never an end in itself, the necessity of employing it at the right time and of abandoning it at the right time ; the absence of over-enthusiasm on the poet's part in pressing it too far, and finally, his keen watchfulness in making sure that it remains a secondary element only—these are the various means by which figures like Metaphor become accessaries (of suggested sentiment).

Here, is an example for the utilisation of a figure of speech as an accessary to sentiment by a poet who is bent upon delineating sentiments only :—

' Her moving-corner'd eye
Trembling as in pain, thou touchest oft and oft ;
Like secret-whisperer,
Tenderly thou hummest, flitting by her ear ;
She waving both her hands,
Thou dost drink her lip, be-all of pleasure soft ;
We, searching for the truth,
Are undone, O drone ! thou, yea, art lucky here ![55]

The realistic description of the bee's behaviour in the above verse is in keeping with the sentiment. "Consideration that it is never an end in itself" implies that though a figure may be utilised as an accessary of sentiment in an instance, it should not at the same time be also intended as pre-eminent.

For example,

He is indeed the Lord
Who, by his brisk order to his discus to smite,
Made the amorous sport of Rāhu's wives,
Devoid of its wild frolic of embraces,
And left with only kisses forsooth.

Here, Periphrasis is indeed intended as pre-eminent[56] though there is the idea that it should serve as an accessary of the sentiment.

The following is an instance of a figure which is not only unintended as primary but also utilized in regard to propriety of circumstance :—

'To-day I shall make the Queen's face purple with anger
Gazing upon this garden-creeper as upon a mistress
That in a moment has displayed buds profuse (powerful longing),
Has a complexion pale with opening buds (has commenced to yawn),
And manifests the disturbance (anguish) felt
By the ceaseless puffs of wind (by constant heavings of sighs)[57].

In this instance the *double entendre* is most appropriate.

The following is an instance of abandoning half-way even a figure of speech which has been already taken up for treatment, in favour of other figures which are more helpful in revealing sentiment :

Red thou art by fresh tendrils ;
And so (i.e. fascinated) am I by thy sweet virtues.
Bees do swarm towards you ;
So do they (i.e. arrows) come towards me,
Shot by the bow of the God of Love.
A blow from the darling's sole will delight you ;
And so does it delight me too.
Thus O sorrowless Tree, one in all respects are we ;
Only I am made sorrowful by the Creator.[58]

The *double entendre* in the initial part of the above verse has been given up half-way in order to make room for another figure, viz. Poetic Contrast. As such, it intensifies the sentiment in question. The two figures do not merge into each other in this instance. Then how exactly are the two related ? If one were to say that they are related like the Man-Lion (an avatār of Viṣṇu) inducing the impression of a new figure altogether though consisting of two clearly different parts, viz., that of *double entendre* and Poetic Contrast, it would be wrong. For, the nature of Merging of Figures has been defined differently. If we find one and the same word giving rise to both *double entendre* and Poetic Contrast, we may regard it as an 'instance of Merging of Figures. For example :

' sa harir nāmnā devaḥ, saharir varaturaganivahena '

That Viṣṇu is Hari only by name ;
But the King is similar to Hari
And also a possessor of the best steeds
Thus deserving the title Sahari
Better than the real Hari.

But in the instance at issue the words that contain *double entendre* and Poetic Contrast respectively are quite different ones. If even in instances like this, only a different figure (i.e. Merging of Figures) is supposed to exist, then it would mean robbing Collocation of Figures of all its scope. It is indeed a pointless argument that this cannot be an instance of Collocation of Figures inasmuch as the existence of Poetic Contrast is achieved only through the agency of *double entendre*. For Poetic Contrast is often instanced in other ways also ; *e.g.* :—

May the light of the lamp of all lands,
With its wick so unique, bring us delight ;
It is not put out even by the force of terrible gales
That blow at the time of the deluge
And rend even mighty mountains in twain ;
It spreads an intense and brilliant light
Even by day itself all round ;
It is never sullied by the slightest trace of dark soot ;
Though it is brought forth by the fire-fly (also, the sun)
It never gets dim by the rise of the sun.[59]

In this example, Poetic Contrast is used without any reference to the points of similarity between the things described.

Nor would it be right to think that in the earlier example, *double entendre* is not intended as individually important, that it is intended only as an accessary to Poetic Contrast and that we do not have any feeling of beauty due exclusively to *double entendre*. For Poetic Contrast can be rendered beautiful even by a good description of mere similarity (i.e. even without the assistance of *double entendre*) as in the following example :—

Similar are my moans to your rumbles,
And my tears to your ceaseless showers ;

The flames of sorrow within me due to her separation
Are like the flashes of your lightning withal.
My darling's face is there within me
And within you the moon is found.
Thus alike we are in all respects
And tell me, my friend! O cloud!
Why are you so intent upon burning me down?[60]

The following is an example which illustrates how a poet bent upon the sole object of delineating sentiments will desist from carrying a figure too far :—

He is indeed a lucky lover who is bound fast
By the noose of his beloved's creeper-like arms.
So soft and tense in her mounting anger,
Is then to the bed-chamber led in the evening
Even as the confidantes are looking on,
Is warned not to do it again with an allusion
To his love-offence in a faltering and sweet tone,
And is beaten by the weeping beloved
As he tries to hide his fault smilingly.[61]

The metaphor (of binding the lover) in this verse which has been allowed to be implied only (in the latter lines) and not carried into every detail contributes to the full delineation of sentiment.

The following example illustrates how the poet looks to it carefully that the accessary nature of the figure is not disturbed even when he intends to utilise the figure in detail so as to heighten the sentiment :—

'*In the Priyaṅgu do I trace thy limbs,*
In eyes of startled antelope thy glance ;
The moon recalls thy radiant countenance,
The peacock's tails thy shining tresses ;
While tiny ripples in the streamlets view
To imitate the archings of thy brows,
Yet alas, o jealous one, in none of these
Is there the whole likeness of thee![62]

A figure of speech thus utilized by a poet will succeed in revealing sentiments. In case the conditions laid down be transgressed, it invariably becomes a destroyer of sentiment. Even this is seen amply illustrated in the works of great poets. But it has not been shown in detail here since a proclamation of the defects of great men who have the bright light of a thousand good sayings about them would amount to a censure of the critic himself. But it deserves to be reiterated that the poet will have best fulfilled his purpose only when he exercises concentration in infusing his work with the soul of Suggestion 'with unnoticeable sequence' described above, follows faithfully the mentioned ways in which the galaxy of figures like Metaphor can be harmonised with delineation of Sentiment and imagines for himself the other details left uusaid herein.

20

The other element of this Suggestion manifests itself in the same way as resonance and temporal sequence of the two meanings will be noticeable. It is also two-fold :—' that which is based on the power of word,' and ' that which is based on the power of sense.'

This suggestion 'with meant but further extending Expressed sense' contains an element which is similar to resonance in so far as it is suggested in such a way that one can notice temporal sequence (between the Expressed and Suggested senses). It is further subdivided into 'that which is based on the power of word,' and 'that which is based on the power of sense'.

One might raise an objection at this juncture to this effect : 'If one were to consider every place where a new sense is conveyed by the power of word as a variety of Suggestion, then the figure *double entendre* would be completely robbed of its scope!' The following text points out that it is not so robbed :—

21

Only that instance wherein is present a figure that is not expressed directly by any word but conveyed solely by the suggestive power of the word itself, should be regarded as Suggestion based on the power of word.

For, only a Figure which is conveyed by the power of the word is intended by us to form an instance of Suggestion based on the power of word and not that all ideas so conveyed are instances of this suggestion. If two ideas are manifest (simultaneously) as a result of the power of word, we have only an instance of *double entendre*. For example :—

MEANING THAT RELATES TO HARA

He by whom the God of Love was destroyed,
By whom the very body of Bali's enemy (i.e. Hari) was turned into a shaft,
Whose necklaces and bracelets are serpents forsooth,
Who bore the Celestial River on his head
And whose holy title, ' the moon-crested Hara ',
Is praised by all the gods,
May that slayer of Andhaka
And the spouse of Pārvatī preserve thee !

MEANING THAT RELATES TO HARI

He, the Unborn, by whom the Demon of the Cart was destroyed,
Whose body that triumphed over Bali was into a feminine form changed,
Who slew the proud serpent Kalinga,
Who held aloft the mountain as well as the earth,
Whose holy name, ' the beheader of Dragon's Head '
Is glorified by all the gods,
And who was himself the cause
Of the destruction of Yādavas—
May that all-giver Mādhava preserve thee !

In fact, Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa has pointed[3] out that the name *double entendre* can apply to such instances too wherein we get the idea of another figure through the particular figure present there. In view of this, one might again doubt whether Suggestion based upon the power of word can be left with any independent scope at all. It is in order to remove such a doubt that the word ' suggestive ' has been used in the text. Hence this is the idea : All instances wherein, through the power of sound, only an Expressed figure is conveyed by another Expressed figure, should be brought under the province of *double entendre*. But such instances where a new figure is conveyed by the suggestive power of word only, a figure which appears thus to be quite different from an Expressed one, will come under the scope of Suggestion based upon the power of word. The following is an example of an Expressed figure conveyed directly (i.e. not suggestively) by the power of word :-

Her bosoms without a garland though
Garlanded (also, ravishing) by nature were ;
Whom would they not amaze !

The mood of ' surprise ' described here happens to be a passing mood related to the Erotic sentiment. Alongside of it we also find the figure of Paradox. Hence this should be regarded only as an instance of *double entendre* which assists in conveying a shade of Paradox ; and not as an instance of Suggestion based on the power of word. All the same, the Erotic sentiment conveyed here by the use of the Expressed figures *double entendre* or *Paradox* can of course be regarded as an instance of Suggestion with unnoticeable sequence. Here is another example taken from one of my own works :—

The entire body of Rukmiṇī is praiseworthy
While Hari's hand alone is handsome (also, he holds the discus called ' The Handsome' in his hand);
She has triumphed over the three worlds
By the graces of all her limbs,
While Hari has measured out the worlds
By the grace of his lotus-foot alone ;
Her whole face is of the form of the moon—
Thus indeed did Hari find
That far superior to his own person she was ;
May that Rukmiṇī protect us.

The *double entendre* which assists in the communication of Paradox happens only to be expressed in this verse. Here is another instance :—

Reeling, jadedness, and laziness ;
Sinking, swoon and stupor ;
Slenderness of body and death itself—
All these are perforce brought upon wives-in-separation
By the poison (also, water) of cloud-like snakes
(also, of snake-like clouds).[64]

To give a still another example :—

Laden with the scent of golden lotuses,
Squeezed by them in the Mānasa lake (also, laden with the glory of smashing
out the fond dreams of his enemies)
And shining with unimpaired abundance of ichor (also gifts),
The mighty elephants are just like his arm-bolts.[65]

Here also the *double entendre* which assists in the use of the Metaphor happens to be Expressed only.

Even a suggested figure will not become an instance of resonant Suggestion based on the power of word if it also gets expressed at the same time by other expressions. In such instances we will find only expressed figure like Evasive Speech.[66] The following is an example in point :—

O Krishna, nothing was seen by me,
Blinded as I was by the dust raised by cows (also, as I was drawn by love for the cow-herd.)
Hence I have stumbled (also, strayed away from morality) ;
And why don't you, O lord, give support to a fallen person
(also, why don't you behave like a husband towards me) ?
Are you not the only succour for the frail women
Whose minds are troubled by uneven paths (also, whose minds are troubled by the five-arrowed Cupid) ?
Thus in the cow-pen was Hari addressed
By the cowherdess with equivocal words ;
May he preserve us for long.

Instances of this kind may, by all means, be objects of Expressed *double entendre*. But places where another figure is conveyed only by the suggestive power of word deserve to be regarded only as instances of Suggestion. As for instance :—

In the meanwhile appeared (also, yawned) the Terrible Time (also, Lord Śiva) of the name 'Summer' putting an end to the two flowering months (also, bringing an end of the aeons) and with radiant laughter in the form of mansions festooned with blooming jasmines (also, with boisterous laughter like full-blown jasmines)[67]

Another instance :—

Buxom (also, louring), and adorned with a garland (also, showering a downpour),
And dark as the black aloe,
Whom would not the lady's heavy breast (also, the heavy clouds)
Make passionately desirous ?[68]

To take still another instance :—

Bringing delight to the public by sucking
And showering down water (also, milk) at proper times,
Scattering wide in every quarter in the forenoon
And receding back at the close of day,
Those veritable ships that ferry one across
The ocean of rebirth's terror and suffering,
May such rays (also, cows) of the blazing Sun
Bring us delight, holy and limitless.[69]

In all these examples, an extraneous meaning is conveyed by the power of word and in order that the two meanings might not appear as entirely disconnected, we will have to postulate the relation of the standard of comparison and the object compared as existing between the two since there is justification also for doing so. Thus the *double entendre* we see here is not grounded on words only as it is the case when it happens to be an Expressed figure only. But it is a figure suggested by the special suggestive power of the word. Thus the examples of *double entendre* and Resonance-like Suggestion are entirely different from one another.

Other figures are also possible in this Suggestion which is based upon the power of word and which is of the nature of resonance. For instance the figure of Paradox becomes a promoter of this Suggestion. An example is found in Bāṇa's description of the country of Sthāṇvīśvara ;—

Where women are outcaste-seekers (also, elephant-gaited) and yet chaste, Gaurīs (also, white in complexion) and yet enamoured of persons other than Śiva (also, riches) dark (also, beautiful) and yet red in complexion (also, possessing rubies) with mouths as clean as those of the best Brahmins (also, sparkling and clean teeth) and yet breathing out the odour of wine.[70]

It is not possible to state here definitely either that the primarily expressed figure is Paradox or that it is *double entendre* helping the idea of Paradox. The reason lies in the fact that the figure of Paradox has not been conveyed expressly by the words. But in instances where Paradox is expressly conveyed by words, if we find *double entendre* also, we will have either the Expressed figure Paradox or the Expressed figure, *double entendre*. Here is an instance from the *Harṣacarita*[71] :—

It was just like a meeting-place of opposite things. Thus for instance, it not only had the proximity of rising darkness (also, the blackness of hair), but it was the embodiment of the Sun (also, its body was luminous)………

For the Suggested Paradox, an instance can be cited from my own work :—

Bow down, you all, to that god
Who is the only refuge for all, while he is himself deathless (also, homeless),
Who is the supreme ruler (also, not the lord of intelligence as also the lord of intelligence),
Who is Hari (also, green) as well as Kṛṣṇa (i.e. dark and also remover of sins),
Who is four-fold in form (also, who is a clever person) and also inactive,
And who is the destroyer of enemies (also, breaker of wheels)
While he holds a wheel in his hand.

In this example, of course, Paradox based upon the suggestive power of words and of the nature of resonance is most transparent.

We find in the same way poetic contrast too conveyed suggestively as for instance in the following verse of mine :—

May both those feet (also, rays) of the Sun to our welfare conduce;
Both they that dispel darkness (also, sin)
And they that profusely illumine the sky (also, the different senses);
They that partake of (or enhance) the beauty of lotuses,
Also they that overthrow (or throw away) the lustre of lotuses;
They that shine on the heads of earth-supporting mountains (or kings);
Also they that rest on the heads of heavenly gods (or the tips of chowries).

Similarly, there are also other varieties of this Suggestion based upon the power of word and of the nature of resonance. They should all be understood by critics of culture in their own intelligence. They have not been recorded in detail here for fear of the work's growing too voluminous.

22

The other variety of Suggestion is based upon the power of sense and it is instanced in places where the second meaning is conveyed only by way of implication by the first meaning and not by the Expressed words at all.

That instance where one meaning gives rise to another through its own power of implication and not through the denotative power of words, becomes an example of Suggestion based upon the power of meaning and similar to resonance. The following is an example :

As the divine sage said this,
The down-faced Pārvatī by her father's side
Counted the petals of the toy-lotus
She held in her hand.[72]

Here, the idea of counting lotus-petals is conveyed expressly and it (i.e. the expressed meaning) subjugates itself in communicating the second idea, namely, bashfulness, one of the passing moods, without taking the assistance of the denotative words at all. This cannot be regarded as an instance of Suggestion with unnoticeable sequence. Only those contexts where Sentiments, etc., are made known by the descriptions of the setting,

responses to stimulii of setting and the passing moods which are themselves expressed by so many words, will serve as proper instances of this Suggestion. The description of Pārvatī adorned with flowers of spring, up to the point of Cupid's discharge of his arrow in the description of spring in the *Kumārsambhava*[73] and also the description of the several responses of Śiva at a time when his mind was perturbed (in the same poem) will show us how they are all expressed by words directly. But here sentiment is made known to us in quite a different way; and that is through the passing mood suggested by the power of implication (in primary sense). Hence this should be regarded as another variety of Suggestion. But a context wherein one meaning is made to suggest another by taking the assistance of denotative power, will not be an instance of this type of Suggestion. The following is an example in point :

Knowing the mind of the paramour
Seeking the time of assignation,
The clever one closed her toy-lotus
With a smiling glance tell-tale.[74]

The fact that the closing of the lotus is suggestive has also been expressed in so many words in this example.

Moreover,

23

A context wherein even an idea suggested by the power of word and sense is again expressed directly in so many words by the poet, will instance only a figure far apart from Suggestion.

When a poet expresses again directly in so many words what has already been suggested either by the power of word or of sense or of both, we get only a figure quite different from this resonance-like Suggestion. In case it happens to be an instance of Suggestion with unnoticeable sequence, we may say that such a procedure will serve as a new figure.

The following is an instance where what is suggested by the power of word is expressed also :—

' O my daughter dear ! don't court misery (also, the poison-eater, viz., Śiva).
Give up your deep sigh (also, fast-moving Wind) coming out so much (also, the up-stretching fire).
Why do you tremble so (also, why should you bother about Varuṇa or Bṛhaspati) ?
Enough of yawns (also, Kubera) that drain away your strength (also, the enemy of Bala, viz., Indra).
You please come this way with me '—
Arranging thus for the rejection of the gods
Under the guise of allaying her fears,
The Ocean indeed did give away Lakṣmī,
Agitated at the churning, to Viṣṇu.
May he remove our sin !

The following is an instance where what is suggested by the power of sense is expressed also :—

' Here my old mother sleeps,
And here my father, the oldest of the old ;
Here it is that the house-maid stretches her body,
So tired and jaded after all her house-hold work !
Here I am, woe is me, all alone ;
Even my husband went on a journey only a few days ago '—
Thus did the young woman speak to the traveller
Under the guise of welcoming words.

The example already quoted, " *O Kṛṣṇa.*,"[75] serves as an instance where what is suggested by the power of both word and sense is expressed also.

24

The sense which suggests another sense is also two-fold :

1. Existing only in ornate expression and 2. Naturally Existing.

The sense which has been pointed out as the suggester of a second sense in Suggestion (of the form of resonance based upon the power of sense) is also of two kinds. The first is that whose existence is real only in the ornate expression either of the

poet himself or of a character created by the poet. The second exists naturally.

The following is an example of suggestive sense whose existence is real only in the ornate expression of the poet ;

The month of spring keeps ready but does not yet fling
The arrows of Cupid, with sharp heads
Of new mango buds and feathers of fresh leaves,
At young women, that targets are.

The example already given, viz., '*on which mountain etc.*'[77] will serve as an instance of suggestive sense whose existence is real only in the ornate expression of the character created by a poet ; or, here is another example :—

By your rising breasts, so fondly
Served by the handmaid, youth,
Cupid seems welcomed warmly
Through gesture of rising for courtesy.

The Naturally Existing is that sense which can possibly exist in fact in the world of reality also. It does not owe its existence only to the ornateness of expression.[78] Examples of this are had in illustrations already cited such as *As the divine sage etc.* The following may be taken as another example :—

Decking her ears with peacock's plumes,
The wife of the hunter moves in pride
In the midst of all her rivals
With their ornaments of pearls.[79]

25

Contexts, where a new figure of speech is seen to result from the mere power of sense and is suggested in the form of resonance should be deemed as instances of another variety of Suggestion.

When we find a new figure conveyed by the power of sense itself, a figure which is quite distinct from the ordinarily expressed figure, we should regard it as another variety of resonance-like Suggestion based on the power of sense. The following is said in order to remove a plausible doubt that the scope of this variety may be quite a limited one.

26

It has been shown effectively (even by the ancient writers) that the assemblage of figures like Metaphor though generally found to be expressed only, also become suggested quite often.

It has already been shown conclusively by eminent writers like Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa that figures like Metaphor which are commonly found to be expressed in many instances will also be conveyed by suggestion in quite a large number of instances. Thus in the figure of Poetic Doubt etc., they have pointed out the suggestion of other figures viz., Simile, Metaphor and Exaggeration.[80] Hence there is no need at all for laboriously explaining how one figure may be suggested by another. Still this much deserves to be recorded :—

27

Even if there should be found a suggested figure, unless there is also a singularity of aim towards it on the part of the Expressed, it cannot be considered as a way of Suggestion.

Even if in the figure expressed, there should be a resonance-like suggestion of other figures, it will not merit the title of a way of Suggestion unless the Expressed one shows also extra beauty in its principally hinting at the other ones. So it is that though Simile is hinted at in figures like Ellipsis, we don't call the suggested simile by the name of Suggestion since there is no beauty solely contributed by it. The following is an example :

To night is greatness brought by moon-beams
And to the lotus-plant by flowers ;
To creepers by bunches of flowers
And to the glory of autumn by swans,
And so it is to poetic works
At the hands of good critics.

In this and such other instances, though the figure Simile is implicit, all the beauty is centred only in the Expressed figure and not in the singularity of aim directed towards the suggested figure. Hence such instances of poetry should properly be described as containing only Expressed figures. But instances

where the Expressed is utilized as wholly directed towards the communication of the Suggested alone, may be called after the Suggested figures.

The following is an instance in point :—

Already he possesses Lakṣmī
Wherefore should he trouble me by churning ?
I fancy not he likes to sleep anon,
Since his mind is never relaxed.
Or does he build a bridge across me once again ?
What use can it serve at all
To him recognised as a sovereign Emperor,
Over all the lands far and near.
The shuddering Ocean at your very approach
Seems to harbour such conjectures.[81]

or to give another instance[82] :—

Filling all space with light of beauty
And smiling when your face doth remain,
O sweet-eyed one, since the sea doesn't swell,
I am sure it is only a mass of water (*also, inertness*).

In the above examples since the beauty of the verses is due to Metaphor which is suggested like resonance, we should properly regard them as instances of Suggested Metaphor.

Here is an instance of Suggested Simile :—

The eyes of heroes will not so delight
In their beloveds' red-anointed breasts
As in the temples of enemies' elephants,
Painted deep in red arsenic.[83]

The following is another example selected from my own work *Viṣamabāṇalīlā*[84] and the context is the conquest of Cupid over demons :—

Robbing the gems born with Lakṣmī
Had been their sole desire so far;
But now had Cupid put in its stead,
Their beloved's reddish lips.[85]

The suggested figure of Paraleipsis is illustrated in the following verse :—

He alone can possibly recount
Hayagrīva's merits in full,
Who by single pots can measure
The capacity of the mighty main.

Paraleipsis which describes the merits of Hayagrīva as indescribable and which thus brings out his extraordinary greatness is suggested in the above example by means of the expressed Exaggeration.

The suggested figure of Illustration may take the form of both resonance-like suggestion based on power of word and that based on power of sense. The following is an example of the former :—

When the fruit is left to Fate,
It cannot be helped ;
Yet this we do repeat—
The red Aśoka's tender leaves
Are not the same as other leaves.

The suggested Illustration here is conveyed by a word (viz., fruit)[86] and hence there is no contradiction involved when the sentence as a whole is taken as implying a general idea.

The following is an example of the latter :—

I conceal my anger in my heart
And show no sign of wrath upon my face ;
Yet, O clever man, as you cajole me,
I cannot be angry with thee
Though you might be an offender truly.

The general statement that it is impossible to be angry with clever men though they might have given offence, is got at by exclusive suggestiveness of the expressed ; and it illustrates the particular statement expressed herein.

In the same way the suggested Contrast also is two-fold. The first can be illustrated in the example already cited ;[87] and the following is an example of the second :—

I would rather be born as a tree,
Stunted and shorn of leaves, in the forest,
Than as a generous but poor person
In this world of men.

The expressed ideas in this example are :—censure of the life of a generous-hearted poor person and praise of the life of a bare and stunted tree. But it is arrived at by suggestion that a comparison is intended between the tree so described and the man so stated, and that the latter deserves far more pity than the former. In fact this Fancied Contrast is exclusively suggested.

The following is an example of suggested Poetic Fancy :—

The stuporous Southern Wind
Wafting the breaths of snakes entwined to sandal trees
Is causing stupor in travellers
In this season of Spring.

Since the verse describes the season of spring, the Southern Wind can cause stupor in travellers only in so far as it excites the passion of love in them. And the Wind itself is poetically fancied as stuporous because of its carrying the breaths of snakes entwining sandal trees. This fancy is not expressed clearly by words (like " as though,") but is conveyed suggestively by the power of sense of the sentence itself just like resonance. It is not possible to say that in the absence of express words like " as though " such instances have no connection at all with Poetic Fancy ;[88] for there is clear evidence for it. We find other examples too of Poetic Fancy where words expressing it are absent ; e.g.

Obtaining at last similarity to your face
Sullied by jealousy though,
This full-orbed moon has outgrown
The limits of his own body in joy.

To give another instance :

Though no bowmen pursued the frightened deer,
Fleeing past houses (in the street),
The deer did not stop its flight anywhere,
Because its lovely eyes were shot at by arrows,
The full and sidelong glances of ladies.

Convention alone is the authority for all such usages of words and senses.

The following illustrates a suggested *double entendre :*

The youths in the town enjoyed
Terraces along with women ;
For they were lovely with flags (also, fame) aloft
In seclusion (also, symmetrical in limbs) and swelling redness (also, love);
And arched their ridges (also, the three folds on the feminine belly) too.

As soon as we get the idea that the youths enjoyed the terraces of their houses with their women, we also get an idea of the *double entendre* that the terraces were like women.[89] Though the words do not directly convey the *double entendre* (since the surface-meaning of words is enough to make the sentence meaningful), it happens to be principally suggested (as reinforcing the implied Simile).

The following is an example of suggested Relative Enumeration:—

The mango tree put forth sprouts,
Came into leaf, budded and blossomed ;
Love in the heart too put forth sprouts,
Came into leaf, budded and blossomed.

Here, the resonance-like charm due to the adoption of the same order in predicating about Love and the mango tree far outshines the charm to the expressed figures—' Combination of Equals ' and ' Conjunction of things with common actions '.

In the same way readers should find out for themselves instances of other suggested figures also.[90] Having thus enunciated the way of suggested figures, the following is said in order to publish its usefulness :—

28

Those very figures which do not possess invariably even the capacity of forming the body of poetry when they appear in their expressed state, will be found to assume extraordinary beauty when they become participants of Suggestion.

Participation in Suggestion is possible in two ways: (1) through the suggesters and (2) through the suggested. In this context it should be taken that the second kind of participation is meant. Even when figures are suggested, they will come under suggestion only if the suggested element is also intended as principal. Otherwise they will be of the form of only subordinate suggested sense, as will be pointed out in the sequel. The same is true of instances also wherein though there is a suggested figure the expressed ones alone appear as principal in importance.

Figures have a two-fold course: (1) Sometimes they are suggested by the idea itself; (2) at other times they are suggested by figures. Of these,

29

When figures are suggested only by the idea itself, then they are invariably participants of Suggestion; for the very procedure of poetry is dependent upon it.

The last quarter of the text adduces a reason in support of the statement made earlier. The reason is that Poetry proceeds only by way of incorporating such suggested figures; otherwise it would be just an ordinary sentence.

30

If other figures are suggested, they will become participants of Suggestion in case the principal importance of the Suggested is discernible in respect of extraordinary charm.

The phrase, 'even by expressed figures', is to be understood in the text after 'if other figures are suggested'.

It has already been remarked that the relative importance or otherwise of the Expressed and the Suggested depends solely upon the degree of beauty brought about by the two. Figures suggested by the idea itself may also be easily illustrated with the examples already cited. Thus in fine, we may conclude that in instances where by means of either the idea (or sense) itself or a figure contained in the idea, another idea or another figure is suggested in such a way that the principal beauty is centred only in the latter, we will get resonance-like suggestion based upon the power of sense.

Having thus explained the varieties of Suggestion, the following is said in order to distinguish between Suggestion and its semblance:—

31

If in an instance the implied sense is such that it can be caught only with great difficulty or if it is only subordinate to the Expressed sense, in either case it will not be an instance of Suggestion.

The implied sense is two-fold: (1) Clear and (2) Vague. Of these two, only the first kind belongs to the way of Suggestion when it is conveyed by the power of either the word or the sense; and not the second. Even if it should be clear, if the implied sense appears as subordinate to the Expressed, it will be outside the scope of this resonance-like Suggestion. For instance:

The lotuses have not been crushed,
Nor have the swans flown away, O aunt;
Some one has thrown the cloud itself
Into our village-tank upside-down.

Here the implied idea is that the guileless woman saw a reflection of the cloud, and it is subordinate to the expressed idea. In this and such other instances where we find greater beauty in the expressed than in the suggested element and can conclude therefore that the expressed is more important than the implied, we cannot see Suggestion instanced because it happens to be subordinate only. To take an example:—

As she hears the twitter of birds,
Flying away from the shrubs of water-reeds,
The limbs of the daughter-in-law
Busy in her house-hold work
Droop (all too suddenly).

It will be pointed out in the sequel that examples like the above illustrate subordinate suggested poetry. But on the other hand, resonance-like suggestion is present in instances, where, even after determining all the implications of the expressed sense in view of the context and so forth we find that the expressed appears only as subsidiary to the suggested. For example:—

Pick the fallen flowers only,
Don't shake the plant,
O the village-chief's daughter-in-law,
For, the loud jingle of your bangles
Is heard by your father-in-law !

Here a lady dallying with a rude paramour is warned by her confidante who hears the loud sound of her bangles outside. We have to understand so much in order to grasp the expressed sense itself fully. After this is understood, when we catch the hidden hint that the confidante is trying to conceal the crudeness of the paramour at the same time, the verse once again becomes a participant in Suggestion and deserves to be classed as an instance of resonance-like suggestion.

Having thus distinguished between the real and the apparent forms of Suggestion with meant expressed sense, the author now proceeds to distinguish the real and apparent forms of Suggestion with unmeant expressed sense :—

32

The usage of a word with faltering denotation either because of the poet's want of education or because of his lack of imagination, should not be regarded by the learned as a way of Suggestion.

Usage of words with only a metaphorical application due to either inadequate education or want of imagination will not come within the scope of Suggestion.

33

The full definition of Suggestion in all its varieties includes clarity of manifestation and principal importance of the suggested element.

This has been abundantly illustrated by now.

THE THIRD FLASH

So long, the nature and varieties of Suggestion have been pointed out in detail from the standpoint of the Suggested. Now the same shall be set forth from the standpoint of the Suggester :

1

Both the varieties of Suggestion with unmeant expressed sense and resonance-like suggestion are suggested by individual words and by whole sentences.

Here are some examples for suggestive words which convey suggestion of the sub-class.—" With the expressed sense completely lost ", under the class of " unmeant Expressed " :—

1. *These seven are the faggots of wealth* [93]
2. *When you have come accoutred,*
   Who can any more neglect his wife ? [94]
3. *What will not be an ornament to figures*
   Which are by nature comely. [95]

In these examples, the words, *faggots, accoutred,* and *comely* are used with exclusive suggestive force.

An example of a suggestive word carrying Suggestion of the sub-class, ' with expressed sense merged in another ' is furnished in the following :—

Nothing worthy of your love has been done, O sweet,
By Rāma whose love for his own life is greater.

Here the expressed sense of the word *Rāma* merges itself in the suggested ideas of unique valour, etc., and hence the word carries a suggestive force.

The following is another instance : –

Thus do the folk quote the moon
As a fitting comparison to her cheeks ;
But if one were to reflect aright,
The moon is but a wretch like the moon.

The word '*moon*' used for a second time in the above instance is conveyer of Suggestion 'with expressed sense merged in another'!

An example of a suggestive sentence of this sub-class of Suggestion itself under the class of 'that with unmeant Expressed' is the following :—

When it is night for all creatures,
The saint doth keep wide awake ;
When the creatures awaken,
It will be night for the truth-perceiving sage.[96]

The sentence does not intend as its purport either the idea of night or the idea of waking state. What else is it then ? The idea intended is aliveness to the knowledge of Reality and aversion to Unreality on the part of a sage. Hence the expressed sense of the sentence is completely given up and the sentence is suggestive.

Here is an example of a suggestive sentence conveying the sub-class of Suggestion, viz., 'that with expressed sense merged in another' :—

To some, Time passes as poisonous,
To some as both poisonous and ambrosial,
And to some neither poisonous nor ambrosial.

Here the words '*poisonous*' and '*ambrosial*' are used in such a way as to merge in the sense of 'miserable' and 'happy'. Hence these words possess the suggestivity of the type mentioned.

The following illustrates the suggestivity of a word in the sub-class of resonance-like suggestion based upon word under the class of suggestion with meant expressed sense : —

Granting I was not created by Fate
To fulfil the desire of suppliants,
Why could I not have been made insentient,
Say, a limpid tank on the roadside,
Or even a well for that matter ?

The word 'insentient' is used by the despondent speaker to apply to himself; but it also applies to the tank and the well by its own verbal force.

An example of suggestive sentence coming under this very class of Suggestion is found in the sentences of Siṁhanāda in the *Harṣacarita* :—

When this joy-ending incident has befallen, you are the only person left to assume the burden of state (Just as the Primeval Serpent alone is capable of bearing the burden of the earth when the great deluge is afoot).

This sentence clearly conveys the resonance-like suggested sense by its verbal force alone.

The following quotation from *Harivijaya* (of Sarvasena) is an example of Suggestive word in the sub-class of Suggestion based upon the power of sense, viz., that which exists only in the ornate expression of the poet :—

Though unoffered, Lord Cupid caught
The face of the goddess of Spring,
Whose ears were bedecked with mango-sprouts
And perfume profoundly sweet.

In the statement, 'though unoffered, the face of the goddess of Spring was caught by Cupid', the word 'unoffered' which denotes only a circumstance, suggests, by the power of sense, the use of force on the part of Cupid.

In this variety of Suggestion itself, an example of a suggestive sentence is furnished in the illustration already cited, viz., 'The spring gets ready' etc.[97] In that example the purport of the sentence that 'the spring gets the arrows of Cupid ready but does not yet offer them to him' is existent only in the ornate expression of the poet and it suggests the passion-exciting nature of spring.

The following is an instance of word-suggestiveness of the sub-class of Suggestion viz., Self-existent, under the class of Suggestion based upon the power of sense :—

O merchant, how can we have
Elephant-tusks or tiger-skins,
So long as daughter-in-law here
Moves with curls fluttering on her face ?[98]

The word 'with her face of flowing curls' can possibly apply to the hunter's wife and at the same time it conveys by the power of sense her great fondness for dalliance and the consequent weakness of the body of her husband due to such excesses.

An example for sentence-suggestiveness in the same variety of suggestion is the illustration—'*Adorning her ear with peacock's plumes, etc.*,' already cited.[99] This sentence too illustrates the great conjugal felicity of a hunter's newly wedded wife whose ears are bedecked with peacock's plumes. Besides, since it is hinted that the husband's strength, which once was great enough to kill down mightiest elephants and bring many rare pearls to his wives who used them as ornaments, has now been reduced to such an extent by constant dalliance with her that he can only kill peacocks—the conjugal misfortune of the first wives is also suggested.

One might raise the following objection at this juncture:—'Suggestion has been defined earlier as a species of Poetry. How can such a species be suggested by a word ? A species of poetry can mean only that composition of words which enables one to understand a specific meaning. This fact will be inapplicable to it when it is held that it is suggested by a word ; for, words are only reminders of such a suggested meaning and not at all denoters.

Here is our answer to the objection:—The alleged defect would have tainted our assertion if it were true that denotation was the criterion for deciding the existence of Suggestion. But it is not true. It has already been established that suggestiveness alone is the criterion in question. In life also, we often speak of the presence or absence of beauty in the individual limbs of persons though in fact it is only the combined beauty of all the graceful and symmetrical limbs that can really be present or absent in a person's body as a whole. In the same way there is no contradiction involved in one's regarding the individual words also as suggesters of beauty which is really occasioned by the combination of different words and in referring to them by

the word *Suggestion!* These ideas are summed up in the following verses:—

(1) *Just as the reminiscence of something undesired clearly becomes a blemish in Defects like "Offensive to the Ear", so also the reminiscence of something desired should be regarded as an Excellence.*

(2) *Though words are only reminders, there is certainly charm therefrom in all the varieties of Suggestion that manifests itself through the individual words.*

(3) *Just like a damsel who appears charming by just a single ornament full of beauty, so also the work of a good poet will appear to advantage when adorned by Suggestion even in one word.*

2

Suggestion with unnoticeable sequence will flash forth in letter, word etc., sentence, composition, and finally the work as a whole.

The objection that letters cannot be suggestive because they are meaningless by themselves is answered below:—

3

The letters 'ś' and 'ṣ', letters conjunct with 'r' and 'dh', all these become deterrents of sentiment. Hence letters suggest sentiments.

4

When these very letters are employed in relation to the sentiment of Disgust and so forth, they will only intensify them. Hence also letters suggest sentiments.

The above verses show positively and negatively that letters do possess suggestiveness.

Suggestiveness of word in Suggestion with unnoticeable sequence is illustrated below:—

There thou stood, trembling all over
With the hem of thy garment slipping down in fear
And throwing those distressed glances
In each and every direction ;
Oh! you were burnt down so soon
By the cruel fire fiercely ;
You could not be seen by him surely,
Since he was blinded by his own smoke.[100]

That the word 'those' in this example is suggestive of sentiment can be clearly discerned by cultured critics.

Suggestiveness of a part of a word is instanced in the following :—

With her shy face bent down in the presence of elders,
Suppressing within her great sorrow
Which made her bosoms heave,
Did she not almost tell me—" remain ! ",
When through her tears she fixed on me
Her one-third glance so lovely
As that of a frightened fawn ?

Here the part of the word 'one-third' is suggestive. A suggestive sentence in Suggestion with unnoticeable sequence is two-fold ; (1) Pure and (2) Mingled with another figure. The following quotation from *Rāmābhyudaya* is an example of the first :—

He, whom you followed even into the forest
With feigned anger, tears and piteous looks;
Though stopped lovingly by mother so much,
That very beloved of yours, O sweet,
Lives indeed with a heart of adamant,
Even when he is parted from you
And even though he sees the quarters
Darkened by the new rain-clouds.

This sentence as a whole exquisitely conveys fullness of sentiment showing as it does the height of mutual love (in the hero and the heroine).

The following is an example of the second variety :—

Buoyed up by the flooded river of new love,
But obstructed by the mighty dams (or elders like dams),
Though the lovers have to stay still,
With their desires unfulfilled,
Like so many figures with painted limbs,
Yet they remain facing one another
And drink the nectar of love
Through pipes of eye-lotuses. [101]

The sentiment is beautifully suggested here by the suggestive figure, Metaphor.

It has been mentioned that Suggestion with unnoticeable sequence can relate to 'composition' also. The nature of 'composition' itself is explained below :—

5

'Composition' is said to be of three kinds: (1) *without compounds* (2) *with medium-sized compounds and* (3) *with long compounds.*

'By others' is to be understood in the verse-text. It is only quoted here and will be commented upon in what follows :—

6

Composition is grounded in qualities like Sweetness and suggests sentiments. The propriety of the speaker and the spoken is the consideration which governs it.

'Composition is grounded in qualities and suggests sentiments'. Here a doubt may arise (*a*) whether there is identity between qualities and composition or (*b*) whether there is difference. In case there were difference between them, once again there would be scope for these two alternatives: (*c*) qualities may be the substratum of composition or (*d*) composition may itself be the substratum of qualities. Of these, in the alternatives of (*a*) and (*d*) the text would mean that composition is grounded in qualities which are either identical with itself or the nature of its attributes and that it suggests sentiments. But in the other alternatives of (*b*) and (*c*) 'grounded in qualities' will mean 'depending upon qualities,' and not 'identical with qualities'.

If one were to ask—'what is the use of such alternative explanations ?', here is our reply :—

In the views (*a*) and (*d*), qualities too will come to be as variable as composition itself (though in fact they are constant). Among qualities, Sweetness and Perspicuity are constantly present in abundance only when the Erotic sentiment of love-in-separation is delineated. Similarly, Floridity relates to sentiments of the Furious and the Wonderful. Once again,

Sweetness and Floridity are found only in instances expressive of sentiment, emotion, mood or their semblance. But there is no such conformity to any rule regarding the varieties of composition. Thus we find a composition with long compounds even in the Erotic sentiment and one without compounds even in the Furious sentiment.

The following is an example of composition with long compounds in the Erotic sentiment :— *Mandāra-kusuma-reṇu-piñjaritālakā.*

The woman with her curls discoloured by the pollen of mandāra flowers.

Or to give another example :—

Anavarata-nayana-jala-lava-
Nipatana-parimuṣita-patralekhāntam |
Kara-tala-niṣaṇṇam abale
Vadana midaṁ kaṁ na tāpayati ||

Whom does not your face torment,
With all its drawings on the cheek wiped out
By the fall of incessant tears from the eyes,
And resting in the palm of your hand ?

For an illustration of the Furious sentiment in which there is composition without compounds, we may mention the instance already cited—'Whoever bears arms, etc.'[102] Hence qualities are not identical with composition in their form. Nor are they attributes of composition.

One might urge as follows :— 'If composition is not a substratum of qualities, then what other substratum can be imagined for these?' Our reply is that we have already explained their substratum.[103]

One might even accept that qualities are verbal. But even so they will not become similar to verbal figures like Alliteration. For, even the ancient writers have declared that Alliteration etc., are purely verbal characteristics having nothing to do with sense. But qualities can become characterists of only such works whose primary meanings have the capacity of unique

suggestiveness. Just as we regard qualities like valour as characteristics of the body, though in fact they are only characteristics of the soul, so also one might speak of qualities as characteristics of word though they really relate to other things (viz., sentiments).

The objector might argue further as follows :—'If qualities are verbal, it practically amounts to this that they are either identical with composition or its attributes. For, words which are not 'composed' can never become substrata of qualities which are attributes of sentiments, etc., and are suggested only by specific factors mentioned above. They can never become substrata, because they are not at all capable of denoting qualities.

The argument is fallacious. As it has been explained earlier, sentiments etc., can be conveyed by letters as well as individual words.

That apart, even in instances of sentiment etc., suggested by a sentence, we do not have any constant composition which serves as the substratum of qualities. Hence such words only as do not have any constant composition but as are enlivened by a touch of specific suggested elements, deserve to be regarded as substrata of qualities.

The objector might continue his argument like this :—'If you say this about the quality of Sweetness, you might say so by all means. But how can Floridity be said to have a substratum in words whose composition is inconstant ? Will the quality of Floridity ever rise from words without the composition of long compounds ?'

Our reply is this :—'If your mind is possessed by the spirit of blind faith in convention, we cannot say anything. Otherwise, we will ask you why it should not be so. Why should not the composition without long compounds be a substratum of Floridity ? We have already explained that Floridity is nothing but the brilliance in poetry which is suggestive of sentiments like the Furious, etc. What would be wrong with it if it should be found even in composition without long compounds ? Their is indeed no blemish which can be discerned by cultured critics.

Therefore, nothing is lost if we regard qualities as attributes of words which do not possess a constant composition. Just as the objects of preception for the different senses such as the eye, are clearly demarcated from one sense to another, so also the objects of different qualities (viz., sentiments) are clearly demarcated from one another and do not admit of even a single exception. Hence qualities and composition are entirely distinct from one another. This is not the same thing as saying that qualities have composition for their substratum, or even that qualities are of the natnre of composition itself.

The objector has also remarked :-- " If composition were to be inconstant in its application, qualities too would be equally inconstant in view of the several exceptions we find to this general rule ".

To this we reply in the following manner :—If in a solitary instance you find an exception so imagined by you, let such exceptions exist by all means. If the objector should ask again " How is it that in the instances pointed out by me, absence of charm escapes the observation of cultured critics ? ", we would give him the reply that any such supposed lack of charm remains concealed because of the poet's genius. Defect is of two kinds :—(1) Born of the poet's ignorance and (2) Born of the poet's lack of genius. Of these, the first will often escape notice as it will be concealed by the genius of the poet. But the defect due to ignorance attracts the critics' attention at once. The following verse sums up this very idea :—

A poet's defect resulting from ignorance will be hidden from view by his genius ; but a defect due to his want of genius will attract one's attention instantaneously.

This may be illustrated now : Even master-poets have delineated passionate Erotic sentiment in relation to divine characters and yet this impropriety does not strike one as vulgar, because the impropriety has been camouflaged by the poet's genius. The description of Goddess Pārvatī's amours in the *Kumārasambhava*[104] is an explicit instance. How there is impropriety in this and such other examples is brought out in the sequel. Whether genius has really comouflaged the defect or

not is decided on the strength of positive and negative grounds. Thus for instance, in any other poet (except Kālidāsa) such a delineation of the Erotic sentiment would certainly strike one as a clear blemish.

According to the view that qualities are identical with compositions, what absence of beauty is there in instances like *Yo Yaḥ* etc. ?[105] We submit that it is such as is incorrigible. Therefore, whether composition is different from Qualities or whether it is identical with Qualities, some other rule which governs the employment of composition will have to be given out. Hence it will be explained hereafter :

" The Speaker "[106] may be either the poet or a character created by the poet. The latter may also be further divided into one who is unaffected by sentiment and emotion or one who is affected by sentiment and emotion. Sentiment, again, may relate to the hero of the story or to his rival. The hero is of different kinds as ' the high-spirited ', etc., and also 'major' and ' minor ' and so forth.

" The Spoken " too may be subsidiary either to the suggested sentiment or to the suggested semblance of santiment ; may be meant to be put on the boards or may not be so meant, may relate to high characters or only to low characters.

In these various alternatives, there is full freedom of choice of the composition when the speaker happens to be devoid of sentiment and emotion. Even when the character created by the poet is devoid of sentiment and emotion, the above will apply. But when the poet or a character created by him happens to be ' a speaker ' suffused with sentiment and emotion, and sentiment itself is principally intended and as such of the nature of suggestion, then as a rule we will have only two kinds of composition, viz., that without compounds and that with medium-sized compounds. So far as the sentiments, viz., the Pathetic and Love-in-separation are concerned, the composition will be only that which is without compounds. If one were to ask why, we would give the following reply :—When sentiment is to be primarily delineated, all possible impediments and deterrents in its comprehension should be avoided in every way.

In these circumstances an excessive fondness for employing the said composition may impede the comprehension of sentiment since compounds lend themselves to various kinds of interpretations. This is particularly true of literature meant for the stage and even in other forms of literature when the sentiments, viz., the Pathetic and Love-in-separation happen to be delineated. Since these two sentiments are most delicate, even the slightest obscurity in word or meaning will impede their comprehension. When other sentiments like the Furious are to be delineated, there is no need for eschewing middle sized composition entirely; sometimes when the exploits of a "bravely haughty" hero are to be described, it is not essential that even the composition with long compounds should be completely forsaken. For even such compositions are in no way inferior to the expressed meanings which suggest sentiments.

To all these compositions, the quality of Perspicuity is uniformly applicable. It has been already remarked that it is common to all sentiments as well as all compositions. If Perspicuity should be abandoned, even compositions without compounds will not be able to suggest the sentiments of Pathos and Love-in-separation. On the other hand, if it is not so abandoned, even compositions of middle-sized compounds can suggest them. Hence Perspicuity deserves incorporation everywhere. So if one does not like to regard an instance like *Yo Yaḥ*, etc., as containing Floridity one should at least consider it as an instance of the quality, viz., Perspicuity and not of Sweetness. No loss of charm will result (in the example even if one should regard it like this), since the intended sentiment will be suggested anyway. Therefore whether one holds that composition is identical with qualities or that it is different from qualities it is indeed suggestive of sentiments since its scope is governed by the rule of *propriety* explained above. The same rule of propriety which we described so long as applicable to compositions suggestive of sentiment, will invariably govern the aim of qualities too; and hence even if one were to decide that composition depends on the support of qualities, it would not contradict our position.

7

Another consideration which governs the usage of a composition is its propriety in relation to the literary medium adopted. Composition thus becomes different in different forms of literature.

In addition to *propriety* of speaker and the spoken, *propriety* towards the literary medium also governs the employment of composition. Literature in Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhramśa has various forms such as '*pearls*' (*muktakas* i.e. single stanzas forming a self-complete unit), run-on verses of two, three, four or more stanzas in the same metre forming a single unit, stanzas in one or more metres describing a single topic, didactic stories in verse, full-fledged novels in verse, short stories in verse, epics containing cantos, dramatic works, historical novels in prose and romantic novels in prose. Composition becomes varied due to differences in their literary forms also. Of these, a poet who is intent on delineating sentiment in *Pearls* will be guided by the considerations of propriety relating to sentiment. This propriety has already been explained. In *Pearls* where the poet has no such intent, he is free to employ any composition that he likes.

Poets are, however, mostly seen to be intent on delineating sentiment even in *Pearls* as in full-fledged literary works. Thus the *Pearls* of Poet Amaru are famous for their profusion in the Erotic sentiment and they are regarded as good as full-fledged works in point of charm.[107] In run-on verses of two stanzas etc., bombastic construction itself becomes proper and therefore we will have compositions of medium-sized and long compounds. But if these run-on verses occur as parts of another whole poem, then the propriety towards a whole poem, indicated already, will apply to it. In works dealing with a single theme and containing verses in one or more metres, the compositions to be employed should be only those without compounds and with medium-sized compounds. Sometimes, though the composition of long compounds might occur in view of propriety of content, 'harsh' and 'pallid' dictions will have to be avoided therein. But there is no such rule so far as didactic stories in

verse are concerned. The reason is that there will just be a narration of the story and no intent upon delineating sentiment. Full-fledged stories and short stories and short stories in verse are common only in the Prakrit language and they abound in run-on verses up to more than five stanzas. Therefore, the use of composition with long compounds also will not be wrong in them. The propriety of diction should always be decided in view of the sentiments to be delineated. If an epic containing cantos should be intent upon delineating sentiments, the propriety of sentiment will govern its use of composition. Otherwise, it is left to the free choice of the poet. We can see writers of epics who have composed works in both these ways; but of the two the works that are intent upon sentiment should be regarded as superior. In dramatic works, any way, there should be a sole intent of delineating sentiment. So far as historical novels and romantic novels are concerned, they are found mostly in prose only and their method differs from that of works in metre. Since the ancients have not given any specific rules applying to these, we shall give them here in brief:—

8

The considerations of propriety detailed above will also govern all prose works which are not governed by the rules of metre.

Though prose works are not governed by rules of metre, the considerations of propriety mentioned above, viz., that of the speaker, the spoken and the literary medium, govern them. Here too, the poet is free to employ any composition he pleases when the speaker is a poet or a character invented by a poet, devoid of all sentiment and emotion. But if the speaker happens to be suffused with sentiment and emotion, the mentioned principles of propriety should be applied. And among them also propriety of the literary medium is of the highest importance. In the historical novel we find mostly compositions with medium-sized and long compounds. The reason lies in the fact that prose attains beauty through the assistance of bombastic construction. But in the romantic novel, though there is preference for bombastic construction, propriety of sentiment should be retained.

9

Composition, united to the propriety relating to the delineation of sentiments, will shine out wherever it might be found. It will, however, assume a shade of variation when united to the propriety of literary medium.

In other words composition united to the propriety in delineating sentiments will shine out everywhere—in prose-works as in metrical ones. But due to propriety of particular literary media it acquires slightly different shades, but does not transform itself entirely. For instance, even in prose works, and even if there should be a historical novel amongst them, composition with long compounds will not be beautiful when the sentiments of Love-in-separation and Pathos are being delineated. So also in dramas etc., even while portraying the Furious and the Heroic sentiments only the composition without compounds is utilised The *propriety* of literary medium is both greater and smaller in. degree than the propriety of sentiment (from different points of view). In the historical novel, we will not have composition without compounds even while depicting sentiments of Love-in-separation and Pathos. So also in dramas etc., we will not get composition with very long compounds even while depicting the Furious and such other sentiments. In this way one should understand the direction in which composition proceeds.

Thus we have enunciated for the first time such principles of literature as will illumine the minds of readers. Learned men who are given to gathering intrinsic excellences from others should never forget these.

'Suggestion with unnoticeable sequence' relating to a whole work is quite well known in such works as the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*. How it is suggested therein is explained below:—

10

Construction of only such a plot, either well-known, or self-invented, as is charming with its propriety of (the accessories of sentiment, viz.,) stimuli of setting, abiding emotions, emotional responses, and passing moods.

11

If, in a theme, adapted from a well-known source, the poet is faced with situations conflicting with the intended sentiment, his readiness to leave out such incidents and inventing in their place imaginary incidents even, with a view to delineating the intended sentiment ;

12

The construction of divisions and sub-divistons of the plot [108] *only with a view to delineating sentiments and not at all with a desire for mere conformity to rules of poetics ;*

13

Bringing about both the high tide of sentiment and its low ebb appropriately in the work ; preserving the unity of the principal sentiment from beginning to end ;

14

A discreet use of figures of speech even when the poet is capable of using them in any number ;—these are the conditions which underlie the suggestiveness of a whole work of literature in regard to sentiments, etc.

It has been already observed that a whole work of literature may also be suggestive of sentiments, etc. The conditions that underlie such suggestiveness are (enlisted here) :—

(1) The first condition is the construction of a beautiful plot, beautiful because of propriety in the use of stimuli of setting, abiding emotions, emotional responses and passing moods with a view to the sentiments and emotions primarily intended to be delineated. Of these, the propriety of stimuli of setting is well known. The propriety of abiding emotions results from the propriety relating to the nature of characters. Nature of characters can be divided into (1) High (2) Middling and (3) Low from one point of view and (1) Divine and (2) Human from another. Whatever the nature of the character delineated, the adoption of such an abiding emotion as is peculiar to the one chosen (without scope for confusion) will ensure *propriety*. Otherwise impropriety will result if one were to attribute 'divine' (i.e. superhuman) high-spiritedness to characters who are but human or to

attribute 'human' high-spiritedness to characters who are divine. Thus it is that the description of supernatural exploits like jumping across the seven seas on the part of kings etc., who are only human, will appear devoid of sentiment inspite of their intrinsic worth. The reason for this is *impropriety* and nothing else.

At this point one might raise the following objection :— Indeed legendary kings like Sātavāhana have been credited with superhuman exploits like going to the netherworld of serpents etc., (by the well-known stories about them). How can there be any impropriety in even an exaggerated description of superhuman powers etc., on the part of kings who are supreme emperors of the entire earth ?

The objection does not apply to what we have said. We do not say that any and every exaggerated description of the powers of human kings is improper. What we say is that while a new plot is being invented by the poet with a human being as the hero, divine characteristics should not be depicted in him. But if the plot happens to be one chosen from a well-known legend in which both the divine and human elements are already found interfused, the poet can, by all means, bring in these elements in to his own plot without being open to the charge of impropriety. The stories of Pāṇḍavas, etc., provide good examples. Even in stories of Sātavāhana, etc., an inclusion of just such superhuman elements as possess the authority of legends would be advisable. Description of other superhuman elements which do not possess such authority would be certainly improper. Hence the following should be deemed as the quintessence of the matter.

> There is no other cause for a break in sentiment except *impropriety*. The greatest secret about sentiment is conformity to well-known considerations of *propriety*.

This is indeed the reason why Bharata[109] has laid down the strict rule that in a drama *par excellence* only a well-known plot and a well-known noble hero should occur. If this rule is followed, a poet can never go wrong in the matter of propriety

in relation to the hero with impossible superhuman characteristics when writing a drama with a plot invented by himself.

There is scope at this point for another objection :— " We can agree to your making a distinction between 'human' and 'superhuman' propriety so far as abiding emotions like 'high-spiritedness' are concerned; but what is the use of making this distinction in propriety when abiding emotions like love are involved ? The fact is that we can describe even divine love only in terms of love familiar to us in kings of our own land, viz., Bhāratavarṣa ".

It is not so. Transgression of propriety would indeed be a grave defect even in the other emotions. Would it not be ridiculous if the love of a low character is depicted after the manner of a high character ? Even in our own land there is thus a different propriety to be observed in regard to each of the threefold nature of the characters in delineating the Erotic sentiment. If one were to say that propriety relating to divine characters is extraneous, we would say in reply that we affirm no such thing at all as a different propriety with regard to the Erotic sentiment, which is unique to divine characters. On the other hand, we would affirm that the delineation of the Erotic sentiment in divine characters also will become delightful only when it is done after the manner of the Erotic sentiment in kings and such other high characters in our own land. In dramas etc., one does not usually come across any delineation of vulgar erotic sentiment in the high characters such as kings. Along the same lines, this should be avoided in depicting the love of divine characters also. Even if one were to say that dramas are only meant to be enacted and since an enacting of physical erotic sentiment would be indecent, it is eschewed only in dramas—we would ask back why the same indecency as relates to their enacting should not also relate to their description in poetry Hence the truth is that both in dramas meant to be represented on the stage and in poems meant only to be read, any description of vulgar Erotic sentiment with reference to high characters like royal heroes and heroines would be as much impolite as a detailed account of the act of cohabitation of one's own parents.

The same is true also of its description with reference to divine characters who are of a high moral stature.

Nor is dalliance the only form of the Erotic sentiment. It includes other forms, too, like mutual love, sight, etc Why should not they be delineated with reference to high characters ? Thus we can conclude that propriety in the nature of characters is as much applicable to emotions like love as to emotions like high-spiritedness. The same is true of emotions like surprise. While it is true that in these matters even master-poets have erred and shown indiscretion, still their defect does not appear glaringly as a defect because it is covered up by their genius, as mentioned already.

Propriety relating to the depiction of emotional responses has been treated at length in the well known works of Bharata and others.

We shall content ourselves with saying only this much :— Every poet who is not only obedient to the rules laid down by Bharata, etc., but who has critically studied the literary works of master-poets and besides who follows the dictates of his own creative imagination, should direct all his efforts with great concentration towards the avoidance of *impropriety* in the matter of stimuli of setting, etc.

The statement in the text that it is the adoption of a plot endowed with propriety—whether historical or invented—which will become suggestive, indicates this :—Though in historical chronicles etc., there may be several sentimental stories, only that in which there is propriety of setting, etc., should be selected by the poet as his theme ; and not any other. He will have to show greater care in the construction of an invented plot than in that of a historical one. For, if the poet were to stumble in that due to his carelessness, it would make one conclude that the poet's want of education is very great.[110] These ideas are summed up in the following verse :—

> When constructing an invented plot, one should so arrange every individual part that the whole becomes full of sentiment,

Conformity to the rules of propriety of setting etc., is the means towards achieving it ; and it has already been explained. Moreover,

> The sentiments of works like the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* are indeed fixed as it were. The poet's liberty should not go to the extent of violating these fixed sentiments in plots based upon such works.

When such works happen to be sources of the plot, the poet's freedom of invention should not find any scope at all. Even the ancients have declared : "There should not be any transgression in the construction of a well-known story". If at all the poet's freedom should find scope, it should be such as will not go against the original sentiment.

(2) The second condition which governs the suggestive power of a whole work of literature is this : If in a plot adopted from a well-known source, the poet is faced with situations conflicting with the intended sentiment, he should be prepared to leave out such incidents inventing in their place even imaginary ones in conformity to the intended sentiment. Kālidāsa's works provide us very good illustrations (of this condition)[111] : and so does the *Harivijaya* of Sarvasena. An example may also be found in my own epic poem—*Arjunacarita*.[112] A poet writing a whole work should be entirely bound by the demands made by sentiment. If he finds, therefore, in a historical source an element which is inappropriate to the sentiment, he should not hesitate to break away from it freely and to invent a new episode in its place which will be appropriate to the sentiment. The poet achieves no purpose indeed by blind fidelity to the story in sources ; for this will have already been accomplished by the historical chronicles themselves.

(3) Another important condition which governs the suggestiveness of works is this :—The divisions of plot, viz., Introduction, Rising Action, Crisis, Denouement and Catastrophe[113] and their sub-divisions such as the 'sowing' etc., should be constructed only with a view to the delineation of

sentiment, as in *Ratnāvalī ;* and not with any desire for achieving conformity to rules (just for the sake of conformity) as in *Veṇīsaṁhāra*, where Merriment a sub-division of the division of plot, viz., Rising Action, has been included in the Second Act though it is most inappropriate to the main sentiment, only because of the keenness of the author in obeying the rules laid down by Bharata.

(4) Another condition governing the suggestiveness of works is the proper portrayal of the rise and fall of the relevant sentiment. This is also found illustrated in the *Ratnāvalī*. Similarly preservation of the unity of the principal sentiment is also important and this can be seen in *Tāpasavatsarāja*.

(5) There is also another condition which governs the suggestiveness of specific works like the drama and it is a discreet use of Figures of Speech even when the poet is capable of using them in plenty. A poet who is an adept in the employment of Figures often becomes so much engrossed in them that he will write his work in utter disregard of the delineation of sentiment. This rule has been laid down here for the edification of such a person. We commonly come across such instances of poets whose only ambition is the use of the Figures to the utter neglect of sentiments.[114] Moreover—

15

Of this suggestion, the variety which is of the form of resonance and which has been already illustrated, is found often in whole works of literature also.

In fact suggestion which is of the form of resonance and which includes two sub-classes has been illustrated under this suggestion, viz., Suggestion with 'meant but further extending Expressed sense.' Here it is added that it will be found often in whole works of literature also. The words of Pāñcajanya in *Madhumathanavijaya*[115] furnish a good illustration. So does the situation of Kāmadeva's meeting with his friends [116] in my own work *Viṣamabāṇalīlā*. The words of the Vulture and the Jackal etc., in the *Mahābhārata* [117] are also illustrations.

16

Case-terminations, conjugational terminations, number, relation, accidence, primary affixes, secondary affixes, and also compounds—all these become conveyers of Suggestion with unnoticeable sequence.

The essence of Suggestion with unnoticeable sequence, viz., Sentiment etc., is conveyed even by the speciality in case terminations and cojugational terminations, in number, relation and accidence, in primary affixes, secondary affixes and compounds. The conjunction 'also' in the verse text indicates that even prepositions and tenses might beeome suggestive. Here is an example :—

That my enemies exist is insulting enough to me,
But more so that he is an anchorite !
He too kills down the race of demons even in my own place ;
And forsooth Rāvaṇa is still alive !
Fie, fie upon Indrajit ! Or what use is there in waking up Kumbhakarṇa either ?
What avail are these arms of mine so futilely fat
By pillaging the hamlet of a heaven ? [118]

Every element in this verse is full of clear, suggestive force. In 'that my enemies there are', the case-termination, relation, and number are suggestive.[119] In 'but more so that he is an anchorite (tāpasa)'[120], we have a suggestive secondary affix as well as an indeclinable. In 'he too kills down the race of demons in my own place ; and forsooth, Rāvaṇa is still alive', we have the suggestive force of conjugational termination and accidence. In the second half of the verse we have suggestiveness of primary affix, secondary affix, compound and prepositions An all-surpassing beauty of construction will be manifest in a poem where numerous suggestive elements combine as in the instance. A rare beauty of construction will result in poetry even by the presence of a solitary suggestive word. When such is the case, what need we say about the combination of numerous suggestive elements ? The example given above illustrates this very strikingly. In the word "Rāvaṇa" therein we not only find the charm due to suggestion with the Expressed sense merged in another, but also the charm due to various elements of suggestiveness described above. Such constructions are found in abundance in the works of great writers who are gifted with extraordinary genius. The following is an instance taken from the great sage Vyāsa :—

Past are their delights
And times do present more and more terrors.
Every morrow, the days become
More evil ; Earth, alas, has lost her Youth

In this instance suggestion with unnoticeable sequence is conveyed by primary affix and number, and suggestion 'with the Expressed completely given up' in the expression "Earth, alas, has lost her youth."

These case-terminations etc. are generally pregnant with suggestion both individually and collectively in the works of master-poets. Here is an example of suggestive case-termination :—

..... made to dance by my dear wife
With her rhythmic claps, so sweet
By the sound of jingling bangles,
Our friend, the peacock, will resort wherein
To the golden perch at the close of day...... [122]

The following is an example of suggestive conjugational termination :—

Get away from here,
Don't exasperate my hapless eyes
Made as it were only to weep ;
For they would not see through thy heart
And became crazy at thy very first sight. [123]

To give another example :—

Don't stand in the way; get away, O boy !
Oh, how shameless indeed thou art !
We are not at all free as we have a duty
To guard the deserted house. [124]

A suggestive relation is illustrated in the following :—

Go elsewhere, O boy !
Why do you look at me so when I bathe ?
Indeed, you should know —
The bank is not at all the place
For those who fear their wives.

In Prakrit words which are derivatively formed from nouns by the addition of the affix '*ka*' (such as "*bhīruka*" in the above instance) are clearly suggestive of contempt.

Compounds also become suggestive when words are compounded in deference to the principles of diction. The suggestiveness of indeclinable conjunctions etc. is illustrated in the following verse :—

All too suddenly has this separation come
And that too from by beloved ; so unbearable it is !
And now that the new rain-clouds have also appeared,
I believe the beauty of days will be halved
For want of any sunshine.[125]

Here the conjunction 'too' is suggestive. In the same way the conjunction 'but' in the following example is suggestive :—

The face of my sweet-browed beloved,
With its lips covered frequently by the fingers,
Lovely with indistinct no's
And resting upon her shoulders
Was somehow raised up by me ;
But kissed it could not be.

Suggestiveness of indeclinables is quite well-known ; but we are thinking here only of suggestiveness of sentiment.

Suggestive prepositions are found in the following example :

Beneath the trees are seen wild rice
Fallen from the mouths of crevices
Wherein parrots do nestle.
Stones so oily and shining indicate
They have been used in cracking wild nuts.

With great confidence the deer wander free
And are unvexed by the din (of the chariot),
The roads to the rivers are marked by water streaks
Dripping from the tips of bark-garments.[127]

The preposition "*pra*" in the above example is suggestive.

Sometimes two or three prepositions are prefixed to a single word and if this does not savour of a blemish, it is because of suggestiveness of sentiment alone ; e.g.—

(1) '*Prabhraśyatyuttarīyatviṣi tamasi samudvīkṣya vītāvrtīn drāg jantūn......*' (when darkness was drawing to a close with its hue of an upper garment, seeing all creatures getting up...[128])

(2) "*manuṣyavṛttyā samupācarantaṁ......*' (pretending as you are, the behaviour of men...[129])

The same is true of indeclinables etc. also :—

(1) '*aho batāsi spṛhaṇīyavīryaḥ..*[130]' (Indeed your valour is enviable, I say !)

(2) *They who are revived,*
Who do not contain themselves with joy
and who dance about shedding tears of joy
With bodies thrilled at the very sight
Of a virtuous person;
They have now, alas ! been led to ruin by wicked Fate
Who favours only enemies of the good;
And woe is me ! alas !
Where can I now turn for help
For the relief of those persons ?

Repetition of words also becomes agreeable when such repetition is resorted to only in view of suggestiveness e.g.—

It is not that the good are not aware,
They are aware that the wicked one speaks
False words brimming with sweetest praise
Only because he is intent on cheating
And is selfish to a degree ;
And yet they cannot bring themselves
To betray his false affection.

Suggestiveness of tense is illustrated in the following :—

Ups and downs in the roads will all be levelled,
Journeys everywhere become slow and slower still ;
Before long, they will exceed the reach
Even of one's mind-chariots.[131]

The future tense in the verb 'will exceed' is highly suggestive of sentiment in this example. The sentiment will become clear if one understands that the purport of the verse is nothing but the portrayal of a setting that serves as a stimulus for the sentiment of Love-in-separation due to journey. Just as the termination part of a word shows suggestive force in the above example, so also the basic part of a word may become suggestive as in the following :—

That was a hut with broken walls
And this is a mansion touching heavenly heights ;
That was an aged cow,
And such herds of elephants dark like clouds
Are now moving hereabout.
How awkward was the thud of the pestle then !
But now I hear sweet music of lovely women.
What a wonder it is that the poor Brahmin
Has been raised in a few days to such a state !

Here the basic element in the word '*divasaiḥ*' (within a few days) is suggestive The suggestiveness of pronouns also can be discerned in the above example itself. It is because of the suggestive force of the demonstrative pronouns that the poet has not made use of express words like 'where' (in order to bring out the contrast). Along these lines, cultured critics should imagine for themselves the suggestiveness of other types also (unmentioned here). Though all this was implied certainly in the statement that suggestiveness is found in word, sentence and composition, yet they have been set forth in detail so that the critics might be edified in diverse ways.

At this stage, one might object as follows :—'Formerly it was declared that sentiments etc., are suggested only by the

power of sense; now, will not this statement contradict the present statement that case-terminations etc., can also be variously suggestive ? We have already given our reply to such objections while proving the suggestivity of words.[132] Moreover, even supposing that sentiments etc., can be suggested only by specific senses, a classified treatment of suggestive elements given above would still be useful, since specific senses are inseparably connected with suggestive words. The classification proposed in other works [133] regarding the charm attained by particular kinds of words in particular contexts also becomes justifiable only when we understand it to be based on the suggestiveness of words.

It might be urged that often such suggestiveness of sentiment is not found in specific words. But one will have to grant that a kind of charm is discernible even in such instances. For we will have appreciated the suggestive charm of specific words, etc., at least in other works of master-poets abounding in suggestion of sentiment ; and by constant appreciation of charm in such words found in a body, we imperceptibly fall into the habit of fancying the same charm in these words even when they are fonnd separately in other works. If it were not so, it would be impossible to explain the distinction that exists in words, in point of beauty, though they all happen to be identical in point of denotation. If one were to dismiss it by the pat statement that the divergence is perceivable only to cultured critics, we will have to put this counter-question to them :—What constitutes a cultured critic ? Is it a mere knowledge of certain conventional canons of literary criticism irrespective of sentiments and emotions ; or is it a skill in appreciation of literature imbued with sentiments, emotions, etc. ? If the first alternative be true, no beauty can be present as a rule in all instances of words advocated by these so called critics of culture ; for it is quite possible to establish another coterie of critics and advocate the absence of beauty in such instances. And according to the second alternative, the definition of a cultured critic will be nothing but aliveness to sentiments. The natural uniqueness in particular words, which

such critics find is none other than the power of infusing sentiments etc. And hence their beauty is principally based on the suggestiveness of words. From the standpoint of denotation, the only uniqueness of charm discernible in them would just be the quality of Perspicuity. If sense too should be left out of account, only Alliteration, etc., would constitute the said uniqueness.

So far, the suggestiveness of sentiments, etc., has been explained. The following verse begins an account of the circumstances that run counter to these :—

17

Whether it is the whole work or a single stanza, a good poet who is desirous of incorporating sentiments etc. in what he writes should take pains to avoid hindrances to them.

A poet who is intent upon incorporating sentiments and emotions in his works, whether they be big or small, should turn all his efforts towards avoiding hindrances. Otherwise he will not succeed in composing even a single verse full of sentiment. The following verses answer the question, 'what, then are these hindrances which deserve to be carefully avoided by the poet ?'

18

Sketching the setting etc., of an opposite sentiment, describing something the connection of which with the subject on hand is only very remote,

19

Stopping the delineation of sentiment unwarrantedly as also elaborating it when not required, over-elaborating it again and again though it has already received sufficient elaboration, and impropriety in respect of behaviour—all these hinder the course of sentiment.[134]

1. The first hindrance to sentiment is the sketching of setting, emotional responses and passing moods which belong to a sentiment not only other than but opposed to the sentiment in hand. For instance, if after portraying a person as spiritual-minded (i.e, as a constituent of the sentiment, viz., Quietude), the poet makes the same person appear in the rōle of

a romantic lover abruptly, (i.e. in the role of a constituent of the setting of the Erotic sentiment), the intended sentiment is hindered. An example of sketching the abiding emotion of an opposed sentiment is had when the hero tries to humour his wives, who are angry because of love-quarrels, by stories in praise of renunciation of worldly pleasures. Similarly an example of an opposed sentiment is seen if the hero is described as getting wild with rage and putting forth gestures of fury when his sweetheart feigning love-anger does not yield to his importunities.

2. The second hindrance to sentiment is the lengthy description of a subject whose connection with the sentiment on hand is only a very distant one. This is illustrated in an instance where the poet who has begun a description of the hero, flies off at a tangent to describe mountains, etc. at an inordinate length.

3. The third hindrance to sentiment is unwarranted for stoppage of the delineation of sentiment and elaboration of it at the wrong place. Unwarranted for stoppage of it is instanced when, after portraying the rise of mutual love in the hero and the heroine, instead of describing their endeavours at union, the poem proceeds to dwell upon their other irrelevant activities. Elaboration of it at the wrong place is had when a god-like hero as Rāma is, for no reason at all, shown as getting interested in activities of love when a terrific battle is raging at its height spelling death of the greatest heroes (as at the time of universal destruction), though there has been absolutely no previous occasion leading up to even the sentiment of love-in-separation at that time. Nor can such a procedure be justified on the ground that the character is shown there only as victim of delusion due to Destiny. For it is proper that the poet should write only with a view to delineating sentiment. The plot is only a means towards that end as observed already in *Verse Text* I. 9. and so forth.

Such mistakes are committed by poets when they become primarily interested in describing the plot for its own sake and

delineate sentiments without discriminating between principal and subsidiary ones. Hence our effort has all along been to make it clear that the poets do well to have the sole intention of infusing suggested sentiments etc., into their works and not merely to exhibit our enthusiasm in propounding a novel doctrine of Suggestion.

4. The fourth hindrance to sentiment is its over-elaboration again and again, though it has already received sufficient elaboration. A sentiment which has received full elaboration due to a description of its various constituents, and which brings enjoyment will itself look like a faded flower if it is pressed far too much again and again.

5. Impropriety in respect of behaviour is also another hindrance to sentiment. For instance if the heroine throws aside decorum and herself conveys to the hero her desire for dalliance, we get this defect. The word *Vṛtti* in the Text may mean either *Kaiśikī* (The graceful diction) etc., which are laid down by Bharata or the *Upanāgarika* (The Urban) etc , laid down by other writers on Poetics. Impropriety in respect of the one or the other will be equally a hindrance to sentiment.

Good poets must be very attentive in steering clear of these hindrances to sentiment and also of other similar hindrances which can be imagined along these lines by the poets themselves. The following verses sum up the points :—

Sentiments etc., are the most important ends for the activity of poets ; hence poets should always be very attentive towards delineating them.

A work devoid of sentiment is the most unpardonable solecism on the part of a poet. It will brand him as a poetaster with nothing but oblivion in store for him.

Time was when poets could win fame by speech unbound by any rule ; but the moderners should not take them as their models and depart from the principles laid down above.

As a matter of fact, we have shown nothing here which is

against the opinions of the most famous master-poets like Vālmīki and Vyāsa.

20

After the intended sentiment has been established on a secure footing, there will be no defect in including even hindrances provided that these come either as foils or as ancillaries.

After a full development of the intended sentiment as a result of its accessories, it would not at all be a defect to portray even the hindrances in case these serve as only foils or ancillaries of the intended sentiment. Hindrances will serve as foils only when they are positively overcome by the intended sentiments, not otherwise. Hence an account of the foils only enhances the development of the intended sentiment. If hindrances should come in as ancillaries, they will have lost their very hindering power. Hindrances can come in as ancillaries, either in a natural way or in an imagined way. In a description of natural ancillaries there is no scope at all for any hindrance. For example, there is no defect involved only in describing disease etc., while delineating the sentiment of Love-in-separation (because disease is a natural ancillary of love-in-separation) : but it would be a defect if one were to describe therein things which are not ancillaries (such as death, for instance). Even if one were to think that death also is a possible ancillary of Love-in-separation. a mention of death would be improper, since a rupture of the substratum itself invariably brings about a rupture of sentiment also. One might aver that the portrayal of death lends greater beauty to the delination of the Pathetic sentiment. But Pathos is not only irrelevant to the sentiment of Love-in-separation which is relevant here, but the relevant sentiment itself is broken up. It (portrayal of death) will not be a hindrance, only when pathos itself happens to be the principal sentiment, or we might say this much : —On very rare occasions, mention of death will not appear as a very great hindrance to the Erotic sentiment, provided there is a prospect of this separation due to death coming to a speedy end by reunion

(in another form). If a long period of time should intervene between death and such reunion, death would once again be a hindrance since the even flow of the current of love would be stopped by it abruptly in the middle itself. Hence, a poet intent upon delineating sentiments should avoid such episodes in the plot.

How hindrances too do not appear as defects when they serve as foils of the intended sentiment is illustrated in the following example :—

Where is misdeed and where the spotless race of the moon ?
Would that I see her again !
My learning should resist all evil ;
But how lovely is her face even in anger !
What will the pure and wise ones say about this ?
Ah, she is not to be had by me even in dream !
Take courage, my heart !
Which youth will be so lucky
As to drink (the honey) of her lips ?[135]

Similarly, the advice of the second young sage to Puṇḍarīka, deeply fallen in love with Mahāśvetā, [136] is another instance.

The following is an example where a hindrance does not appear so because of its being ancillary to the intended sentiment in the natural course of things :—

Reeling, jadedness and laziness etc.[137]

In the following examples we have the use of hindrance not appearing as defects, because of their being ancillary to the intended sentiment in an imagined way :—

1. *Your pallid and sunken face,*
   Your passionate heart and sluggish body
   Declare loudly, O friend,
   The disease of consumption
   Rankling within your heart.
2. *It is indeed a lucky lover; etc.* [138]

A hindrance can become subsidiary (to the intended sentiment, in another way also. Two sentiments or emotions mutually opposed may both be made ancillary to another idea which

happens to be the principal content in the sentence by force of its contextual importance. The hindrance due to opposed sentiments will cease to be a defect in that case. Verses like '*Let the fire of Śiva's shaft* etc.,' [139] illustrate this. It might be asked how there is no opposition between the two sentiments therein. The reply is that both of them are definitely decided there to be subsidiary to the main content. Once again it might be asked how the natural opposition between two opposite things disappears. We answer that such opposition will appear a defect only in positive injunctions and not in mere quotations. For example, in the following verse :—

" Hither !.........Away !
You may sit !.........no, get up !
Speak up !.........Silence ! "
Thus do the wealthy persons play
With suppliants ridden by the planet of desire.

There is a real opposition though both injunctions and prohibitions are found side by side, because they are only quotations. In the same way we can understand that there is no opposition in the verse referred to (viz., *Let the fire of Śiva's shaft* etc.). Neither the element of Love-in-separation due to jealousy nor that of Pathos is positively affirmed in this verse. Its main content is the extraordinary glory of Śiva as the destroyer of Tripuras. The two elements of sentiment just now mentioned are clearly manifest as subsidiary to this main content.

Nor is it possible to say that the procedure of direct assertion and indirect narration is not found in sentiments. The reason is that every one accepts them as contents of sentences. When purport of sentence and expressed sense can both contain the procedure of direct assertion and indirect narration, who can prevent the statements from containing these since sentiments are also suggested only by them ? Even those who do not accept that sentiments themselves can be the main content of poetry will have to concede that at least they are conveyed by the main content. Even then, there will be no opposition

in the verse in question (viz., *Let the fire of Śiva's shaft* etc.). There is no scope at all for any opposition because we get the idea mainly of the extraordinary greatness of Śiva as the directly asserted element in the verse and it is this element which is reinforced by the indirectly narrated elements of the other two sentiments (viz., Love-in-separation and Pathos). That particular effects are produced by the agency of two causes opposed to each other, yet co-operating in the production of effect, is a matter of common observation. Opposition would be there only when it is held that the same cause gives rise to two opposite effects simultaneously and not when it is said that two causes opposed to each other are contributing simultaneously towards the production of a single effect. It might be asked how such subjects involving opposite elements would have to be represented on the stage. The answer is that what applies to the representation of similar expressed subjects when they are indirectly narrated also applies to these indirect and suggested elements of suggestion. Thus the opposition in the verse has been got over by the assistance of the analogous principle of direct assertion and indirect narration.

Furthermore, while the extraordinary greatness of a hero who is at the height of his admirable powers is made the main subject of description, the pathetic sentiment in respect of his enemies does not cause any sorrow in the minds of critics; on the other hand it serves to produce great delight. Since the power of the pathetic sentiment will thus have been practically stultified, no fault would be committed if one were to delineate its opposite sentiment also (i.e. the Erotic) in the place. Therefore, only that sentiment deserves to be ranked as a hindrance to sentiment, which hinders either a sentiment or an emotion that happens to be the main content of the sentence in question and not at all the one which hinders only another ancillary sentiment or emotion.

The opposition in the verse may be got over in another way also:—Suppose the primarily intended content in the verse (viz., *Let the fire of Śiva's shaft* etc) is looked upon as an element of the sentiment of Pathos itself. In that case, the element of

Erotic sentiment will have to be considered as conveyed in an indirect manner. If we thus consider that the Erotic element is subsidiary to the Pathetic element, the Pathetic sentiment will only acquire added significance. For, the sight of naturally lovely objects reduced to a pitiable state evokes greater sorrow (than the sight of objects without such loveliness) in the onlooker due to the reminiscences called up in his mind of all their past beauty. The following provides an instance:—

This is that hand which used to draw out our girdles,
And which used to caress our bosoms;
Which used to touch lovingly
Our navels, thighs and private parts
And untie the waist-knots of our lower garments! [110]

In the same way, we can understand in the verse under consideration that the fire of Śiva's shaft conducted itself like a lover who has given offence but lately and thus considered too the seeming opposition therein will disappear. Thus from whatever standpoint we consider the verse, the opposition can be explained as unreal. On the analogy of this, all such instances as the following should be regarded as devoid of the defect of opposition:—

Stepping on grounds over-grown with hard grass
With blood gushing out of their tender toes,
Causing their feet to appear
As if they were painted with lac,
With faces washed in streams of flowing tears,
Overcome by fright, and holding the hands of their husbands,
Your enemies' wives go round and round wild-fires
As though they are going through
The ceremony of a wedding once over!

Thus far, we have pointed out the distinction where sentiments can be delineated alongside of opposed sentiments and where they should not be so delineated. We shall explain in what follows the proper order to be followed in the delineation of such sentiments in one and the same work:—

21

Though there is a convention that more than one sentiment should find a place in whole works of literature, one of them alone should be made principal by the poet who is after achieving greatness of his works.

Though in fact the convention is that in epics etc., as well as dramas etc., several sentiments should be delineated either with equal importance to each or with differing importance, the better procedure is that a poet who is intent upon endowing his work with abundant beauty, should make it a rule to give principal importance to only one intended sentiment amongst them.

It might be asked how any single sentiment can be rightly made principal when several other sentiments too have received fullness of treatment. The following Text answers the objection:–

22

The importance of an intended sentiment which is shining throughout the work abidingly cannot be marred by the inclusion of other sentiments.

When a sentiment happens to be intended as primary in a work and is kept up constant by being delineated again and again, its importance cannot be marred at all by the inclusion of other transitory sentiments since it underlies all the rest. The reason why it is so is explained in the following :—

23

Just as one plot is made to remain major in a work as a whole, so also one sentiment can be made to remain major and it will not at all be a discrepancy.

Just as one plot composed of several divisions is made to progress uniformly and pervade the work as a whole and just as it never gets mixed up with minor plots, and even if it should get mixed up, just as its importance does not suffer, so also when a single sentiment is made to remain the major one in a whole work, there is no discrepancy involved. On the contrary, such a procedure will bring abundant delight to cultured critics whose discriminative power is sharp and appreciation vast.

Perhaps one might object to this as follows :—

'The relation of principal-subsidiary may hold good at best to such sentiments which are not opposed to each other, e.g. : The Heroic and the Erotic, the Erotic and the Marvellous the Heroic and the Furious, the Furious and the Pathetic or the Erotic and the Marvellous. But how can it ever hold good to sentiments that are mutually opposed such as—the Erotic and the Disgustful, the Heroic and the Terrible, Quietude and the Furious, Quietude and the Erotic ?'

Our reply to the objection is given below :—

24

When a sentiment is delineated in a work as the principal one, no other sentiment, whether unopposed or opposed to it, should be treated elaborately. This will ensure one that no opposition between them will remain any more.

When any single sentiment like the Erotic happens to be principal in a work, no other sentiment, whether unopposed or opposed, should be treated fully at the same time. Full treatment of the other sentiments can be avoided in the following ways :—

1. Even an unopposed sentiment should not be given importance greater than that of the principal sentiment. Even if the two should get equal importance, there will be no scope for any opposition between them. e.g. :—

On one side cries the beloved
And the war-drum din on the other ;
The heart of the soldier oscillates
Between love and lust for fight.

2. Passing moods which are opposed to the principal sentiment should not be described at length, and if described at all, there should be an immediate reversion to the passing moods of the principal sentiment.

3. Even when a subsidiary sentiment is being treated fully, it should be at all events kept only as a subsidiary by constant attention.

Other ways can be imagined by readers themselves along the lines indicated.

If the subsidiary sentiment happens to be an opposed one, it should be carefully depicted only as lesser than the principal sentiment, for example, if Quietude is the principal sentiment, the Erotic should be lesser in importance; so also, if the Erotic is the principal sentiment, Quietude itself should be the lesser. The words, "than the principal sentiment", have been included in the gloss in order to silence the objection that there can be no sentiment at all, properly speaking, in the absence of full treatment. The idea is that the subsidiary sentiment should not be given the same degree of full treatment as is given to the principal sentiment. Who can ever deny the natural treatment which even a subordinate sentiment might receive (in the usual course of things)? Thus no one—not even those who do not accept the principal-subsidiary relation of sentiments—can ever deny that a single sentiment will have principal importance in spite of the fact that the work may contain several sentiments also alongside of it. Thus too, the opposition of sentiments can be avoided in works by portraying such unopposed or opposed sentiments with due deference to the principal-subsidiary relationship. The above has been written from the standpoint of those who hold that one sentiment can become an accessary of another as a passing mood. Since in the opinion of others, the abiding emotions themselves of sentiments are metaphorically designated by the term 'sentiment', there is no difficulty at all in sentiments becoming ancillaries.

Hitherto we have explained such general means of overcoming opposition between sentiments, as are commonly applicable to the resolution of opposition between the principal sentiment and the unopposed sentiments as well as that between the principal sentiment and the opposed sentiments. In what follows, the specific means of overcoming opposition between two opposed sentiments only is set forth

25

If a sentiment opposed to the principal one happens to occur in the same substratum as that of the latter itself, the opposed santiment should be given a different substratum; (once this is done) there will be no defect even if it should be treated in full.

The Opposite is of two types:—(1) 'Opposite of another in the same substratum' and (2) 'Opposite of another coming beside it'. So far as the principal sentiment is concerned, if another sentiment also is found in the same substratum i.e., acquires equal importance with it—e.g. when the Heroic is the principal sentiment, the occurrence of the Terrible along with it in one and the same character—we will have an instance of the first type of the Opposite and in such places, the substratum of the other sentiment should be varied: The Terrible sentiment should be delineated only with reference to the enemy of the hero who is the substratum of the heroic sentiment. When this is done, there would be no fault in even treating the opposed sentiment at length. By describing great terror on the part of the enemy, the extraordinary glory of the hero in point of his policy as well as prowess will be only thrown into bolder relief. This has been very well illustrated in the description of Arjuna's descent to the netherworld in my own work, *Arjunacarita.*

The manner of avoiding the opposition caused by a conflicting sentiment in the same substratum and of making it subsidiary to the principal sentiment in the work has been pointed out in the above text. The same is pointed out below with reference to the opposite of the second variety:—

26

A sentiment which has no opposition due to the sameness of substratum but which becomes an opposite of another (i.e. principal) sentiment coming closely beside it, should be so conveyed by the intelligent poet that a third sentiment will intervene between these conflicting ones.

Though a sentiment may be free from opposition conditioned by the sameness of substratum, if it should be found to conflict with another closely occurring sentiment, it should be introduced into one's work only after making a third sentiment intervene between them. The delineation of the sentiment of Quietude and the Erotic in the play *Nāgānanda* affords an illustration to this.

We state emphatically that there is a sentiment of Quietude and its nature is delineation of the joy due to the decline of desire. So it is that the ancients have also said:—

Both the passionate joy of this world
And the excessive joy in Heaven cannot come
To the level of even a sixteenth fraction
Of this joy due to decline of desire. [141]

Even granting that this joy is above the experience of all individual men, one will not be justified at all in dissenting to its constituting the unique experience of extraordinary personages. Nor is it right to include it under the category of the heroic sentiment itself. For, it is an established fact that the heroic (sentiment) is full of egotism; and this exists only in the form of absence of egotism. If one were to imagine identity between the two, notwithstanding this difference, one might at that rate imagine even the heroic and the furious as identical. Hence the best way of avoiding the difficulty would be to decide that specific temperaments like 'compassionate heroism' which are singularly free from egotism, form varieties of the sentiment of Quietude and the same temperaments will form varieties of the heroic sentiment at other times (when there is a touch of egotism about them). Thus it is established that the sentiment of Quietude exists. A sentiment opposed to it may also be delineated in a work containing it without incurring any fault provided a third sentiment unopposed to it is made to intervene between the two as in the example already mentioned.

This very idea is reinforced in the following :—

27

By the intervention of another sentiment, even the opposition of two sentiments in the same sentence will disappear.

It cannot indeed be a delusion that the opposition between two sentiments in a work will disappear by the intervention of a third sentiment. For, it is seen that even the opposition of sentiments in the same sentence will disappear in deference to the principle laid down. The following is an illustration :—

The heroes comfortably seated in aeroplanes,
Saw below with wonder their own corpses
Pointed out by heavenly nymphs ;
Their chests were scented with heavenly perfume now

While the bodies below were soiled by earthly dust ;
They were now embraced by the heavenly nymphs,
While the bodies below were clasped by she-jackals ;
They were now being fanned by the barks of the heavenly tree
Sprinkled with aerated sandal-water,
While their bodies below were fanned by the flapping wings
Of flesh-eating vultures, smeared with blood.

In this illustration the heroic sentiment intervenes between the sentiments or the accessaries of the sentiments of the Erotic and the Disgusting ; and hence there is no opposition.

28

The opposition and non-opposition of sentiments should be clearly noticed in the above manner, particularly so in the Erotic sentiment, for it happens to be the most delicate of all (sentiments).

The cultured critic should notice carefully the opposition and non-opposition of sentiments in whole works and other instances in accordance with the principles laid down above. He must particularly do so in the Erotic sentiment. For the Erotic sentiment is brought about by a full treatment of the emotion of love and the nature of love is such that it will be marred at the slightest reason. Hence the Erotic sentiment is the most delicate of all sentiments and will not bear the inclusion of opposed sentiments even to the slightest extent.

29

The good poet should be extremely attentive so far as that sentiment is concerned. Otherwise, the slightest inattention (or lapse) on his part will appear glaring at once.

The poet should be very attentive in regard to that sentiment as it is more delicate than every other sentiment. If he should carelessly falter in this sentiment, he will at once become a butt of contempt in the circle of cultured critics. As the Erotic sentiment is invariably within the experience of all persons, it is not only the most charming but also the most important sentiment.

In these circumstances,

30

Either for the sake of winning the attention of people who deserve to be instructed or for the sake of endowing the work with unique charm, a touch of the opposite sentiments may be brought into the accessaries ef the Erotic sentiment. It will not be a fault.

The touch of opposite sentiments will not mar the accessaries of the Erotic sentiment, not merely when the principles relating to non-opposition of sentiments are followed, but also when the purpose of winning the attention of people who deserve instruction or that of endowing the work with unique charm, is present. People who deserve instruction will grasp the moral instruction happily only after their attention has been won through the medium of the accessaries of the Erotic sentiment. Sages brought entertainment parties such as the drama into vogue only for the propagation of moral instruction in a pleasing way to those who deserve to be so instructed.[142] The inclusion of the accessaries of the Erotic sentiment in opposed sentiments is justifiable on another ground also. It is the fact that the Erotic sentiment has the power to delight the minds of one and all. Hence there is no defect due to employment of an opposed sentiment in instances like the following :—

It is true that women are winsome
And true that riches are alluring ;
But life itself is as fleeting
As the tremulous glances of a drunken dame ![143]

31

When a good poet composes his poem bearing in mind these concepts of non-opposition and opposition of sentiments etc., he shall never blunder.

When a poet gifted with extraordinary genius bears in mind while he composes his work, the concepts of opposition and non-opposition of sentiments, emotions, their semblances, etc., in the manner indicated above, he can never go wrong.

The usefulness of the treatment of opposition and non-opposition of sentiments has been explained above. In the following, the usefulness of the treatment of the Expressed and the Expressions also as suggestive of sentiment is indicated :—

32

The main task of a master-poet lies in a proper marshalling of all the contents and the expressions in the direction of sentiments, etc.

The main business of a master-poet is none other than the proper marshalling of both contents, i.e. plots, and expressions used in setting them forth, in the direction of sentiments, etc. In other words, the main function of the poet lies only in making one sentiment principal throughout the poem and in employing both words and senses only in such a way that the former is suggested clearly.

The following text shows how this idea of writing a poem only with the main intention of suggesting sentiments etc., is a well known concept even in ancient treatises such as that of Bharata :—

33

VṚTTIS (lit. Modes) are said to be of two kinds only because they relate to appropriate employment of senses and sound in keeping with sentiments, etc.

Modes of employment are themselves given the designation of " Mode ". The mode of employing senses in conformity to sentiment as well as to the considerations of propriety underlies the various (dramatic) Modes such as *Kaiśikī* etc.[144] Similarly that which relates to sounds underlies the (figurative) Modes such as *Upanāgarikā* (the urban) etc. Thus mode, properly employed with the sole intention of conveying sentiments etc., will lend charm to dramatic as well as poetic works. Sentiments, etc., constitute the life-essence of both these Modes. Plots, etc., serve only as the body.

Some might raise the following objection :—' Sentiments, etc., are related to plots, etc., by the quality-substance relation and not by the life-body relation. One can perceive the expressed only as full of sentiment but never the expressed as an entity separate from sentiment '. Here is our reply :—Is the expressed sense full of sentiment in the same way as the body is full of whiteness ? If it were true, just as a sight of the body will be invariably accompanied by the perception of its whiteness

also on the part one and all, so also sentiments, etc., would have to be perceived by all critics, cultured or otherwise, along with the perception of the expressed sense itself. But such is not the fact. That has been explained in the FIRST FLASH itself.

There is scope for this view also :—'Just as the quality of preciousness in diamonds is discernible only to select connoisseurs, so also the presence of sentiments, etc., in the expressed sense is discernible only to select critics'. This view also is untenable. If it were correct, just as the preciousness in diamonds of quality will be discerned as not being different from the very nature of their being diamonds, so also sentiments would have to be discerned as not being different from the nature of the expressed settings, emotional responses, etc. But it is not so. No one gets the idea that the setting, the emotional responses and passing moods are themselves sentiments. The apprehension of the setting, etc., is only an invariable condition of the apprehension of sentiments etc., and hence we might posit a cause-effect relation to exist between the two apprehensions. There is, therefore, bound to be some temporal sequence also between the two. But this sequence is not noticed since it is so minute. Hence it is that we mentioned above that sentiments are suggested only through unnoticeable sequence.

This is another possible objection :— 'Since word itself aided by context, etc., produces the apprehension of the expressed as well as the suggested meanings at the same time, where is any point in imagining temporal sequence to exist at all between them ? There is no such rule that a word can become suggestive only when there is conscious apprehension of the expressed sense. For example, Suggestion of sentiments, etc., is certainly achieved even from sounds in music and so forth ; and there is no intervening apprehension of expressed sense at all between the sounds and the suggested sentiments'. The following is our reply :—We also agree that only such words as are aided by context etc., become suggestive. But this suggestiveness is sometimes due to their specific nature itself and sometimes due to the denotative power of words. In instances where suggestiveness is due only to the specific nature of sounds and where apprehension of expressed meanings does not play any part at all, it would be tantamount to saying that suggestiveness is not governed by the denotative power of words at all. But if suggestiveness is to be governed at all by the denotative power of words, the conclusion becomes irresistible that the apprehension of suggested sense can only be later in time than the apprehension of expressed sense and of words that denote it.

If that temporal sequence is so brisk that it escapes notice, what is to be done ? If in truth, the apprehension of sentiments were possible just by words aided by context etc., without any need of the apprehension of expressed sense, then every reader acquainted with the context, including those who are quite ignorant of the denotation of words, should have had the apprehension of sentiment by merely hearing a poem. If the apprehension of the expressed and the suggested were simultaneous, there would be no use at all for the apprehension of the expressed. On the contrary if there should be any use for the apprehension of the expressed, it is possible that the two can co-exist. It is true that in music we have suggestiveness due to the perception of the specific nature of sound alone. But even there, we do have, invariably, temporal sequence between the apprehension of the nature of sounds and the apprehension of suggested sentiments. But this temporal sequence in the two functions of sounds cannot be noticed when sentiments are suggested ; because sentiments are neither opposed to the expressed sense nor appear as similar to the other senses ; they are not capable of being conveyed by aught else and all their accessaries work together with lightning-quickness.

But in some contexts, the sequence is noticeable also. Instances where we find apprehension of resonance-like suggestion may be cited as examples. One might ask us 'how is it so ?' and we would give the following reply :—There will be apprehension of two senses in resonance-like suggestion based on the power of sense, viz., (1) the expressed sense and (2) the sense suggested by the power of sense but quite distinct from the other expressed sense. Since no one can conceal the cause-effect relation between the apprehensions of the two senses, the

temporal sequence between them is obvious. Prakrit stanzas quoted in the FIRST FLASH for establishing the existence of the implied sense serve as illustrations of this also. Since in those instances the difference between the expressed and the suggested is very great, it is impossible to affirm that the apprehension of the one is identical with that of the other. Even in resonance-like suggestion based upon the power of sound—as, for instance, *May the light of the lamp of all lands,*[145] etc.,—where we have the apprehension of two senses from the same words, similitude between the two senses will be found suggested. Since we do not have any word openly expressing similitude, we will have to agree that it is suggested only by the power of sound. Thus it is clear that there is temporal sequence between the apprehensions of the expressed sense and the suggested figure even in that type of suggestion.

Similarly the temporal sequence between the apprehensions of the expressed sense and the suggested figure is patent also in the specific variety of resonance-like suggestion based upon the power of sound, viz., that which shines out in individual words. The fact is that the adjective will be equivocal. Instead of understanding another word for denoting the second sense, we apprehened the second sense also by virtue of the same word. Since the second sense is not conveyed by a specific word, we will have to hold that it is conveyed only through the power of sense. Though the apprehension of the suggested is thus produced by sense alone, it is still regarded as based on the power of the equivocal word itself.

Even in Suggestion based upon unmeant expressed sense, since the apprehension of the suggested sense comes only after the apprehension that the conventional meaning of the word is inapplicable (in the context), temporal sequence is present as a rule. Since the expressed sense therein happens to be unmeant, the question whether there is temporal sequence or not between the expressed and the suggested senses, was not taken up before. It is clear, therefore, that even as the apprehensions of denotative word and denoted sense involve a cause-effect relation and consequently temporal sequence, so also the

apprehensions of the expressed and the suggested involve a cause-effect relation as well as temporal sequence. As already illustrated, sometimes it is noticed and sometimes it is not.

Some might object as follows to our procedure of dividing suggestion into various kinds from the standpoint of suggestiveness :—" What is this suggestiveness ? The power of conveying the implied sense need not be designated by the name 'suggestiveness' at all. The existence of the suggested sense is dependent upon the existence of the suggestive word. So also, the existence of the suggestive word is dependent upon the existence of the suggested sense. As the definition thus moves in a viscious circle, nothing definite will have been established about either ". We would put them a counter-question :— When we have already established the existence of suggested sense as distinct from the expressed (by other arguments), what scope for objection is there if suggestiveness were made to follow from the existence of the suggested ?

The objector might argue further as follows :—' It is true that the existence of the suggested sense as distinct from the expressed has been established by the arguments already given. But why should that sense be called by the name " suggested " alone ? It is right that we should designate it as " Expressed " itself, wherever it happens to be primarily important since it is primarily intended to be conveyed by the sentence as a whole. Thus the sentence which conveys that sense contains only one function and that is denotation. What is the use of attributing a new function to it ? Thus the sense which happens to be the main purport of a sentence can only be primarily " expressed ". Apprehension of other senses from the sentence prior to the apprehension of the purport is only a means to the latter just as the apprehension of word-meaning is only a means to the knowledge of sentence-purport.'

We shall now reply to the objection :—Let us take an instance where a word conveys another meaning after having conveyed its primary meaning earlier. Is there any difference or no difference at all between the two functions of the word, viz., the denotation of primary meaning and the implication of

another sense? The view that there is no difference at all between the two is untenable. For, not only the scopes of the two functions are different, but their natures also are different. To illustrate: the scope of the function of denotation in a word is confined to its primary sense; while the scope of the function of implication includes a sense other than the primary one. It is not possible to deny that the expressed is "its own" sense of a word while the implied sense is "one belonging to another". The apprehension of the expressed will be directly related to the word while the apprehension of the implied will be remotely related to the word through the medium of the Expressed sense. While the expressed sense is directly related to the word, the implied sense relates to that which is in its turn related to the word since it is implied by the power of expressed sense. If the implied sense too were directly related to the word, then there would be no need at all for referring to it as another sense. Thus the difference in scope between the two functions is clear.

In the same way their difference in nature too is obvious. The function of denotation itself cannot be the same as the function of implication since we find suggestiveness of sentiments etc., even in sounds of music. It is well known too that gestures, etc., which are not even sounds, possess the function of suggesting specific ideas. In the illustration '*with her face bent down*' etc.,[146] the specific gesture (viz. side-glance) of the heroine has been described by the great poet in a way suggestive of unique charm. Since the scope and natures of the two functions are thus quite different, it is clear that the denotative function of words and the implying function of words are quite different from each other. When the separate individuality of the two functions is accepted, it will not be possible to give the designation of "the expressed" to that other meaning which is only implied by the power of the expressed sense. But we too would agree that the other sense too comes within the power of words. But at the same time we would say that the meaning is conveyed only by way of suggestion and not by way of denotation. If a word which is capable only of denoting its primary meaning directly is also seen actually conveying

another meaning directly denoted not by this word but by some other word only, then we would be right in regarding it as an instance of suggestiveness of word.

The analogy of word-import and sentence-purport too does not quite apply to the Expressed and Suggested senses since in the opinion of some philosophers,[147] the very apprehension of sense from individual words is unreal. Even those who do not hold that it is unreal will have to agree that the analogy of the relation between the pot and its material cause will explain better the relation between sentence-purport and word-import. Just as the material causes of a pot cannot be recognised separately after the pot has come into being, so also word and its sense are not recognised separately after the sentence and its purport have been apprehended as a whole. If they could be recognised separately, the very apprehension of the whole sentence-purport would have to be driven away to a distance. But this principle does not hold good with reference to the expressed and suggested senses. When the suggested sense is apprehended, the expressed sense is not driven away to a distance since the apprehension of the suggested is inseparably occasioned by the apprehension of the expressed. Hence the analogy of the pot and the lamp would fit them best. Just as the light of the lamp will not recede as soon as the perception of the pot is brought home to the observer, so also, the expressed sense will continue to shine out even after the apprehension of the suggested sense has been achieved. In the light of these considerations, it should be understood that the remark made in the FIRST FLASH—*Just as the purport of a sentence* etc. (Verse Text 10)—aims only at pointing out the similarity between the two in respect of their being means to some other end (and that the analogy is not intended to be pursued into details).

Some might say:—'At this rate a sentence will have to possess two senses simultaneously. If that should be the case, its very nature as a sentence will be upset. For, a sentence can only be that which conveys a single sense'. But there is no fallacy in our argument. For, we decide that one of these senses is subordinate and the other principal. In some instances, the

suggested will be principal and the expressed subordinate. In other instances the expressed itself will be principal and the suggested will be subordinate. We have already declared that the designation of "Suggestion" is to be given only when the suggested sense happens to be principal. When the expressed itself is principal, it comes under one of the varieties of poetry to be explained in the sequel.

Hence this much is certain :—When poetry purposes the suggested sense, the latter can never be expressed, but only suggested.

What is more, in instances where the suggested is not intended as principal, you (i.e. the objector) will not be able to regard it even as expressed since the word does not purpose it at all. This also adds support to our conclusion that there is some definite scope for suggested senses of words. And where it happens to be intended as principal, why should its existence be gainsaid? Hence suggestiveness is positively different from denotation.

Another reason which supports the same conclusion is this :-Denotation is based upon words only, while suggestiveness is based not only upon words but also upon senses since suggestiveness, as already pointed out, relates to words as well as senses.

Indication also is based upon both through metaphorical application and secondary sense. But suggestiveness differs from it too both in respect of nature and of scope. This is the difference in scope :—It is well known that Indication is the name given to a verbal function which does not proceed principally. But suggestiveness is a verbal function which proceeds principally. The apprehension of the three-fold suggested sense from the expressed does not in the least appear to be subordinate.

This is another difference in respect of their natures :—Indication is practically Denotation itself with this difference that it is a subordinate verbal function. But on the other hand suggestion has been proved to be quite different from Denotation.

A still another difference between the two functions is this ;—When another sense is conveyed by a sense through

Indication, the first sense merges itself with the second and becomes one with it, as for instance in the sentence—*The hamlet (is) in the Ganges.* But when one sense conveys another through suggestion, the first sense retains its individuality while conveying the other just like a lamp. *Pārvatī counted the petals of her play-lotus etc.*, are illustrations in point. If the name 'Indication' were to be given to those instances also where one sense conveys another without losing its own importance, then it would be tantamount to saying that Indication itself is the primary verbal function. For in general, every sentence possesses the power of conveying a purport over and above the expressed senses of individual words.

The following question may be put to us :—'Well, even granting the truth of what you say, what is the precise verbal function involved when sense conveys the three-fold suggested content?' Here is our reply :—Sense therein acquires the said suggestiveness only because of the words aided by context etc. Hence how can anyone deny the use of words in such suggestion?

The difference in the scopes of Indication and Suggestiveness is also obvious. The scope of Suggestiveness is three-fold, viz. (1) Sentiments etc., (2) Specific figures of speech and (3) Suggested ideas. Of these, none will or can say that the apprehension of sentiments etc., is identical with Indication. The same is true of suggested figures also. So far as suggested idea is concerned, that alone is suggested therein which is intended to be conveyed by the poet by a process other than Denotation, when he finds that the beauty he wants to endow the idea on hand cannot be achieved by means of Denotation itself. All this cannot be included in the scope of Indication since we can see several examples of Indication based merely on convention or usage. This has been already explained. If at all there is any touch of beauty instanced in Indication, it will be entirely due to the entry of the suggestive element therein. Hence indication and suggestiveness are widely different from each other. The truth is that Suggestiveness not only differs from Denotation on the one hand and Indication on the other, but it is also based upon each of them. In Suggestion with

meant but further extending expressed sense, suggestiveness gets assistance from Denotation; in Suggestion with unmeant expressed sense, it gets assistance from Indication. These two varieties of Suggestion were proposed at the outset itself with a view to bringing out the fact that Suggestiveness is assisted by both Denotation and Indication. It is not possible to regard suggestiveness which is assisted by both these to be identical with either. Since it sometimes derives assistance from indication, it cannot be identical with Denotation alone; since it gets assistance sometimes from Denotation, it cannot be identical with Indication alone. Thus it cannot be comprehended by either since it partakes of the characteristics of both. Besides this, it also partakes of the characteristics of sound which is devoid of both the verbal powers of Denotation and Indication. Thus the sounds of music do possess suggestiveness in respect of sentiments, etc., and they are never seen to possess either Denotation or Indication.

Furthermore, since we can see suggestiveness in instances which are not even sounds, it is wrong to consider it as a form of verbal functions like Denotation. Though suggestiveness is thus different from the well-known functions, viz., Denotation and Indication of words, if it should be still regarded as another form of verbal function itself, why should not one regard it at that rate as a form of work itself?

Thus it is clear that the functions of words are three-fold—(1) Denotation, (2) Indication and (3) Suggestiveness. When the suggested sense itself happens to be the principal one also in an instance of suggestiveness, it deserves the title of Suggestion. This suggestion may be divided into two important categories, viz., (1) that with unmeant expressed sense and (2) that with meant but further-extending expressed sense, These have been treated elaborately at the outset itself.

The objector might argue as follows:—You are right when you say that there is no element of Indication in Suggestion with meant but further-extending expressed sense. For it is impossible to speak of indication where a second meaning is apprehended over and above the apprehension of the expressed sense. There are two forms of Indication:—(1) Usage of a word to convey a second meaning because of some reason and in such a way that the primary meaning is entirely concealed as in the example:—'*The student is a veritable fire*'. (2) Usage of a word in such a way that its primary meaning is retained in part while another meaning also is conveyed as in the example:—'*There is a hamlet in the Ganges*'. In both these forms of Indication, the primary sense will not be intended in full. Therefore it stands to reason that in Suggestion with meant but further-extending expressed sense where the primary sense is fully intended and the denotative word itself conveys another sense also, one should speak of suggestiveness. Indeed, that which illumines itself along with shedding light upon other objects is regarded as a suggester. In the instances mentioned, denotation itself possesses suggestiveness also and it is not at all possible to speak of Indication as being applicable to them. But what difference is there between Suggestion with unmeant expressed sense and Indication? The same two forms of Indi-Indication described above constitute the two forms of this Suggestion also'.

The fact is that there is no defect involved even in this state of affairs. Though Suggestion with unmeant expressed sense might walk in the footsteps of Indication, it does not assume the form of Indication itself. For, it is possible to come across Indication which is completely devoid of suggestiveness. But one can never find suggestiveness devoid of the suggested content which is a source of beauty. This has been already pointed out. The first form of Indication, viz., metaphorical attribution of identity, takes its stand in the characteristics of the expressed sense. For instance, the student is referred to as veritable fire because of his fiery or short temper. The face of the heroine is spoken of as the moon itself because of its pleasing nature. Similarly other examples are—'*.....for lovers, there is no repetition*' etc. The second form of Indication, viz., secondary sense also is possible if there is just a connection with the secondarily indicated sense though there is no apprehension of the suggested content full of beauty. '*cots creak*' etc., are examples.

Of course, in some instances Indication becomes a source of the apprehension of the suggested content full of beauty; but it is entirely due to its touch of suggestiveness as in the case of denotation. In instances where we have a treatment of supernatural events, e.g. *persons three will reap......*,the treatment can be justified only in view of the apprehension of suggested beauty and hence it stands to reason that we should regard them as instances of Suggestion only, though Indication might also be present therein. Thus in both the divisions of Suggestion with unmeant expressed sense, we will find Indication tinged with a shade of suggestiveness. This will not appear identical with Indication but quite separate from it and brings great delight to the minds of cultured critics. Though all this has been indicated already, it has been repeated with the object of making the point clear.

Furthermore, the fact is indisputable that the suggestive power of words follows only in the wake of well-known convention. The suggestive power of words follows the track of the well-known conventional relation of word to meaning which is given the designation of the denoter-denoted relationship. But it becomes coloured by its association with other adventitious circumstances. That is where suggestiveness differs from denotation. The denotation of every word is constant because right up from childhood when one first picks up the language, the meaning of each word remains quite unchanged throughout one's life. But the suggestiveness of words is not so constant. The reason is that it is adventitious. Its apprehension is there only when all circumstances such as context combine in conveying it; otherwise it will not be apprehended at all. It might be argued what is the use of examining the nature of such an adventitious concept? The examination of its nature is not at all a defect, in so far as its adventitiousness is seen only from the standpoint of suggested sense, which happens to be its main province. The analogy of *probans* in an inference is well applicable to suggestiveness. Since Inference is dependent upon one's desire, when there is no such desire to infer on a person's part, the existence of the quality of probans in anything is far from constant from the

man's point of view of the *probandum*. Suggestiveness also is exactly like this. Though from the standpoint of word, it might be inconstant, one should not rush to the conclusion that it is a variety of denotation. If it were really a variety of denotation, it too should have been as constant as denotation itself in respect of word.

An adherent of the Mīmāṁsā school of philosophy will have to accept perforce the conclusion that words have an adventitious power of the nature of suggestiveness. For he is a believer in the theory that not only there is a natural and eternal relation between word and its sense but also that there is difference between sentences uttered by men and those revealed in the Vedas. If he does not accept this adventitious power of words, the result would be that human utterance and superhuman revelations would both be on a par since the relation between word and its sense is acknowledged to be eternal in both the cases. But if he should accept this adventitious power, he can easily account for the possibility of falsity in human utterances. For, though one might hold that the relation between sentences and their purport is eternal, there will also be room left to attribute adventitious draw-backs such as delusion due to the fleeting desires of the speaker.

Instances too can be found in nature of objects which produce effects opposite to their nature due to their contact with adventitious circumstances though their nature itself is not completely lost on that account. For example, even the cool-rayed moon and such other cool objects which allay the heat of the entire universe by their refreshing coolness are seen to cause intense pain to onlookers who are afflicted by the burning pangs of separation from their beloveds. One who likes, therefore, to uphold the doctrine that the relation of word to its meaning is natural or eternal, will have to affirm obviously some adventitious element at least which belongs to words and which is distinct from denotation if he should explain properly the falsity of human utterances. And it cannot be anything other than suggestiveness. Suggestiveness is the same as the communication of what is suggested. All human utterances

primarily communicate the intention of the speaker. That intention is suggested but not denoted since the relation of denoter-denoted does not apply at all to the intention and the word.

As for the objection that at this rate all sentences in the world will have to be designated as Suggestion since all sentences in the world do contain suggestiveness (of intention), we say that the objection is valid in a way. It is a fact that suggestiveness of the speaker's intention is common to all human sentences in the world. But the thing is that this suggestiveness is in no way different from denotation itself. The suggested and the expressed are so organically bound up with each other therein and the Suggested is not at all intended as exclusively important, which consideration alone entitles a content to get the designation of Suggestion. If the speaker's intention which shines through words and meanings should be intended as important, it is only when it is directed towards the communication of the suggested alone exclusively. Nor can we think that even this suggestiveness is enough to explain all instances which come under the province of Suggestion. For, the province of Suggestion is unlimited while that of the said suggestiveness is but limited. Hence the conclusion is established that whether it be of the nature of speaker's intention or not, if the three-fold suggested content should be principally manifest, it will provide sufficient ground for the designation of suggestion. This definition of Suggestion which takes into account suggestiveness as explained above cannot be tainted by the fallacies of *too wide* or *too narrow*. Thus the verbal power of suggestiveness will be found to concur with the views of the experts on the theory of sentences (i.e. Mīmāṁsakas) far from conflicting with their doctrines.

So far as the system of grammar is concerned, the question whether the theory of Suggestion is compatible with that system or not, does not arise at all ; for the very expression Suggestion has been borrowed (into the field of poetics) from the grammarians who maintain that sound in its eternal form of SPHOṬA (lit. Burst) is identical with Ultimate Reality itself (and that it is only suggested and never expressed).

Turning to the rationalistic system of logicians, it will be seen that the theory of Suggestion cannot clash with their views either. Indeed they hold that the relationship between a word and its meaning is conventional or man-made. They also admit that suggestiveness is within our experience and that it is seen not only in meanings but also in words. Hence there is no need at all for refuting their views.

The logicians indeed may hold divergent views so far as denotation is concerned, e.g. 'Is this a natural power or a power man-made ?' But there is no scope at all for any conflicting opinion so far as suggestiveness is concerned, because suggestiveness follows in the wake of denotation, and is found to be present even in other places (where denotation is absent) and its experience is pretty universal. All the controversies of logicians relate only to imperceptible objects and never to perceived ones. Logicians are never seen to hold conflicting views about such subjects of common and doubtless perception as—'This is black' and 'This is sweet'. When one logician perceives an object as black without the association of any contradictory circumstances and says—'This is black', another logician does not proceed to challenge him and assert—'This is not black ; this is yellow'. So also when suggestiveness is found by experience to exist in words which are denotative, in sounds of music etc. which are not even denotative, and finally in gestures and so forth too which are not words at all, no one can gainsay it. Various turns of speech both in verse and prose which are suggestive of non-denoted beautiful meanings are commonly met with in the gatherings of wits. Which man of taste can be deaf to their implications without becoming a butt of ridicule ?

But the logicians might bring forward the following objection :—'It is true that in the instance mentioned, one does catch the implication of spoken words for they certainly possess suggestiveness. But in fact this suggestiveness is none other than implication ; and implication is the same as the state of an inferential *probans*. The apprehension of the suggested idea is thus identical with the inferential knowledge of the *probandum*. In other words the relation of suggester-

suggested is none other than the relation of probans–probandum. There is also another reason which substantiates this conclusion:—You have yourself explained just now that words possess suggestiveness directed to the speaker's intention and it is our conviction that the speaker's intention is only inferable.'

To this, our rejoinder is as follows:—Even if the alleged view be true, there is nothing lost. Our only purpose is to establish the fact that suggestiveness is a verbal power, over and above two other powers, viz., denotation and indication. And this position of ours will not suffer in the least even if we should accept your allegation. It might be called by the name of suggestiveness, or that of an inferential probans or by any other name for that matter. But whatever the name by which we might call it, the fact remains that we will have admitted that there is a third verbal power and that it is quite distinct from the other two well-known powers. In these circumstances there is no cause at all for any real dispute between us. But the truth is that suggestiveness is not identical with the state of an inferential probans, nor is all apprehension of the suggested idea identical with inferential knowledge.

You have indeed made a clever use of our own words in substantiating your position. You have remarked glibly that the speaker's intention is certainly implied and added that such implication is the same as the state of an inferential probans. We shall therefore explain in greater detail the real meaning of our statement for your benefit:—The scope of words is two-fold:—(1) Inferable and (2) denotative. Of these, the inferable is always of the nature of the speaker's intention. This intention of the speaker, once again, is two-fold:—(1) desire to utter words for their own sake and (2) desire to convey meaning through words. Between these, the first type of speaker's intention does not play any part in verbal discourse. It only serves to distinguish an animal from a non-animal. But the second type of speaker's intention plays the part of a proximate cause in verbal discourse through it is rendered rather remote due to several other intervening factors between the utterance of the word and the apprehension of its meaning. And both these types of speaker's intention are inferable from words.

But the denotative scope of words relates to meaning itself which happens to be the aim of the speaker's intention to convey meaning. It is also two-fold:—1. The Expressed and 2. The Suggested. The speaker may use words with a view to conveying his meaning directly by means of them (and then we have the expressed meaning) or he may use words which do not directly convey his meaning, with a view to achieving some purpose (and then we have the suggested meaning). Both these aspects of the denotative scope of words are far from appearing as probandum of any inference based on words. On the other hand the relationship between word and such denotative content is one other than inference whether it be a conventional or unconventional relationship. It is only the aspect of intention on the part of a speaker to employ words or meaningful words that is inferable and not the meaning itself conveyed by his words. If it were true that the meaning itself could form the probandum of an inference having words for its probans, there should be no scope for doubts at all whether any meaning is right or wrong. For instance, when the probandum viz., fire, is inferred from the probans viz., smoke, there is indeed no room for any doubt about the existence of fire.

Since the suggested meaning is conveyed by the power of the Expressed itself, it, too, is related to the word just as the expressed meaning is related to the word. Directness or remoteness is not the differentiating condition of a relationship. That suggestiveness is related to denotation has been already shown. The conclusion is thus indisputable that words will have the state of an inferential probans only while implying the intention of the speaker and that the meanings themselves which are signified by the words are due to the verbal power of denotation and not Inference.

Now we may take instances of meanings which are suggested by a word. These may be of the nature of intention and may not be as well. Can we say that all such meanings are conveyed by the power of denotation alone in words? Or should we postulate some other function? It has been already shown that the power of denotation alone cannot explain the suggested

meaning. Hence we will have to admit another function and that function itself is called suggestiveness by us. The nature of suggestiveness is not co-extensive with the nature of an inferential probans, since the former exists in objects like light where the latter is absent. Just as the denoted content of words is not identical with the probandum of an inference, so also the suggested content is not identical with it. Contrariwise, that which becomes the object of an inferred probandum as shown above, does not constitute what is denoted but constitutes only an adventitious attribute of what is denoted. If the denoted meaning too were to be inferable as probandum, there could be no occasion at all for any differences of opinion regarding it in the world. But such differences are within our common knowledge and this has also been explained already.

It is no doubt true that sometimes one does resort to inference and other Instruments of knowledge while deciding the truth of even an expressed meaning. Though it thus falls within the scope of other Instruments of knowledge, its being at the same time an object of the verbal power of denotation does not suffer in the least. The same is true of suggested meaning also. As a matter of fact, the question of logical truth and falsity in regard to suggested meaning is entirely futile. Such being the case, it would be nothing but ridiculous if one were to indulge in discussions regarding different Instruments of knowledge applicable therein. In a word, we can wind up the discussion by saying that it is impossible to identify the apprehension of the suggested meaning with the apprehension of the inferred probandum in every case.

Though it is true that we have affirmed above the existence of an implied aspect in words (viz., speaker's intention) which is also inferable, and that it can also be called by the name of suggestiveness, we never believe that it is a conclusive factor at all in deciding about the designation of suggestion to be given to particular instances.

The reason why we made that remark is quite a different one: It was put forward by us only as an argument to elicit the support of even philosophers holding the doctrine of eternal

relationship between word and sound to the fact that suggestiveness is a unique function of words. That suggestiveness, as a matter of fact, co-exists sometimes with the state of inferential probans of words, and sometimes shines through denotative words as well as non-denotative words. We have laboured this point at so much length just to show that no scholastic objection should be raised by any of the controversialists, adherents as they might be of different systems of thought. Hence we might conclude that suggestiveness is a power of words, quite different from all powers like Indication and Denotation. Notwithstanding all this, controversialists might still persist in asserting dogmatically that it is included under them only; but our doctrine of suggestiveness which attempts at explaining the speciality of suggestiveness, at disarming all divergences of opinion and at educating the taste of critics, will not certainly deserve any censure. It is not indeed possible to belittle the usefulness of detailed definitions of particulars, simply because general definitions are already there. If one should belittle them, it would be no better than saying that the definitions of all particular concepts in philosophy are just so many repetitions in view of the fact that the general definition of the *Summum genus* itself, viz., Reality, has been propounded at the very outset. Thus—

The variety of Poetry designated as Suggestion which had become a source of controversy for long because its real nature had eluded even persons of the best intellect, has now been explained in this way.

34

We can see another variety of Poetry viz, Poetry of Subordinated Suggestion, wherein the artistic excellence of the Expressed is greater than that of the suggested, though the latter also happens to be present alongside of the former.

The suggested sense has been compared to the composite charm of lovely women and it has already been mentioned that when it happens to be exclusively important, we get the type of poetry which merits the designation of DHVANI. When the same happens to become secondary and the Expressed alone

shines out prominently, we get another type of poetry which can be regarded as GUṆĪBHŪTA-VYAṄGYA or 'Poetry of subordinated Suggestion'. In this variety, once again, a bare idea conveyed by such words as have lost their conventional denotation might be the suggested element and it might become secondary to the purport of the sentence as a whole got at by its component denotative words, as in the following example :—

Who could be this new ocean of charm
With dark lilies floating beside the moon ;
With twin temples of elephants merged
Beside plantain-stems and lotus-stalks ?

Even when words other than those whose expressed sense is concealed are employed, if only the suggested sense conveyed by them should be secondary to their expressed meaning, we find sometimes this variety of Poetry with subordinated suggestion. Instances quoted already such as *Twilight is blushing,*[151] etc., will serve as examples.

If what is suggested is also expressed again by other words we should consider it too as an instance of subordinated Suggestion. Examples of this have been already given; e.g. *Knowing that her paramour,*[152] etc. If the suggested element happens to be of the nature of sentiment etc., and if it is also secondary to the expressed, we should consider it as an instance of Figurative sentiment as already demonstrated. The subordination of sentiment, etc., to the main purport of the sentence in such instances can be likened to the circumstantial subordination of a king who has to walk behind his own servant when the latter is a bridegroom taken in procession. When a suggested figure is secondary to the expressed, we have instances of figures like Ellipsis implying a simile etc.

35

In all poetic compositions that look delightful by reason of their lucid and elegant words, only this variety of poetry should be recognised by the intelligent critic.

Despite the fact that poetic compositions which look lovely and bring delight to discriminating critics appear unlimited,

this very variety, viz., Poetry of subordinated suggestion, should be recognised in all of them. For example—

Lakṣmī is his daughter,
Hari himself the son-in-law
And wife no less than Gaṅgā ;
Verily, Amṛta and the Moon are his two sons,
Ah, what a family indeed this Mighty Ocean has !

36

The whole host of figures is seen in many an instance to put on a new charm when it is brought into touch with the suggested element.

The earlier writers on Poetics have themselves shown how a few of the Figures of sense acquire a new charm when they get into touch with the suggested element consisting of either a figure or a bare idea. But a scrutiny of instances will reveal that this is true of all the figures. To illustrate :—Just like the figures Ellipsis implying a simile and condensed Metaphor, all the other figures too are seen generally to contain a touch of either another figure or another idea which happens to be suggested. For, in the first place, one can posit at least a touch of exaggeration in figures one and all. In fact the greatest poets have amply incorporated exaggeration into their works with a view to endowing them with unique shade of charm. When such exaggeration is utilized in a work in keeping with principles of propriety, how can it ever fail to cause delight ? Bhāmaha, indeed, has given the following definition of Exaggeration :—

This (Exaggeration) is itself the artistic turn of speech and it is by this that poetic content is made manifest. A poet should strive after this in particular and what figure can be there without it ?

This should be understood to convey the following sense only :—Only that figure in which Exaggeration reigns supreme, acquires abundant beauty due to the poet's genius. Others are ornamental figures only in name. Hence all figures deserve to be regarded as so many bodies (whose soul is exaggeration) only

and by a metaphorical application of identity between them, (one might say that) exaggeration, is itself the same as the host of all figures.

This sometimes merges with other figures expressly (1), and suggestively at other times. Its suggestibility too may be optionally principal (2), or secondary (3). In the first case, we have the well-known expressed Figures. In the second case it comes under DHVANI or Suggestive Poetry. In the third case it will be Poetry of subordinated Suggestion. This characteristic is no doubt found in figures other than Exaggeration also. But these other figures do not have an all-inclusive reference to the whole host of figures. The uniqueness of Exaggeration lies in this that it is pervasive of every figure of speech.

In figures like Metaphor, Simile, Combination of Equals. Corroboration, etc., wherein similarity is the chief justification for their being styled as ornaments, the idea of similarity which is manifest only through implication attains excessive charm and hence they all come within the purview of Poetry of subordinated Suggestion. So far as figures like condensed Mataphor, Paraleipsis and Periphrasis are concerned, since the suggested element in them happens to provide invariably the justification for their being styled as ornaments, there can be no dispute regarding their claims to be brought under Poetry of subordinated Suggestion. But with regard to some figures under this class of Poetry, their capacity to get a touch of other figures will be restricted only to particular ones. Veiled Praise, for instance, involves only the figure—Sweet Flattery. In other figures, the said scope is further limited to suggestion of figures only (as against ideas). For instance, in Fancied Doubt, etc., only Simile is involved. Yet other figures may be found to be mutually involved ; e.g., Ellipsis implying a Simile and Simile. That the figure Ellipsis involves simile is widely known, (Though not so well-known), even Simile may involve a shade of Ellipsis, as for instance—a Wreath of Similes. Thus in an example such as—

Like a lamp in union with radiant light, etc.,[154] the shade of Ellipsis is quite clear.

All figures, then, which contain a touch of suggestion and at the same time owe their excessive charm due to that touch, deserve to be brought within the compass of Poetry of subordinated suggestion. The only feature shared in common by all the figures, mentioned as well as unmentioned here, is thus the element of subordinated suggestion. And hence by proper understanding of the latter's nature, all the characteristics of the former will become clear automatically. The procedure (of rhetoricians) who refrain from attempting a general definition of ornaments and give details only of individual figures cannot lead one to an apprehension of the truth about them just as a bare enumeration of individual words cannot lead to the truth about all words possible in the world. The reason is that they are infinite. Indeed, the variations of human speech are infinite and the figures of speech in poetry too are equally infinite. But subordinated suggestion has a wider range of application, in so for as it can enter into relationship with suggested elements also. Therefore, this second manifestation of suggestion too should be recognised by cultured critics as a beautiful avenue for master-poets. Certainly, there is not a single variety of poetry holding out an appeal to the heart of cultured crities which does not attain artistic excellence by the slightest touch of suggested sense. The learned should deem this as the greatest secret of Poetry.

37

Even for such expressions of poets as are already adorned by figures, this shade of suggestion will be a most important ornament even as bashfulness will be for women.

By this shade, even a commonplace will be invested with unique charm as for instance in the following :—

The indifinite graces of the bride with guileless looks
Are so uncommon as they spring
From her implicit obedience of Cupid's behests
That one can only contemplate on them
With a concentrated mind
In some solitary spot.

The word 'indefinite' (original: *Ke'pi*) conveys the expressed sense very vaguely and at the same time offers itself to be flooded with infinite suggested feeling most easily and in so doing is there any shade of beauty left uncontributed by it to the passage as a whole?

38

Of course we see the communication of a new meaning by the agency of Ironic Tone. Even this will come within this variety of poetry so long as the suggested element happens to remain secondary.

The communication of a new meaning through Ironic Tone also comes within the scope of this variety of poetry, viz. Poetry of subordinated Suggestion. For example: –

Without worry will the sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra
Remain as long as I live?[155]

To take another example :—

Yes, we are unchaste; but please stop scolding,
O paragon of chastity!
You have never sullied your morals truly;
But like the wife of a commoner
I am not in love with a barber.[156]

It is not merely the Ironic Tone which is responsible for conveying the second sense but the power of words only which takes assistance from Ironic Tone suggested by its own power of denoted sense. For in other instances, where we resort to Ironic Tone at our will, it is not found that specific senses are communicated. The specific sense so communicated is suggested only inasmuch as it results only by the power of expressed sense though it is ingrained also in the power of word itself deriving assistance from specific Ironic Tone. When the apprehension of the expressed sense associated with suggested sense occurs in such a way that the latter is definitely subordinate to the former, we have indeed subordinated suggestion and instances of poetry containing it should be designated by this name. The characteristic of subordinated suggestion is indeed none other than denotation of the expressed sense in association with the suggested.

39

Instances which can reasonably be brought under this class of poetry should not be classed under DHVANI by cultured critics.

The Pathways of Dhvani or *primarily* suggestive poetry and poetry of subordinated suggestion often merge into each other in individual instances. Whether it is the one or the other name which the instance deserves should be decided only on basis of stronger arguments in favour of the one or the other. One should not be unduly prepossessed in favour of *Dhvani* everywhere. For instance –

After painting her feet red,
The handmaid wished laughingly –
'May you touch the crescent moon
On your husband's head with this!"
At this, Pārvatī gave her a blow
With her garland without a word.[157]

To cite another example :—

When her sweet partner addressed her
Unwittingly by her rival's name
While handing her flowers above her reach,
She did not say anything;
She only drew lines on the earth with her foot
And her eyes were bedewed with tears.[158]

The suggested content has been to some extent expressed also by the negative statements—'beat her without a word' and 'she did not say anything' in the above examples. Hence it is better that we regard them as instances of subordinated suggestion only. It is only when suggested content is exclusively conveyed without any touch of indirect denotation that we might regard it as principal as in the example—'*when the divine sage spoke thus...*'.[159] But in the examples in hand, the suggested ontent is found repeated in an indirect way and hence the expressed content also is as important as the suggested itself. Therefore, one should not give it the name of Poetry with resonance-like suggestion.

40

This class of Poetry, viz., that with subordinated suggestion will also assume the form of DHVANI or that with principal suggestion if one views it from the standpoint of exclusive purport of sentiment, etc.

When viewed from the standpoint of purport, viz., sentiment, etc., even poetry with subordinated suggestion will become poetry with principal suggestion itself. The two examples just now quoted illustrate this. The following is another instance:—

'O gallant, Rādhā indeed is too stubborn;
She goes on shedding tears though you have
Wiped them with the waist-garment of your dearest mistress.
The heart of a woman is indeed adamant;
So you may stop these attempts at allaying her anger';
May Hari who was addressed thus
During his conciliations preserve us.

Now it will be remembered that the different words found in the example—'*That I have foes is sufficient shame......*'[160] have been spoken of as suggestive from this standpoint only, i.e. from that of sentiment etc., which happens to be the purport of the sentence as a whole, though in fact we have a communication there of the expressed also in association with the suggested content. One should not commit the mistake of regarding those words as instances of Suggestion with expressed content merged in the unexpressed; for, the truth is that all of them have an expressed content which is meant (as important). The expressed content in them is no doubt associated with the suggested, but in no way can we say that it has transformed itself into the suggested. Therefore the sentence therein is *Dhvani* or container of principal suggestion, while the words are all examples of subordinated suggestion. Nor need one think that only words with subordinated suggestion can become revealers of the suggested content with unnoticeable temporal sequence; for, words instancing other types of suggestion also such as that with the expressed merged in the unexpressed, can become its revealers in the same way. For example, in the

illustration under consideration, the word Rāvaṇa which belongs to a type of suggestion other than subordinated suggestion, we have suggestiveness. But in a sentence where there is no primary purport of sentiment, etc., even if there should be the presence of words with subordinated suggestion, the sentence as a whole will come only under the etegory of subordinated suggestion (and not under that of principal suggestion). The following and such other instances might be cited as examples:

Even a king they serve,
They make use of even poison,
And they dally with women too;
How clever of mankind all!

Great attention should be paid in the matter of deciding the principal or subordinate nature of the expressed and suggested contents. It is only thus that the distinct scopes of principal suggestion, subordinated suggestion and figures of speech can be clearly grasped without confusing the one for the other. Otherwise, confusion will arise even in regard to well-known figures themselves as in the following:—

No heed was paid to the lavish expense
Of the stuff of loveliness
And great pains were taken upon himself;
But in the result, only a torch of misery has been lit
In people who were so long living happy and free;
Even this luckless lady herself
Has been drowned in despair
For want of a befitting spouse.
What might have been the idea in the Creator's mind
When he brought the body of this charming lady into being?[161]

A critic has remarked that the figure of speech in this example is veiled Praise. But the remark is not well-balanced. For, if it were true that the purport of this sentence is exhausted in the nature of this figure alone, there will be no complete agreement between the various parts of the sentence. Certainly, the alternatives found in the example cannot be looked upon as

coming from the mouth of any passionate lover. For, no lover would ever say anything in the strain of—'Even this luckless lady herself has been drowned in despair due to the absence of a befitting spouse'. Nor could they be from the mouth of an ascetic since the sole activity of an ascetic consists in avoiding such alternatives (relating to passion). We do not also know the original source from which this verse has been selected. Had we known the source, perhaps we might have been able to understand by it a sense in keeping with the context in which it occurred. For all these reasons, the figure instanced here is Indirect Narration (in our opinion). By so looking upon as an indirect narration we would clearly understand the fact that this is nothing but a lament on the part of a person who is puffed up with the pride of matchless merits in himself, who has brought fever upon jealous rivals by the excess of greatness achieved by him and who cannot find a single critic of sound judgement who can appreciate him fully. There is also a tradition which ascribes this verse to Dharmakīrti. It is most plausible that it is his composition in reality also. For the same idea has been adumbrated by him in other verses of his like the following one :—

With depth unfathomed
Even by one whose intelligence is vast,
With its essence ungrasped
Even by those of great industry,
My doctrine, alas! will grow old in my own body
Like the ocean's water,
Since it can never obtain a worthy recipient.

The expressed content in Indirect Narration will reveal a threefold shade of construction—(1) Intended (2) Unintended and (3) Both intended and unintended at the same time. The first, viz., Intended is instanced in '*If that which suffers pain for other's sake' etc.,*[163] or in the following verse of mine :—

The things of beauty which are commonly seen
Find their fulfilment only when they become

Objects of sight at least for a trice.
But if the world should become void of light,
How can the eye see things any more?
It will only be on a par with all other limbs
Or, perhaps, not even on a par with the other limbs.

In the two verses just now referred to, the sugercane and the eye are intended in fact though they do not constitute the main subject of description. The main subject of description for both those verses is the pitiable state of a very meritorious person who does not receive any recognition of his merits by others owing to the undeserved environment into which he has been driven. The following is an instance of the second, viz., unintended :—

Ho! who may'st be thou?'
'Well, listen—take me to be a luckless tree of ill-omen'.
'Why, you seem to talk in a strain of disgust (with life)!'
'Quite so! 'Why for?' I shall tell you presently:-
'Look at yonder banyan tree;
All the travellors flock to it for refuge.
Though I stand by the road-side,
Even my shade is not doing good to men'.

Since conversation with a tree is impossible, the verse with its unitended expressed content conveys by implication the purport, viz., that it is the lament of a self-respecting person who is in penury though he is a henchman of a very wealthy man because of the latter's wicked nature.

The following is an example of the expressed content which is both intended and unintended :—

You will become a butt of ridicule, O boor,
If you go on fencing (or nourishing) this thorny strawberry-shrub
Which has sprung up in an out of the way corner,
Which is so ugly and bereft
Of all fruits, flowers and leaves!

The expressed content in this verse is neither quite possible nor quite impossible.

We may conclude therefore by saying that the principal or subordinate nature of the expressed and the suggested contents should be carefully noted.

41

These two classes of poetry are decided thus on the principle of importantance or unimportance of the suggested content. That which is other than both is given the name of Portrait (citra).

Portrait–Poetry is also seen to be two-fold inasmuch as it is based either on word or on meaning. The first variety is word-portrait and the second, meaning-portrait.

If the suggested content is all important, we get the class of poetry called *Dhvani* or poetry with principal suggestion; if the same is subordinate, we get the second class of poetry called *Guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya* or poetry with subordinate suggestion; That class of poetry which is seen to differ from both, and which is destitute of purport relating to sentiments and emotions, etc., which is devoid of the power to reveal any suggested content and which owes its construction only to the strikingness of the expressed meanings and expressions denoting them, gets the name of *citra* or Portrait. It is not Poetry at all, strictly speaking. It is only an imitatation of Poetry. One of the sub-divisions of this portrait–Poetry is word-portrait such as Rhyming Repetition and so on whose employment involves much difficulty. The second sub-division differs from word-portrait and may be called meaning–portrait. It will also be devoid of even a touch of the suggested content and will be wanting in the purport of sentiments etc. Poetic Fancy and such other figures are illustrations of this.

An objector may argue as follows :—

" Now what is this portrait-poetry? That in which there is not a touch of suggested content. The suggested content has been already shown to be three-fold. Of these three types, instances where the first two types of suggested content, viz., ideas and figures are absent, may by all means be imagined as instances of Portrait-Poetry. But indeed no class of poetry is possible in which sentiments etc., are not involved. For, we

cannot of course regard poetry as devoid of content itself. And all subjects in the universe become ultimately connected with some sentiment or emotion, at least in the form of stimulii. Sentiments are indeed so many states of mind; and nothing in the world can be imagined which does not bring about a particular state of mind in man. In case a thing does not have any effect on one's state of mind, it cannot become a subject at all for the poet's activity. When something has become a subject for the poet's activity, how can we speak of it is as protrait"?

This is what we would say in reply :—It is no doubt true that no species of poetry exists which absolutely does not convey sentiment. But all the same, if the poet is seen without any exclusive intention of conveying sentiments, emotions, etc., and is more keen after employing figures only, either of sound of sense, we may take it (for all practical purposes) that the content is devoid of sentiments etc., in view of the keenness after employment of figures. The content of words in poetry is based only upon the poet's intention. Though some sort of apprehension of sentiments, etc., is possible by force of the expressed sense itself even in instances wherein no such keen intention towards them is present on the poet's part, still it will be negligibly slender and from this standpoint also, one might justify the existence of scope for Portrait-Poetry. This is summed up in the following verses :—

1. *The employment of figures in the absence of intention towards the purport of sentiments, emotions, etc., should be regarded as an illustration of Portrait-Poetry.*
2. *If on the otherhand, there exists a sole instention towards sentiments, etc., no poetry can remain outside the sphere of Dhvani or poetry of principal suggestion.*

This class of Poetry, viz., Portrait-Poetry has been recognised at all by us because of the practice of poets who recognise no laws in their usage of words and who go about producing works without any intention of incorporating sentiments, etc., therein. But if we should strictly apply the new principle of

poetry laid down here there can be no class of poetry other than *Dhvani* or poetry with principal suggestion. For, in the absense of wholehearted intention towards sentiments etc., the very activity of poets will not appear charming; and contrariwise, in the presence of whole-hearted intention towards sentiments etc., there will be no subject which will not attain exceeding charm by being made an accessary of the intended sentiment. Even amongst insentient objects, there are none which will not become accessaries of sentiment either by acting as stimulii towards the intended sentiment or at least by a metaphorical application of the behaviour of sentient objects to themselves. Hence it it is that we say—

In the boundless realm of poetry, the poet alone is the creator, and as it pleaseth him, so doth this world revolve.

If the poet be intent upon the erotic sentiment in his poem, the whole world will be suffused with that sentiment. But if he be void of emotion (in his poem), the world too will be void of sentiment. A good poet will freely design even insentient objects to act as sentient ones and sentient objects to act as insentient ones.

Thus it is clear that there is absolutely no such subject which does not become an accessary of the intended sentiment by the poet's desire so long as his concern is solely with sentiment. Nor does it ever fail to acquire exceeding charm when so handled. All this is seen in the works of master-poets. In our own poetic compositions too, we have tried to illustrate these principles as far as possible. Thus viewed, all classes of poetry will come only within the sphere of *Dhvani* or poetry with principal suggestion. From this standpoint of sentiment etc., on the part of the poet, even the class designated by the name of 'poetry of subordinated suggestion' will come only under the sphere of *Dhvani*, as we already said. It has also been said that in quatrains of sweet Flattery and devotional hymns, if sentiments etc., are regarded as subordinate and that in Prakrit verses known as *Hṛdayavatīs* and in some gnomic verses of worldly-wise men, if the expressed sense itself with an

undercurrent of suggested content strikes us as important, the reason is to be sought in the fact that the Poetry of subordinated suggestion too is a derivative of *Dhvani* itself. Thus, when we strictly apply the new principle of poetry enunciated here, we can speak of Portrait-Poetry only in a loose way, only as an aid to the understanding of beginners in the study of poetry. So far as persons with well-developed intellects are concerned, *Dhvani* or poetry with principal suggestion alone will deserve the title of Poetry. So, the following sums up the position :—

Cultured critics should understand that Dhvani whose sole condition is the principal nature of the suggested content embraces all instances of poetry wherein is found a purposively conveyed sentiment or at least an idea or figure conveyed in a covert fashion.

43

It shines in divers ways with its several varieties of subordinated suggestion, Figures, its own sub-varieties, their intermingling and collocation.

If one should take into account the permutations and combinations of the different types of *Dhvani* itself and the varieties of subordinated Suggestion and Figures of sense, their resulting number would be many. Thus to name some of the major manifestations of Dhvani—(1) Merged with its own varieties, (2) Co-existing with its own varieties, (3) Merged with Subordinated Suggestion, (4) Co-existing with subordinated Suggestion, (5) Merged with other Figures of sense, (6) Co-existing with other Figures of sense, (7) Merged with other co-existing figures and (8) Co-existing with other mutually co-existing figures.

The first manifestation will sometimes involve the relationship of the governor–governed as in—'*As the divine sage*', etc.[163] Here the variety of Dhvani, viz., resonance-like Suggestion based upon the power of sense governs the other variety of *Dhvani*, viz., suggestion with unnoticeable sequence.

Sometimes the relationship existing between the two may be one of doubt that both are simultaneously applicable as in the following example :—

O Brother-in-law! this lady
Just came out to see the procession
When your wife said something in her ear
And she is weeping so much.
Pray, you comfort the pitiable lady
In the empty terraced-house close by.[164]

The expression—" Pray, comfort her " may be imagined both as an instance of Suggestion with its expressed content merged in the unexpressed and as an instance of suggestion with the expressed content intended but further-extending. There is no positive ground for deciding one way or the other.

Often we see that several varieties of suggestion with unnoticeable sequence do all enter into a single suggestive word as in the verse—' *The quarters are all smeared* ', etc.[165] ' Co-existence with its own varieties' is also instanced in this verse itself. Here indeed we find a collocation of two varieties of Suggestion viz., that with its expressed content merged in the unexpressed and that with its expressed content wholly lost. ' *That there are enemies* ', etc.,[166] illustrate the mingling of *Dhvani* with subordinated suggestion. Here is another example :—

Do tell us where that Duryodhana is,
That designer of the gambling ruse,
That burner of the lac-dwelling,
That self-conceited one,
That expert in denuding Draupadī
Of her clothes and braids of hair,
That master whose slaves are Pāṇḍavas,
That " King ", that eldest of a hundred brothers
like Duśśāsana,
And that friend of Karṇa ;
We have come here only to see him
And not with anger.[167]

In this example the Suggested content with unnoticeable sequence conveyed by the sentence as a whole is found mixed up with words that denote the expressed with an undercurrent of the suggested content. Though there is thus an intermingling of the subordinated suggestion got through word-content, and

principal suggestion got through sentence-purport, there is no opposition between them just as no opposition will be involved in the intermingling of two varieties of *Dhvani* itself. Just as varieties of *Dhvani* can intermingle without opposition, so also can other manifestations of suggestion based upon word-content and meaning-content intermingle without any opposition.

Furthermore, opposition between the principal and subordinate elements is possible only when the suggested content of the two happens to be one and the same, not when the suggested contents of the two are different from each other. Hence it should be understood that as in the case of denoted-denoter relationship, so in the case of suggested-suggester relationship also, the expressions ' intermingling ' and ' collocation ' do not involve any opposition.

Instances where some of the words have unmeant expressed content or an expressed content implying resonance-like suggested content, will instance Collocation of principal suggestion and subordinated suggestion. ' *How do they do* ', etc.[168] are examples. In this example the expressed—' those companions of the sports ' and ' those witnesses of Rādhā's amours ' carry principal Suggestion while the words ' all those ' and ' I am afraid ' carry subordinated suggestion.

The intermingling of Figures of sense and Suggestion with unnoticeable sequence is most commonly met with in all poetry which is full of sentiments and adorned by Figures. Other varieties of suggestion too can intermingle with Figures as in the following verse of my own authorship :—

That fresh outlook of poets
Whose activity succeeds in enjoying sentiments all
And that learned outlook which proceeds
Towards probing the truth of objects verily—
Both these outlooks we have tried to utilize
In figuring out the world so long
And have become exhausted in the attempt.
O Lord sleeping on the sea,
We never obtained in any of these,
Happiness comparable to devotion for Thee.

In this example, the Figure Paradox is found intermingled with the variety of suggestion, viz., that with the expressed content merged in the unexpressed.

Collocation of Suggestion with Figures of sense is possible only in regard to words. In examples of this kind, some of the words will contain figures of sense while some others will contain varieties of Suggestion. For instance—

Lengthening artfully the sweet and excited notes of the cranes,
And perfumed all over by friendship with the scent of new-blown lotuses at dawn,
The wind over Siprā, so agreeable to the body,
Will remove the women's fatigue of limbs due to amourous sports,
As if he were a dear lover
Proficient in the art of coaxing.

In the word ' friendship ' in this example we have Suggestion with unmeant expressed sense. We have other Figures in the other words.

A way of suggestion intermingled with other Figures which are themselves mutually co-existing is instanced in the following :—

The imprints of teeth and the marks of nails
Left upon your body full of thrill
By the lion-queen intent upon blood, (also, love)
Was gazed at with eagerness even by ascetics.

Here we find Suggestion with unnoticeable sequence intermingled with the Figure Paradox, which in its turn co-exists with the Figure, Condensed Metaphor. For, the main purport of the sentence is nothing but the sentiment of heroic self-sacrifice (due to boundless compassion).

A way of suggestion co-existing with another Figure which in its turn co-exists with yet another Figure is illustrated in the following :—

When days echo the rumbles of new clouds
And look dark to the eyes of travellers (also, 'when the audience of travellers get interested in new performances on the boards')

The dance of peacock-herds with uplifted necks
Looks lovely indeed. (also, ' the vocal music of peacock-flocks accompanying their dance-performance looks lovely ').[170]

Here the way of suggestion, viz., resonance-like suggestion based upon the power of word co-exists with the other Figures, viz., Simile and Metaphor.

44

Such are some of the different ways of principal suggestion and some of the minor classes of the major ways. Who can ever count them exhaustively? We have just indicated, therefore, their direction only.

The ways of principal suggestion are indeed limitless. We have only pointed at their direction with a view to educating cultured critics.

45

Principal Suggestion which we have defined hitherto should be attentively studied not only by all poets who aspire after writing good poetry but also by all critics who aspire after understanding it well.

It is only by their skill in recognising principal suggestion defined above that good poets and good critics attain abiding glory in matters relating to poetry.

46

Those who were unable to explain properly this essential principle of poetry as they had only a glimmering of it (and nothing more), have brought into vogue the theory of styles.

We have explained above the fundamental principle of poetry by using the term *Dhvani*. Since only vague glimmerings of this principle were had by ancient writers, they could not explain it exhaustively and brought into vogue the theory of three Styles, viz., *Vaidarbhī*, *Gauḍī* and *Pāñcālī*.[171] While the theorists of style show only vague flashes of this very principle of poetry, we have very clearly demonstrated it in all its bearings and hence there is nothing for us to consider seriously about the theory of styles.

47

Once this theory of poetry is fully understood, even the so called "Modes" relating to the nature of sounds as well as to the nature of meanings will become intelligible.

When this theory of poetry involving a discrimination of the suggested-suggester relationship is grasped, other categories like literary modes, viz., those relating to sound such as *Upanāgarikā* as well as those reating to sense such as *Kaiśikī* will become quite intelligible (even in the same way as the styles). Otherwise Modes will remain only incredible like unseen objects, and will not come within the range of personal experience (though there might be testimony of the ancients to that effect). Therefore the nature of principal suggestion should be understood clearly.

The definition of *dhvani* suggested by another critic, viz , 'it is that kind of poetry wherein some indefinable charm is brought about both in words and in meanings, a charm which is discernible only to select critics even as the preciousness of rare gems' does not deserve consideration here as it is untenable. For, the uniqueness in the very nature of words which distinguishes one word from another is nothing but absence of unintelligibility and tautology. Similarly the positive excellences of words are harmony, and Suggestivity. The unique excellences of meanings are perspicuity, suggestiveness and association with the suggested element. These unique characteristics of both words and meanings are quite definable and in fact they have been defined in several ways. If one should still imagine that there is some other indefinable uniqueness in words and meanings, it will only indicate that the man has taken leave of his good sense. For, indefinability in the sense of 'inexpressibility by all words' is never indeed possible logically; since at least the word 'indefinable' itself will have ultimately expressed it, if not any other. If one should modify the notion of 'indefinability' to mean 'indeterminate experience of something which eludes determinate usage of words', this view also agrees only with the unique charm of gems and not with the charm of

poetry, since the latter has been explained by several writers on poetics quite determinately unlike the former whose values are seen to be fixed only by imaginary standards. There is of course similarity between the two in the fact that their worth can be recognised only by select connoisseurs. There is no scope for conflict of opinion at all in regard to the fact that only jewellers can recognise the worth of gems and that cultured critics alone can appreciate the sentiments in poems.

As regards the well-known theory of the Buddhists that everything in the world is indefinable, we shall take it up for discussion in our other work concerned with a review of Buddhist theories.[172] It is not taken up here because of our fear that any exhibition here of our learning in other works might only offend the minds of cultured critics. We will only say that our definition of *Dhvani* will be at least on a par with the definitions of perception, etc. proposed by the Buddhist philosophers themselves.

Thus it might be taken that the definition of *Dhvani* propounded here is valid since no other definition will hold good to it and since it is not subsumed by the conventional meanings of words. The following sums up the conclusion :—

Indefinable manifestation is not a definition of
Dhvani, since its content can be defined.
The definition given already should be deemed as
the correct one.

THE FOURTH FLASH

The theory of principal suggestion has been propounded thus far in all its bearings with a view to clearing up conflicting opinions. In what follows, other practical use to which such a theory might be put is explained :—

I

By the ways of principal suggestion as also subordinated suggestion shown thus far, the quality of creative imagination in poets will assume endlessness.

Endlessness of creative imagination in poets will be another outcome of the theory of principal and subordinated suggestion laid down already.

If one should ask—'how is it ?'

2

By a mere touch of even a single variety of suggestion (among the many that have been enumerated), the poet's expression will acquire novelty though it might embody only a trite idea.

The expression of a poet will appear quite novel though it might embody an idea already found in an earlier poet, if it is adorned by at least a single variety of suggestion from among the many varieties that have been mentioned.

How a touch of the two varieties of Suggestion with unmeant expressed content endows novelty even to themes corresponding to those known already is illustrated in the following :—

Her gentle smile is winsome
And the grace of her looks tremulous and sweet,
Her utterance of words is ebullient with novel arts and emotion;
The course of her movements is of the sweet perfume,
That spreads out of an opening bud.
Indeed as the deer-eyed lady steps into her youth,
Is there anything that does not look lovely ?

This verse has acquired a novelty all its own thanks to the touch of Suggestion with unmeant expressed content, notwithstanding the existence of an earlier verse embodying the same idea. Here is the earlier verse :—

To whom are women not dear,
With their graceful smiles and tremulous looks,
With their faltering words and lingering steps,
Due to their heavy hips ?

So also the following verse (1) appears novel because of its association wish Suggestion in which the expressed content is merged in the unexpressed despite the existence of an earlier verse (viz., 2) unfolding the same idea :—

1. *He That is first is first indeed;*
Among the host of beasts,
He that subsists upon the profuse flesh,
Of elephants by himself killed,
Is the lion in truth
By whom will the lion be baffled then ?

2. *Can one who has won glory by the wealth of his own valour*
Be outshone by anyone else ?
Will ever the lion be defeated
Even by the mightiest elephant ?

Novelty is seen in the same way by a touch of these varieties of suggestion with meant but further-extending expressed content ;—The first is the new verse and the second an old one embodying the same idea :—

1. *The bride placed her face over her lover's,*
Feigning sleep as he lay,
And stayed so for a while close to his forehead,
Her eagerness to kiss him being halted
By her fear that he might wake up.
He too would not take the initiative
Fearing that she might turn away her face
Because of bashfulness.

His heart in that acute suspense
Reached the acme of delight!

2. *Seeing the sleeping chamber secluded,*
The young wife gently rose a bit from her bridal bed
And went on feasting her eyes for long
On the face of her husband feigning sleep;
She then kissed his face without hesitation
And finding that his cheeks were thrilled at her kiss,
She bent down her head abashed.
Then it was that the laughing husband
Kissed her long in turn.[173]

Another example, equally striking, is the verse :—'*Frowning with its waves as with brows,*' *etc.*[174] Despite the existence of verses like—nānābhaṅgī-bhramadbhrūḥ.[175]

3

The sentiments etc., whose scope is very wide should be followed along the said course. The limited range of poetry has become so unlimited only because of their influence.

The scope of sentiments, emotions, their semblances, and their cessations is indeed very vast in view of the numerous varieties of stimulii and responses that are possible in regard to each of them. This has indeed been shown already. And all of them should be followed only along the said course (of suggestion). It is indeed because of the influence of sentiments, etc., that the field of poetry which has been narrowed down in divers ways by the works of a thousand poets, or to be precise, of innumerable poets in the past, can still hold out infinite possibilities (for present as well as future poets). Sentiments and emotions, etc., become infinite indeed because of the association of each one of them with different stimulli, responses and passing moods. Even if the poet handles a subject taken from life in deference to the demands of any single sub-division of these, the subject becomes infused with characteristics quite unknown to it in life. This has already been set forth in our

treatment of Portrait-Poetry. A master-poet has indeed written a sententious verse conveying this fact :—

Homage to the Muse of gifted poets
Which makes us feel in our hearts
As though things which are quite unreal
Are very real forsooth.

The infinity attained by poetic themes due to their association with sentiments, emotions, etc., has been demonstrated hitherto. This is accounted for in the following:—

4

Even trite subjects in poetry will put on a new freshness if they get into touch with sentiment just as the same trees appear quite new with the advent of spring.

The following illustrates how novelty is achieved by a commonplace theme due to the influence of resonance-like suggestion based upon the power of word under the class of suggestion with meant but further-extending expressed content :—

1. *Now you alone are left with (also, the primeval Serpent) for bearing the burden of the earth.*[176]

2. *The Primeval Serpent, Mount Himālaya, and you—*
Are all great, mighty and constant;
For the moving earth is borne by all the three
Without overstepping the self-apportioned limits.

The second is the older verse.

An illustration of novelty due to the influence of resonance-like suggestion based upon the power of sense is found in the verse—'*As the divine sage*', etc.[177] despite the existence of verses like—

When the talk about the bridegroom is going on,
Girls bend down their faces in bashfulness
And indicate the eagerness within their hearts
By their bristling thrills outside. [178]

In the instance '*The spring keeps ready*', etc,[179] we have novelty due to the touch of the same variety of Suggestion with a subject which is real only in the ornate expression of the poet despite the existence of verses like—

At the advent of spring,
Do come forth at once
Longings in lovers' hearts
And buds in the mango-tree.[180]

In the instance '*O merchant*,' etc.[181] we have novelty due to the touch of the same variety of suggestion with a subject which is real only in the ornate expression of a character invented by a poet despite the presence of verses like—

My son who brought widowhood to cow-elephants
By shooting just a single shaft
Has now been reduced to such a state
By this wretched daughter-in-law
That he must carry a bundle of shafts.

Novelty is produced in poetic themes not only by their union with the varieties of suggested content, but also by their contact with the varieties of the suggestive elements. But we will not record it here lest the work should grow too voluminous. Cultured critics have to imagine it for themselves.

Though it has been reiterated again and again, still the following is said once more since it happens to be the very essence of the matter at issue :—

5

Though several varieties of the suggested–suggester relationship is possible, the poet should be most intent upon one of them in particular, viz., that relating to the delineation of sentiments, etc

Though words involving the relation of suggested-suggester are possible in various ways, the poet desirous of securing novel poetic themes should be most intent upon one of them only, viz., suggestion of sentiments, etc. So long as the poet exercises undeflected concentration regarding the suggested contents, viz., sentiment, emotion, its semblance, and the suggesters previously explained, viz., letter, word, sentence, and composition, and the work as a whole, the poet's entire work will become strikingly novel. That is why in epics like the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, the subjects of 'battle' etc., appear quite new though they are described again and again.

In a work as a whole, the delineation of a single sentiment as the predominant one will endow not only novelty of content but also abundance of charm. If one should ask for examples we would say in reply that the *Rāmāyaṇa* is itself one example and that the *Mahābhārata* is another. Into *Rāmāyaṇa* indeed, the First Poet himself has incorporated the sentiment of pathos as is clear by his own declaration—"*Sorrow has taken the turn of a stanza*".[182] It has in fact been kept up as predominant till the very end of the work in view of his concluding the work only at the point of the eternal loss of Sītā by Rāma.

In the *Mahābhārata* too, which combines both the elements of instruction and poetry in one, it will be seen that its conclusion in a note of despair consequent to miserable deaths of Vṛṣṇis as well as Pāṇḍavas, as constructed by the great sage, reveals his primary intention of preaching the moral of renunciation through his work and throws light upon the fact that he meant final emancipation as the foremost of human values and Quietude as the most predominant sentiment in the whole work. This has been partially brought out even by other commentators on the *Mahābhārata*. Even the reverend sage himself whose foremost desire was the rescue of his fellowmen from the deep abyss of ignorance in which they were weltering by vouchsafing to them the light of supreme knowledge, has declared in no uncertain terms :—

'*Just in the same proportion as worldly pursuits*
Turn out to be unavailing,
One's sense of aversion to them will become firm ;
There is no doubt at all.'

and so on in the same strains more than once. It stands out most clearly that the main purport of the *Mahābhārata* is

the communication of the fact that Quietude is to be regarded as the most prominent sentiment, the others being secondary to it and that final emancipation is the most prominent of human values, the other values being only subsidiary to it. The principal-subordinate relationship of sentiments has been set forth already.

Just as the body might be invested with prominence though it is only secondary when the really prominent soul is not taken into consideration, so also a secondary sentiment as well as a secondary value might be justly regarded as prominent in itself and beautiful.

It might be urged by some that all the points sought to be conveyed in the *Mahābhārata* have been enumerated exhaustively in the Introduction itself while the above point is conspicuous by its absence in the Introduction. They might add that on the other hand Vyāsa expressly claims in the Introduction that his work throws light on all the human values and that it contains all the sentiments.[183]

Here is our answer to the objection :...Though it is true that nowhere in the Introduction we come across an express statement to the effect that in the *Mahābhārata*, Quietude is intended to be the most prominent of all sentiments and that final emancipation is intended to be the most prominent of all human values, it is also true this has been conveyed in a suggestive way through the sentence—

> *Herein, forsooth, will be glorified*
> *Lord Vāsudeva, the Eternal.*[184]

The idea implied in this sentence is that all the other subjects described in the *Mahābhārata* such as the exploits of the Pāṇḍavas end only in tragedy and belong only to the realm of ignorance while the only eternal and truly abiding subject glorified here is Lord Vāsudeva. Therefore (suggests Vyāsa), be devoted in heart only to that supreme Lord; don't remain attached to empty pleasures and don't be too intent upon excellences even like statesmanship, modesty, and valour just for their own sakes'! Similar suggestive statements bringing out

the futility of worldly existence are found in the later portions also of the Introduction. The verses that immediately follow, viz., '*He alone is Real*', etc.[185] are also imbued with this very significance.

By appending *Harivaṁśa* at the end of the *Mahābhārata*, the great Poet-Creator Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana has made this inner and beautiful significance abundantly clear. By propagating the cause of whole-hearted devotion in that Absolute Reality beyond the realm of worldly existence, he appears definitely to have regarded the entire activities of worldly existence to be of the nature of a *prima facie* case (deserving refutation). He indulges in lengthy descriptions of the greatness of deities, sacred spots, asceticism, etc., only because they serve, in his opinion, as the channels of realising that Supreme Reality; other particular gods also are glorified only as so many manifestations of His Supreme glory. The description of the exploits of Pāṇḍavas etc., is also meant to produce a sense of renunciation; renunci-tion, in its turn, is the very root-cause of final emancipation, and final emancipation itself has been shown in the *Bhagavadgītā* and so forth to be a means towards the attainment of the Supreme *Reality*. Thus, indirectly, even the description of the exploits of Pāṇḍavas etc., might be regarded as a means towards the attainment of the Supreme Reality. Instead of referring to the Supreme Reality by the very word Supreme Reality, Vyāsa uses a synonym, viz. Vāsudeva. By this word Vāsudeva we should consider as intended the meaning of Supreme Reality only, which is the abode of boundless power because in several contexts like the Gītā, this word has been widely used to convey the meaning of Supreme Reality itself. It should not be under-stood to mean only the human being born as son of Vāsudeva in Mathurā but the Supreme Reality itself imitating in every way the nature of such a human being born in Mathurā; because, the word under consideration, viz., Vāsudeva, is qualified by the adjective, viz, Eternal. And in other works like the Rāmāyaṇa, we find this word used as a proper name for other incarnations also of the Supreme Lord. This fact has indeed been established even by grammarians themselves.

Hence we are quite justified in saying that the purport implied by the sage for the sentence in question of the Introductory chapter is the perishable nature of everything with the single exception of the Supreme Lord and that the *Mahābhārata* as a whole is intended by him to convey the highest human value, viz., final emancipation, when the work is regarded as a scripture and to delineate the sentiment of Quietude whose nature is of heightening the tranquil happiness at the cessation of desire as the predominant sentiment in the work when it is regarded as a poem. As this purport happens to be the most essential one, it has not been stated expressly but conveyed by way of suggestion. An intrinsically essential idea acquires beauty only when it is revealed in a way other than the expressed. In polished literary circles it has indeed become a convention to communicate their best ideas only through suggestion and not at all by express words.

Therefore, the conclusion is irresistible that novelty in poetic theme as well as great beauty of construction is achieved by adopting a single predominant sentiment into a poem as a whole. That is why such compositions containing only themes in keeping with sentiment are often seen to hold out abundant charm although they may be lacking in different figures of speech. For instance—

'Victory to that sage, the foremost of asceties,
The mighty soul who was pitcher-born ;
For he could behold both the divine Fish and Tortoise
In the hollow of his single hand.'

and such others might be cited. The idea that in the hollow of a single hand, one could see both the divine Fish and Tortoise heightens the sentiment of Wonder. Further, though the idea of the whole ocean being comprised in the hollow of the sage's hand is traditional, the idea that both the divine forms of the Lord, viz., the Fish and the Tortoise were seen by him there at the same time, is most original and it heightens the sentiment mentioned, all the more. An idea which is already familiar due to wide currency among people will not cause surprise though it might embodp an element of wonder.

An original poetic theme conforms not only to the sentiment of wonder but also to the other sentiments as in the following example :—

That part of her body which touched
The end of your balance as you passed her along the street,
Still sweats, horripilates and shivers,
Thou handsome youngman !

The sentiment apprehended by contemplating upon the verse as it is, will never be had by any express statement to the effect, 'By your touch, she sweats, horripilates and shivers.'

Thus we have demonstrated how poetic themes are rendered new by the contact of one or another major variety of *Dhvani* or principal suggestion. In the same way, the element of subordinated suggestion too which is threefold from the point of view of the suggested content will ensure novelty to poetic themes if adopted into the work. But we have refrained from illustrating it here in detail for fear of making the work swell unduly. Cultured critics should fancy it for themselves.

6

So long as these varieties of principal and subordinate suggestion are utilised in a work and so long as the poet has the gift of creative imagination (in so utilising them), there can be no dearth of poetic themes.

The ellipsis to be supplied in the text is 'notwithstanding the existence of several ancient poetic works' before 'so long as he has the gift of creative imagination.' But in the absence of creative imagination, the poet can certainly have no poetic theme at all. Nor can it be held justifiably that even in the absence of creative imagination directed towards vision of meanings, strikingness in style is possible of achievement since style is nothing but employment of apt words to convey both types of meaning (viz. the expressed and the suggested). Cultured critics would certainly not countenance the position that style is a mere arrangement of letters without any concern regarding the meaning to be conveyed. At that rate, every

clever arrangement of sweet-sounding syllables, irrespective of meaning, should have deserved the designation of poetry. But it might be asked whether the designation of poetry is not commonly applied to all unions of words and meanings including the ones under consideration (viz , those that owe their beauty to style alone). Our reply is that such specimens are regarded as poetry only in a loose way after the analogy of a composition which is allowed to be ascribed to an imitator though it contains only ideas borrowed from another poet.

This infinitude of poetic themes is brought about not only by way of suggested content but also by way of expressed content. This is set forth in the following: —

7

Infinitude is achieved by the expressed content also even when it remains in its pure and natural state, by reason of the considerations of circumstance, place, time, etc.

Even expressed content which is pure, that is to say, independent of the suggested element, will attain to infinitude in the natural course of things. It is indeed the nature of expressed content that it becomes infinite by differences of circumstance, place and time as also by differences within itself in sentient as well as insentient objects. Even a faithful description of the divers natures of such express ideas in a well-known way will bring about endlessness in poetic themes. To illustrate the novelty due to differences in circumstance, we may mention the description of Pārvatī in the *Kumārasambhava*. Though the description of her beauty has been completed even at the outset by the verses beginning with : '*By a combination of all subjects bearing comparison, etc.*,'[185] she is once again made the subject of description in a different way as the instrument of Cupid when she comes within the range of Lord Śiva's sight in verses such as : " *Decked in the ornamental flowers of spring*," *etc.*[186] ; and furtheron her exceeding beauty of form is described yet again at length in conveying how she was dressed up as a bride at the time of the wedding in verses beginning with: '*Placing that damsel in her front*',[187]. These repeated descriptions of the poet

do not appear at all as tautological or as devoid of ever-fresh and rich significance. This has indeed been strikingly declared in my work-*Viṣamabāṇalīlā* :

There is no limit to them
And they will never look like repetitions : —
The graces of sweethearts
And the meanings of good poets' words.

The second variety of ' circumstance ' is this: All insentient objects such as the mountain Himavān and the river Gaṅgā are accredited with a second sentient personality that presides over their insentient form. That presiding personality of theirs lends itself to be treated in a way natural to other sentient persons and when so treated it will appear quite novel. For instance, in the *Kumārasambhava* itself, we have first of all a description of Himavān in his mountainous form and later on he is endowed with the nature of a sentient man and addressed persuasively by the Seven Sages. We find novelty positively in such description. This is indeed an established practice of poets. This principle has been shown at length in the *Viṣamabāṇalīlā* for the benefit of poets seeking instruction.

Even among sentient themes, 'circumstances' of age such as childhood, bring about novelty. This is, in fact, commonly found in the works of poets. And even between two themes whose circumstance of age is identical, there might exist other minor circumstances conducing to difference. For example what a world of difference is there between girls who are love-smitten and girls who are not (though they might be of the same age) ! And even amongst one class of these, there might exist further variations due to their modesty or wantonness. Again, in insentient themes too there is scope for difference in circumstances like germination, etc. Utilisation of individual differentiating circumstances like this into poetry would endow it with infinitude. Here is an example:—

Such terminal sprouts of the lotus-creeper,
As compete in beauty with the peeping tusks
Of a young she-elephant,

And by eating which a unique sweetness of sound
Is attained by the cooing swans
Through the clearing up of their throats
By the astringency of their taste,
Have now come out in lotus-ponds.

In the same way other examples too should be imagined (by the readers themselves).

Variety due to place is possible in insentient themes also. Thus winds blowing from different directions and over different places and even other objects like waters and flowers are well-known to vary. In sentient objects, of course, individual differences in men, beasts and birds due to their being brought up in town, forest, water, (respectively) are found to be most remarkable. If these differences are properly appreciated and embodied in a work, the scope of poetic themes will naturally become infinite. To illustrate :—Among men only, there are so many differences in speech, dress, etc., between one individual and another due to their differences in province and country that no one can recount them exhaustively. This is much more so in regard to variations in women. All this is incorporated into their works by poets according to their individual imaginations.

Variety is contributed by time also. For instance, seasonal differences bring about differences in atmosphere, sky, water, and such other insentient objects. With reference to sentient beings also, feelings of anxiety, etc., produced by particular times are well-known.

Equally well-known is the practice of describing all objects in the world with an eye to their innate individual differences.

At this point, some might raise an objection: 'Objects are communicated only by their generic nature and not at all by their specific traits. On the basis of their own personal experiences of joy, etc., and their causes, poets universalise that the same experiences should follow from the same causes elsewhere also. Thus they embody ideas in their works only on the basis of the generic nature of experience common to them as well as other persons. Surely, poets do not have any direct vision into the specific variations of all things in the past, present and future like Yogins. And the generic universal of experience which is common to all experiences that are possible and which is common to men, one and all, is but restricted in scope and one can very well regard it to have been completely exhausted by the ancient poets themselves. For one cannot reasonably say that it has remained outside the ken of the ancients all along. Hence the idea of the moderners that a specific variation of an object is being presented in a novel fashion is only an empty boast. The only variation that actually exists is the manner of presenting the (old) idea ; that is all'.

This is our reply :—The statement that poetry proceeds only on the basis of generic nature and this being but limited, it must have been exhausted already and therefore there can be no novelty about poetic themes, is incorrect. For, if it were true that poetry proceeds on the basis of generic nature only, how could we account for the fact that the objects described by master-poets possess the highest beauty ? Furthermore, since there would be no matter for poetry except universals, there would be no possibility at all for a second poet to be rightly so regarded after Vālmīki, the first poet; for he will have already exhausted the poetic subject which is a generic universal. The objector might explain it away by pointing out that it is variation in the manner of presentation which entitles a second person to call himself a poet. But we would ask the counter-question-what exactly is this 'variation in the manner of presentation' ? Presentation is nothing but speech which is capable of conveying the intended sense. If there should be variation in the manner of presentation how then can there be no variation in the matter which is so presented ? Matter and manner are indeed related by the inseparable relationship of inherence. The generic nature of matter in poetry however is cognised as non-different from its specific variations. So an adherent of the doctrine of variation in manner of presentation will be forced by logic to accept variation in matter too,

whether he desires it or not. The following states this in brief:

If one would reckon at least a single person besides Vālmīki as endowed with poetic genius, there is no escaping the principle that poetic themes are infinite.

Moreover, the contention that variation in manner of presentation conditions novelty in poetry, is more in line with our own view. For, the number of conditions which have been shown by us so far to govern the novelty of poetic themes will be doubled in fact in view of the variation in manner of presentation. The whole group of well-known figures like Simile and *double entendre*, will itself assume infinite variation and branch off into a hundred ramifications when employed with a view to variation in the manner of presention. Variation in manner may bring about infinitude of poetic themes in another way also. Since the meanings of expressions are restricted to a particular language only, if various other meanings are also conveyed by the same expressions from the standpoint of other languages, we will have strikingness of subject matter. One of my own verses can be cited as an example:

The time of men is spent
In repeating "Mine, Mine" (also, "Madhumathana" according to another dialect);
Even so, Lord Janārdana does not
Come within the range of one's mind.[188]

Thus, the deeper we examine the nature of poetic themes, the more we will be convinced of their endlessness. This much, however, might be stated here:

8

We find in plenty examples of utilising the expressed content with variations of circumstance, etc. But it will shine out only in the association of sentiment.

The phrases 'as has been shown already' and 'it cannot be denied that' should be understood in the text in the latter and former half respectively of the first sentence.

Hence the following is stated in brief for the edification of good poets.

9

If only the real nature of objects in the world, differing as it does according to place, time, and so on, is utilised in such a way that it is imbued with sentiment, emotion, etc., and that it is in keeping with the demands of propriety;

The ellipsis to be supplied in the following text is—"not to speak of human poets with limited powers".

10

Like the resources of Primordial Nature herself, the infinite possibilities of poetic themes can never be drained off even by a million Bṛhaspatis composing with all their might simultaneously.

Though Primordial Nature has been responsible for the creation of numerous worlds containing varied objects over legion cycles of past aeons, it is not possible to say even now that her ability for the creation of new objects has diminished even by a jot. So also, the realm of poetry will not grow less though countless poetic minds might take nourishment from it. On the contrary, it will become richer with newer and newer possibilities. All the same—

11ab

There are bound to be plenty of coincidences amongst great minds;

For it is a wellknown truth that the thoughts of great men bear strong affinities to one another.

11cd

But all of them should not be regarded by the wise as being identical (in respect of plagiarism).

The following points out how they are not identical.

12

Coincidence means correspondence with another. It may be like that of a reflected image, or like that of a painted picture or like that of two living persons resembling each other.

Coincidence in poetic themes is just another name for the resemblance of one poetic theme to another. It is decided to be of three kinds—(1) Like that of a reflected image of persons,

(2) Like that of a painted picture of persons, and (3) Like that of two living persons resembling each other. Some poetic themes are like reflections of other poetic themes; some others are like painted pictures of other poetic themes. Still others are just similar to other poetic themes.

13

Of these, the first has no separate existence at all of its own; the existence of the second is no more than a nonentity; while the third has a definite existence of its own. A poet need not reject such similiarity in themes.

An intelligent man should avoid the first kind of coincidence, viz., that like a reflected image, because it has no separate life of its own or, in other words, not even a real body of its own. The second kind of coincidence, viz., that like a painted portrait also deserves to be eschewed since its soul is nothing but a nonentity though it has a body of its own. But the third kind of coincidence in poetic themes need not be rejected by the poet at all since it possesses a lovely body of its own which is real (as well as a distinct soul). It is not at all possible to affirm that two living persons who bear close resemblance of features are identical with each other.

This is accounted for in the following :—

14

So long as there is a separate life of its own even a poetic theme, bearing close correspondence to an earlier one will acquire exceeding beauty, juct as the delightful face of a woman will appear exceedingly charming in spite of its strong resemblance to the moon.

So long as its vital essence is present, even a poetic theme similar to an earlier one will appear exceedingly beautiful. Just as a body appears lovely thanks to the association of even past graces, so also a poetic theme will look graceful even while it bears similarity to lovely shades of meaning in earlier works. It will never appear as tautological. The face of a lady bearing resemblance to the moon is a simile.

Hitherto different coincidences between units of whole

sentences have been clearly demarcated. In the following it is shown that correspondences between individual words in poetic themes do not become flaws at all :—

15

Even when the already existing elements of poetic themes such as arrangements of letters, etc, are utilised, it will certainly not smack of a flaw so long as the poetic theme as a whole is shining with novelty.

Not even a Bṛhaspati can use letters or words which are entirely new. Though the self-same letters and words which are common to all poetry are employed in present works also, their novelty does not suffer on that account. The same is true of meanings too which are conveyed by words involving *double entendre*. Therefore,

16ab

Whatever theme it might be, so long as it produces the impression in the minds of people: "Yes, this is a lovely and unique flash";

The meaning is 'so long as the favourable impression that it is an extrodiuary flash is produced in the mind of cultured critics'.

16cd

Though it might smack of earlier usages, a theme can very well be utilised by a good poet. He will never become an object of censure by so doing.

Even such a theme reflecting a shade of another earlier thought can very well be utilised by a good poet so that a new grace of construction, involving a composition of words capable of surrendering the expressed content to the intended suggestive content, is made to shine forth. He will not be open to any reproach if he does this.

Hence the following cannot be gainsaid.

17ab

May words that appear (to critics) as full of manifold ideas and ambrosial sentiments be freely spread out. Poets need have no compunctions in the flawless realm of their own.

Poets need not be under the impression that only new ideas should be striven after and that there is no virtue in writing what others have already written.

17cd

The Goddess of Speech, Sarasvatī, herself will provide the desired ideas for a good poet whose mind is averse to borrowing the belongings of another.

For a poet whose mind is averse to the idea of borrowing the belongings of another, the Goddess of Speech, Sarasvatī herself will provide the desired matter. The creative activity of good poets is indeed an outcome of the fruition of excessive merit amassed by them in past births and such men will neither be eager in borrowing ideas invented by others nor will they find any need of taking great pains over their work. The Goddess Sarasvatī herself will present them the ideas that they are after. This in fact is the greatness in the poetry of great poets. Amen ![189]

Poetry indeed is the name of a veritable garden of gods (also, of scholars); it puts on beauty of qualities and ornaments which are not only delicate but also befitting to the heightening of sentiments; from it do blessed men gather all the objects after their hearts. We have shown in it the presence of dhvani (lit. Sound) or Suggestion and may it prove a source of enjoyment to sublime souls even like the magnificient Wish-fulfilling Tree !

The true nature of the essence of good poetry was but dimly discerned and remained asleep as it were, all along, even in the minds of men with mature intelligence. It has now been set forth at length in order that it might wake up once again in cultured critics, by one who is known by the famous name—Ānandavardhana.[190]

NOTES

1 This invocation at the commencement of the work is more than a mere conventional etiquette. Abhinavagupta contents himself with explaining its hidden suggestions as relating to *Vīrarasa*, to ideas like the unique efficiency of the Lord's nails and to Figuresl ike *Vyatireka*, *Utprekṣā* and *Apahnuti*. It appears to me that there is also a veiled reference here to the singular abilities of the author in silencing all controversies about *dhvani*. An invocation to Lord Nara-simha is indeed most apt in a work which sets out to demolish all orthodox notions inimical to the proper pu·suit of poetry.

2 The views of those who denied *dhvani* are recorded for the first time by Ānandavardhana ; and we have no evidence to decide their historical authenticity. For a fuller account of the theory of *dhvani* prior to the Dhvanyāloka, see my article, *Germs of the Theory of Dhvani*, A.B.O.R.I. vol. XXVIII pt. 3-4.

3 Qualities *(guṇas)*, and figures of sound and of sense (*S'abda*-and *artha-alaṅkāras*), refer to the formal categories of Sanskrit Rhetoric taught by Bhāmaha in his *Kāvyālaṅkāra*. *Rītis* were popularised by Vāmara.

4 Divsions (*Vṛttis*) like *upanāgarikā* were formulated by Udbhaṭa in *Kāvyālaṅkārasaṅgraha* (Ch. I). Compare—

शषाभ्यां रेफसंयोगैष्टवर्गेण च योजिता ।
परुषा नाम वृत्तिः स्याद् ह्लह्ह्याद्यैश्च संयुता ।।
सरूपसंयोगयुतां मूर्ध्नि वर्गान्त्ययोगिभिः ।
स्पर्शैर्युतां च मन्यन्ते उपनागरिकां बुधाः ।।
शेषैर्वर्णैर्यथायोगं कथिता कोमलाख्यया ।
ग्राम्यां वृत्तिं प्रशंसन्ति काव्येष्वादृतबुद्धयः ।।

But he got his cue from Bhāmaha's account of Alliteration.

5 Manoratha, a contemporary of Ānandavardhana, according to Abhinavagupta.

6 Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa is a very respected name in Sanskrit Poetics. He was a courtier of King Jayāpīḍa of Kashmir (779—813 A.D.) and wrote works on Poetics like the **काव्यालङ्कारसंग्रह** and **भामहविवरण.** The latter is lost.

7 The verse is from Hāla's anthology of Prakrit lyrics known as **गाथासप्तशती;** No. 175 in Weber's edition.

8 Op. Cit. No. 669.

9 Op. Cit. No. 944 (Supplement 7).

10 Op Cit. No. 968.

11 Abhinavagupta says that this is spoken by a clever friend who wants to warn her guilty mistress of the approach of her husband.

12 i.e., in the Second Flash. With the concluding considerations under Kārikā 4, Compare—

"Whatever noble, elevated, moral or otherwise admirable sentiments my be explicitly stated by the poet, they are clearly not to be taken *as proof* ofihas lofty poetic stature.........There is a big difference between controlling and conveying feelings and talking about them." —I. A. Richards, *Practical Criticism*, P. 355.

13 Ānandavardhana says that "the sorrow of the First Poet, viz. Vālmīki at the (ultimate) separation of the curlew-couple, transformed itsel, into a verse". (The verse in question is *Rāmāyaṇa*, I. ii. 15). He adds in thfe Vṛtti 'that sorrow is indeed the *Sthāyibhāva* or abiding emotion which is at the root of *karuṇarasa* or the sentiment of pathos'. Once again, in the *Vṛtti* on IV. 5, he refers to this fact and states in so many words that he has woven (āsūtritaḥ) this *karuṇarasa* into the *Rāmāyaṇa* as the predominant sentiment. All these taken together will not leave such doubt in the mind of the reader about the meaning of Ānandavardhana. But this does not quite square up with the position of Abhinavagupta that *Rasa* is only the aesthetic experience of the *sahṛdaya* or reader or spectator. It is *āsvādya* or *carvaṇāviṣaya* only to the mind *(cittavṛtti)* of the disinterested spectator: As much Vālmīki has to be fancied by him as a disinterested spectator who 'enjoys' the sentiment of pathos instead of 'suffering' the emotion of sorrow when he sees the pitiful spectacle of the curlew irreparably separated from its mate, through death at the hands of the hunter. The passages—*na tu muneḥ s'oka iti mantavyaṃ* etc. in the *Locana* might be read in this connection. He goes one step further and says that this 'aesthetic delight' due to the pathetic sentiment surges so much in the breast of Vālmīki that it *overflows* in the form of a verse because it is of the very nature of a state of mind to overflow in the form of expressions, when it has melted. Strangely enough, he quotes with approval the statement of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka that "unless the poet is full of sentiment himself, he cannot infuse it into his poem" (cf. *Yāvatpūrṇo na caitena tāvannaiva vamatyamuṃ)* We call this strange because Abhinavagupta himself makes it clear in other places (See Kāvyaprakāśa, ch. IV, for a summary of Abhinava's view) that *Rasa* is the aesthetic experience of the connoisseur alone and not that of the creative artist in his creative moments; that the poet also can have the full experience of *rasa* only in his capacity of a *sahṛdaya* or critic of his own work, that in short, *Rasa* is possible only in the realm of art and not in the hard world of reality where only the play of emotions is seen. (At the most the poet may have *rasa* only in a germinal form since its full enjoyment is by the *sahṛdaya* alone. Cf. Abhinavabhāratī P. 95.)

All these lucubrations only take us off at a tangent and lead us into the land of confusion. What Ānandavardhana meant is simple enough. He meant that poets should be intent upon making their works full of sentiment and even Vālmīki himself has utilised the emotional inspiration he got from life towards the delineation of the pathetic sentiment as the predominant one in the whole of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. His sorrow itself, true enough indeed, found an outlet not in tears but in poetry because he was a creative genius, and because he could steadily keep before his mind the different considerations that help to achieve unity of sentiment throughout his work. The word *Rasa* in short is used by Ānandavardhana in its usually accepted sense and not in the specific sense after the heart of Abhinavagupta. According to Ānandavardhana, *Rasas* may be found in works and there may be conflicting *Rasas (viruddharasas)* in the same work. The only point of note is that their existence is realised only by way of suggestion. But according to Abhinavagupta *Rasas* have no previous existence. They arise for the first time in the mind of the spectator *(Cf. Rasāḥ pratīyante iti odanam paca itivad vyavahāraḥ)*. Ānandavardhana is not unmindful of what Abhinavagupta says; but he uses the term *Rasa* loosely in its general connotation. While Ānandavardhana has written the *Karika* from the standpoint of the poet whose duty it is to delineate chiefly sentiments etc., in due regard to the fact that they are only suggestible and not expressible Abhinavagupta interprets this text from the point of view of the critic's aesthetic delight.

Further evidence in support of our simple interpretation of Ānandavardhana's view of Rasa is furnished by the following passages—

i On p. 318 (Kashi Sanskrit Series Edn.) Ānandavardhana states in so many words that the poet or a character invented by him may be either suffused with *Rasa* or may be without it; And that the locus of *Rasa* may be either the hero or the ante-hero. (वक्ता कविः कविनिबद्धो वा; कविनिबद्धश्चापि रसभावरहितो रसभावसमन्वितो वा। रसोऽपि कथानायकाश्रयस्तद्विपक्षाश्रयो वा।) The meanings of these straight remarks will have to be twisted if we take Rasa to mean the reader's aesthetic enjoyment.

ii. In Ch. III Rasas are said to be governed by *Prabandhaucitya* and so forth. This remark will be meaningful only when *Rasas* are taken as the *cittavṛttis* that constitute the subject of a work and not when they are taken as the reader's *cittavṛttis*.

iii. While explaining the word *rasākṣiptatayā* in Karikā II. 16, Ānandavardhana states explicitly that figures come at the beck and call of a *poet* suffused with emotion ....रससमाहितचेतसः कवेरहंपूर्विकया परापतन्ति।

iv. The use of the word *rasābhāsa* in the same context as something desirable in poetry and not as something detestable shows that the reference is to the content of poetry and not to the content of the critic's mind. If *rasa* means the delight of the critic, how can its *ābhāsa* or semblance be delectable to the same degree?

v. *Rasas* are frequently said to be alaṅkārya or things beautified by alaṅkāras or Figures (II 6 etc.). How can this be possible unless Rasas form the content of poetry?

vi. Rasas like *s'ṛṅgāra* are held to be more delectable than others (cf. II. 7 f etc,). Can we think of such distinctions if Rasas relate only to the reader's delight ?

7 Figures, like *s'leṣa* and *virodha* are said to suggest *Rasa* in instances like '*Tasyā vināpi hāreṇa......*' (p. 236, Kashi Sanskrit Series Edition.) The Rasa so suggested will more naturally be that of the poet rather than the critic's.

I have written this note at such length because eminent scholars like Prof. M. Hiriyanna have taken Rasa in the sense made out by Abhinavagupta and claimed that one of the contributions of Indian Poetics to world literary criticism is the idea that the poet's personal emotion is not of much value in poetry, and that in lyrics too, we may not have any glimpse into the poet's personal emotion (Vide, Hiriyanna, *Art Experience*, Radhakrishnan Memorial Volume, Allen and Unwin.). I believe that this was never the position of Ānandavardhana though it might find support from Abhinavagupta. In the process of creation, the poet's personal emotion does have a very important place though it becomes quite irrelevant from the standpoint of the reader since he may be interested only in enjoying the emotion to the extent it has been universalised. *S'oka* according to Ānandavardhana was found in Vālmiki as a personal emotion (bhāva) and it was this that inspired him to write a distich. But readers take interest in it because it was transformed into a universalised *Rasa* of *Karuṇa*, through the distich.

14 There are two readings of the text here of the word translated by us—" if they are not good songsters." The readings are *Pragītānām* and *apragītānām*. Abhinavagupta gives the etymological meaning of *pragīta* only ; but his commentators, (like Rāmasāraka, Uttuṅgodaya and Kuppaswami Sastri) think that he is in favour of the reading *apragītānām* in the text. Hermann Jacobi follows the *Kāvymālā edition* and adopts the reading *pragītānām* in his German translation which reads—

".........Wie solchen, welche nur die Theorie der Musik kennen die individuellen ganzen und Zwischentone guter Sanger unerkeunbar sind." (Z.D.M.G. Vol. LVI, p. 588). The word *pragīta* means "good singer" according to both Abhinavagupta and Jacobi ; not "good song." The word appears with the genitive case-ending in the text and the question is whether it is to be construed with the immediately following word गान्धर्वलक्षणविदाम् or with the immediately preceding word स्वरश्रुत्यादिलक्षणम्. Jacobi adopts the latter construction and translates that those who know the theory of music only might miss the 'whole note' (semibreve) and middle notes of good singers. But we have preferred the other construction in so far as it agrees on all fours with the comparison in question. The balance may be brought out as follows :

1	वाच्यवाचकलक्षणमात्रकृतश्रमाणां	=	गान्धर्वलक्षणविदाम्
2	काव्यतत्त्वार्थभावनाविमुखानां	=	अप्रगीतानाम्
	put in apposition to above.		put in apposition to above.

3	असावार्थः Subject.	=	स्वरश्रुत्यादिलक्षणम्
4	अगोचरः Predicate	=	अगोचरम् Predicate understood.

The passage is very significant as illustrative of Ānandavardhana's aesthetic attitude which surveys the other arts too like Music in discussions about poetry unlike his predecessors who gave only rules of Rhetoric.
For the whole idea in this Kārikā, cf.—

" The real danger of *dictionary understanding* is that it so easily prevents us from perceiving the limitations of our understanding ;... In addition to directing a fairly precise thought, most language simultaneously endeavours to excite some refinement of feeling. This function of language fails at least as often as the communication of sense. And our means of discovering for ourselves whether we have or have not understood this feeling correctly are even less satisfactory than in the case of thought. As a rule, close contact with persons who are exacting in this respect can give us the necessary training,... Subtleties of tone are rarely appreciated without some special training."—I. A. Richards, *Practical Criticism*, pp. 327-8.

15 The original word *āloka* may mean 'light' as well as 'sight' or seeing objects. We have preferred the second meaning as Abhinavagupta also does. The ultimate end served by *dīpa-s'ikhā* is seeing rather than light. But Jacobi renders it as " Hellıgkeit " or 'brightness'.

16 This analogy of *padārtha* and *vākyārtha* has been revised in the Third Flash in view of strict logical accuracy. That consideration is absent here.

17 The word *dhvani* is used in the text in at least four senses—1) the function of suggestion, 2) suggestive expression or meaning, 3) suggested content and 4) poetry with principal suggestion. The context has to decide which meaning is meant in a particular line. Here, of course, the last is intended.

18 These are called *parikara-s'lokas* or compendious verses. They will sum up in short compass the essential points raised in the course of a lengthy discussion. The purpose served by them is that of a *resumè*. They are common in Sanskrit philosophical works and are generally from the pen of the original authors themselves.

With the idea in the *Kārikā*, cf.—

" Subordination (as opposed to abrogation) of sense is nearly omnipresent in poetry. The poet makes a statement about something, not in order that the statement may be examined and reflected upon, but in order to evoke certain feelings, and when these are evoked the use of the statement is exhausted. It is idle and irrelevant to consider the statement further,"—I. A. Richards, *Practical Criticism*, p, 354.

19 This verse is ascribed to Pinūāi.

20 This is a beautiful instance of *samāsokti;* and is also quoted by Hemacandra in his commentary on Kāvyānuśāsana with a very brilliant explanation—तत्पुरःसर इति आगच्छन्त्या इव सन्ध्यायाः कामुकवद् दिवसः पुरस्सरः संमुखं सरतीति व्याख्येयम्। न तु पदातिन्यायेनाग्रे दिवसो गच्छति सन्ध्या च पश्चादिति। एवं हि वर्षशतैरपि समागमो न भवतीति किं चित्रम्। '*in her front*' should be taken to mean 'towards her' and not merely moving in front like the vanguard of an army'. The lady of the twlight must be understood to be advancing to meet her lover, the Day; and the Day like a passionate lover is also moving to meet her as it were. Though they thus move eagerly towards each other, they never meet. They are ever so close and ever so parted. If they were to be moving mechanically one behind the other as in an army, the very question of their meeting would never arise even after ages. The source of the verse is unknown.

21 According to the *Subhāṣitāvali* and *S'arṅgadharapaddhati*, the author of this verse is Bharcu or Bharvu praised by Bāṇabhaṭṭa. cf. Māgha, XI 4, for this figure अनुक्तनिमित्तविशेषोक्ति.

Abhinavagupta notes that 'according to Udbhaṭa the cause of frigidity is cold (शीत) and according to others whom he calls '*rasikas*' the cause is 'the feeling in the lover that dream is a speedier course to union with his beloved than actually moving out.' But literary critics conversant with Alaṅkāras consider the omission of the reason itself as a source of charm.'

22 Several beautiful examples of the Figure अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा or Indirect Expression are furnished by Ānandavardhana himself in the Third Flash under Kārikā, 40. In line 26 correct the misprint 'indended' into 'intended.'

23 For a hypothesis about the historicity of these 'learned men' see my paper '*Germs of the Theory of Dhvani*', already referred to in note 2.

24 A detailed explanation of the Vaiyākaraṇa theory of *Sphoṭa* and its relation to the Ālaṅkārika concept of *dhvani* appears in my paper mentioned in in the previous note. As Mammaṭa clarifies in his *Kāvya-prakās'a* (ch. II) the grammarians called only sounds as ध्वनि. The literary critics enlarged its scope to include अर्थ or meaning also.

25 Pañcatantra, I. 45.

26 This is a very high compliment paid by a gallant to the beauty of his sweetheart; source untraced.

27 Harṣa's Ratnāvalī II. 12

28 *Bhallaṭās'atakā*, V, 56

29 Lāvaṇya means literally 'saltishness', but by usage 'beauty'.

30 The Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti on one of whose works Ānandavardhana is said to have written a commentary writes similarly about the distinction of primary and secondary meanings,

यत्र रूढ्याऽसदर्थापि जनैः शब्दो निवेशितः।
स मुख्यस्तत्र तत्साम्याद्गौणोऽन्यत्र स्खलद्गतिः।

—Pramāṇavārttika, III. 37.

The most important condition for resorting to *Lakṣaṇā is skhalad-gatitva* or apparent inapplicability of the word's dictionary meaning in a given context *e, g, The boy is a lion.* The indicated meaning 'The boy is brave' removes this difficulty. But the purpose of saying 'The boy is a lion' instead of 'The boy is brave' is the idea of conveying the extraordinary nature of the boy's bravery. Now this meaning which forms the purpose is conveyed straightaway by the word and Indication cannot function when there is not the said incompatibility or *skhaladgatitva* in the word. This explanation is according to Abhinavagupta, and it equates *skhaladgatitva* with *mukhyārthabādhā*. Another explanation would be to take it in a positive sense rather than in the negative sense detailed above. Positively understood, it refers to the movement of the word in signifying the intended sense. It is a convenient metaphor to explain the indirect relation between the word used and the secondary sense grasped. While the relation between the word and its meaning is direct, we can figuratively say that the word's movement or *gati* towards its sense is straight or unfaltering, But when the relation is indirect, the *gati* will be *skhalad* or faltering, The *gati* of the word then is faltering only in cases of indication and not so in cases of denotation or suggestion, cf, also Mammaṭas Kāvyaprakāśa, II, 16.

31 This shows clearly that the author had no access to any written exposition on the theory of suggestion though it was a concept well known in literary circles of Kashmir. He admits here the possibility of such earlier works as a hypothesis only.

32 Mahānāṭaka, V, 7, (J. R. A. S, 1898, p. 296)

33 Rāmāyaṇa, III. xvi, 13

34 Though *Rasavadalaṅkāra* was recognised by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, its detailed exposition was attempted for the first time by Udbhaṭa. cf. Kāvyālaṅkārasāra-saṅgraha, IV 3-4. For a critical exposition of the same, vide Prof. M. Hiriyanna's paper on Rasavadalaṅkāra, in proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference, vol, XVI.

35 The reference is to Udbhaṭa.

36 Cf. प्रेयो गृहागतं कृष्णमवादीद्विदुरो यथा।
अद्य या मम गोविन्द जाता त्वयि गृहागते।
कालेनैषा भवेत्प्रीतिस्तवैवागमनात् पुनः॥

Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra, III. 5.

Here Vidura gives expression to his sense of supreme happiness at the arrival o Kṛṣṇa and wishes that the same may be renewed frequently.

37 Quoted by Vallabhadeva in his *Subhāṣitāvali* (2570) as anonymous.

38 Amaruśataka, 2

39 We do not know the critics who held such a view.

40 Vikramorvaśiya.

41 Ibid. Translation Sri Aurobindo's.

42 This simile became the common stock of all succeeding writers on poetics.

43 As held by Bhāmaha ; cf. śravyaṁ......kāvyaṁ madhuramiṣyate, II 3.

44 Bhīma's words to Kṛṣṇa in Veṇīsaṁhāra, Act I.

45 Such was the view held by Daṇḍin, cf. *ojaḥ samāsabhūyastvam*... —Kāvyādars'a, I 80 a.

46 Aśvatthāman's words in Veṇīsaṁhāra, Act III.

47 For *s'rutiduṣṭa* and other verbal flaws, see Bhāmaha, I. 47ff. Śrutiduṣṭa is the flaw instanced in words that bring indecent associations. *Viṭ, Vānta, Klinna, aṇḍaja*, etc., are examples.

48 The instances quoted by Bhāmaha wherein these cease to be defects contain *rāsas* other than *s'ṛṅgāra*. cf.

तथा विक्लिन्नगण्डानां करिणां मदवारिभिः ।
मदक्लिन्नकपोलानां द्विरदानां चतुश्शति ॥

—I. 57 b and 58a.

Hence Ānandavardhana's guess is quite brilliant.

49 In this and the following Kārikās, the author breaks entirely new ground. He reveals a taste which was unknown in the earlier period of decadence.

50 Cf. "Images, however beautiful, however faithfully copied from nature, and as accurately represented in words, do not of themselves characterise the poet. They become proofs of original genius only so far as they are modified by a predominant passion, or by associated thoughts or images awakened by that passion."—Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, Cf, also "Figures naturally impart assistance to, and, on the other hand, receive wonderful aid from sublime sentiments...... A figure, then seems most dexterously applied when it cannot be discerned that it is a figure" *Loginus on the Sublime* p, 139 (Cassell's National Library Edition)

51 Amarus'ataka. According to Arjunavarmadeva the Figure is *Apahnuti*. Abhinavagupta says that the figures instanced here are "*S'leṣa, rūpaka, Vyatireka* and so forth." But the existence of these figures in no way impedes the grasp of the sentiment of love.

52 Examples like Ghaṭakarparakāvya and Śiśupālavadha, XIX may be quoted in galore from Sanskrit Literature.

53 A Prākrit Mahākāvya by Pravarasena, sometimes ascribed to Kālidāsa.

54 *Rasābhāsa* is a technical expression whose connotation differs from writer to writer. In the eyes of later writers like Hemacandra and Viśvanātha, attribution of complete sentimental behaviour to insentient objects is *Rasābhāsa*. So understood, verses referred to in notes No. 40 and 41 above will be very good instances, But Abhinavagupta thinks that incompleteness or deficiency in the subjects sentimentally described is rasābhāsa. He quotes a verse of his own as example wherein speech is said to be lacking in charm though equipped with all Excellences and Ornaments until she succeeds in winning the fascination of her dear husband, Śiva (cf, *priyeṣu saubhāgyaphalā hi cāruta*—Kālidāsa, Kumārasambhava, V 1). Abhinavagupta adds that this is Rasābhāsa because real *s'ṛṅgāra* is impossible so long as the heroine is lacking in Excellences or Ornaments as stated in the verse. In support of his view he quotes the authority (of Bharata ?) to the effect 'Love relates to youths, gorgeously dressed etc, (उत्तमयुवप्रकृतिरुज्ज्वलवेषात्मकः). Cf, Locana, pp, 199-200. Kashi Sanskrit Series Edn. The precise sense in which Ānandavardhana is using the word is not clear.

55 S'ākuntala, I.

56 The suggested idea is that Rāhu's head was severed by the discus of Viṣṇu, though it continued to live trunkless. Plainly stated, there is no beauty in this idea. Hence the Periphrasis which adds beauty to it. According to the ancient school of critics, the verse is figurative because there is a euphemestic turn given to an otherwise ordinary idea. According to Ānandavardhana, the figure is so for an entirely different reason; viz, because it gets the touch of *s'ṛṅgāra-rasa*, *S'ṛṅgāra rasa* here is not primary, but accessary since the context is one glorifying Viṣṇu and not one describing the amours of Rāhu's wives. It is only in such cases where Rasa is present and yet subordinate, that an alaṅkāra gets importance and acquires real beauty.

57 *Ratnāvalī*; Act II,

58 *Hanumān-nāṭaka*, V. 24,

59 *Sūryas'ataka*, 23

60 Yas'ovarman's *Rāmābhyudaya*; Cf, ZDMG, XXXVI P, 521

61 *Amarus'ataka*, 9

62 *Meghadūta*, II 54, Translation Rooke's, 9.10 (R S S Edn)

63 *Kāvyālaṅkārasaṅgraha*, IV, cf

एकप्रयत्नोच्चार्याणां तच्छायां चैव बिभ्रताम् ।
स्वरितादिगणैर्भिन्नैर्बन्धः श्लिष्टमिहोच्यते ॥
अलङ्कारान्तरगतां प्रतिभां जनयत्पदैः ।
द्विविधैरर्थशब्दोक्तिविशिष्टं तत्प्रतीयताम् ।

64 Also quoted by Hemacandra as an example of *Madhyama-Kavya*. —Kāvyānuśāsana, ch. II.

65 Hemacandra quotes this verse and explains it as an example of figures suggesting new ideas *(vastu)*. Here the Metaphor of 'arm-bolts' suggests according to him that the hero does not stand in need of any military force as horses or elephants for his conquests—Kāvyānuśāsana, p. 79, (Bombay Edn.)

66 This figure *Vakrokti* in this specific sense was not recognised by early writers like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, and Vāmana. But the idea is quite common in later works like *Alaṅkārasarvasva.*

67 Bāṇa's *Kādambarī*

68 Ascribed to S'akavṛddhi in the Subhāṣitāvalī

69 *Sūryas'ataka*, 9

70 *Harṣacarita*, III

71 *Harṣacarita*, I

72 *Kumārasambhava*, VI 84

73 *Ibid*, III

74 Cf. *Kāvyādars'a*, II 261

75 Ascribed to Rudraṭa in the Subhāṣitāvalī. In the text No. 75 should come at the end of line 14.

76 See p, 40. Correct the misprint 75 in the text into 76.

77 See p, 15.

78 It would be interesting to compare in this connection Aristotle's distinction of subjects into '*possible*' and '*probable*'.

79 Hāla's *Saptas'atī*, 173

80 Cf, *Kāvyālaṅkārasaṅgraha*, VI 3

अलङ्कारान्तरच्छायां यत्कृत्वा धीषु बन्धनम् ।
असंदेहोपि संदेहरूपं संदेहनाम तत् ।—

81 There is *Rūpaka dhvani* here according to Abhinavagupta,

82 This is Ānandavardhana's own composition, As Abhinavagupta points out, the expressed figure here is *s'leṣa* and the suggested figure-*rūpaka*.

83 The expressed figure here is *Vyatireka* while the suggested one is *upamā*.

84 We are told by Abhinavagupta that the *motif* of this Prākrit work was Cupid's triumph over the three worlds *(trailokyavijaya)*

85 Here *atis'ayokti* is the Figure expressed and *upamā* the one suggested.

86 As the *Locana* explains, the Expressed meaning stops with the idea that the fruit of the Aśoka is unlike the sweet fruits of trees like the mango. But by suggestive force of the word 'fruit' we make out that the successful fruition of even royal efforts rests with Fate. That is why the suggested universal statement deriving support from the particular instance quoted is *arthāntaranyāsa.*

87 See 'Red thou art...' (p. 34) and 'May both those...' (p. 43) quoted above.

88 cf. मन्ये शङ्के ध्रुवं प्रायो नूनमित्येवमादिभिः ।
उत्प्रेक्षा व्यज्यते शब्दैरिवशब्दोऽपि तादृशः ॥

Kāvyādars'a, II. 234.

89 Since all the different attributes can apply equivocally to both terraces and women.

90 Abhinavagupta has given more examples of suggested figures like *dīpaka, aprastuta-prs'aṁsā, apahnuti, sasandeha, prativastūpamā* and *atis'ayokti*.

91 This Kārikā forcefully sums up the author's attitude towards the place of figures in poetry. so long as the *alaṅkāras* are only *vācya*, they do not deserve to be regarded as part and parcel even of the external body of poetry, i.e. *s'abda* and *artha*. Even for those who do not recognise *dhvani*, alaṅkāras will be but extrinsic elements of grace (cf. काव्यस्य शोभायाः कर्तारो धर्मा गुणाः । तदतिशयहेतवस्त्वलङ्काराः । —Vāmana's Kāvyālaṅkāra sūtra, III, 1-2.). But if they enter into relationship with *dhvani*, they will really become intrinsic elements of charm. Here we have a strikingly novel review of the use of Figures.

92 Hāla's Saptaśati, 159.

93 The Mahābhārata, V. xxxviii, 38.

94 The Meghadūta, I. 15.

95 The Abhijñāna-Śākuntala, I. 15.

96 Bhagavadgītā, II, 69

97 See p. 46

98 Hāla, 251.

99 See p. 46

100 Tāpasavatsarāja of Māyurāja, Act II.

101 Ascribed by Vallabhadeva to Narasiṁha.

102 See p. 27

103 See p. 25-27

104 Canto VIII is meant.

105 See p. 27

106 See p. 45

107 Cf. the saying—*Amarukakaverekaḥ s'lokaḥ Prabandhas'atāyate* (one verse of Amaruka is as good as a whole work)

108 Daśarūpaka, I. 22 ff. The *Sandhis* are five phases in the development of the dramatic plot roughly corresponding to Introduction (Protasis), Rising Action (Epitasis), Climax (Peripeteia), Denouement (Catabasis) and Catastrophe. The *sandhyaṅgas* are the various intermediate stages that form a *sandhi.*

109 Nāṭyaśāstra, XVIII. I0.

110 Cf. Aristotle's remarks on the different provinces of Poet and the Historian—"It is not the Poet's province to relate such things as have actually happened, but such as might have happened—such as are possible, according to probable or necessary consequence. ...The Historian and the Poet are distinguished by this—that the one relates what has been, the other what might be. On this account Poetry is a more philosophical and a more excellent thing than History; for Poetry is chiefly conversant about general truth, History about particular."—p. 32. Prof. H. Morley's Translation (Cassell's National Library).

111 Abhinavagupta remarks that the chronicles which form the sources of Kālidāsa's *Raghuvaṁs'a* do not relate the wedding of Aja and such incidents.

112 Abhinavagupta points out that incidents like Arjuna's conquest of the

Netherworld which occur in this poem are invented by the poet only and have no basis in the earlier chronicles.

113 The five stages in the action of the hero towards the achievement of his goal are called *Pañca-avasthās* by Bharata and they are :—1. Beginning (*Prārambha*), 2. Effort (*prayatna*), 3. Possibility of goal's realisation (*prāpteḥ sambhava*) 4. Certainty of goal's realisation (*niyatāpti*) and 5. Realisation of goal (*Phalayoga*). The parts of the plot (itivṛtta-khaṇḍāḥ) that relate to these are respectively called *mukha*, *pratimukha*, *garbha*, *avamarśa* and *nirvahaṇa* according to Abhinavagupta. He also opines that the *artha-prakṛtis* or factors that ensure the intended goal, *bīja* (seed), *bindu* (unexpected xtension)—*Patākā* (sub-incident) and *prakarī* (mixed incident) also may come in when the hero's goal is to be secured only by the efforts of his minister—and *Kārya* (Attainment of goal) are included in the concept of *sandhis*. For details see Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, ch. XXI. 20 ff.

114 As an example of this over-fondness for figures at the expense of *Rasa*, Abhinavagupta quotes a verse from the drama Svapnavāsavadatta — '**स्वञ्चितपक्ष्मकपाटं. . . .**' which is missing in the one published by Ganapathi Sastrin. Since the author of the thirteen Trivandrum plays is not culpable of the defect in question to any notable extent, the ascription of these to Bhāsa becomes open to doubt.

115 Abhinavagupta quotes the relevant verse from the Prākrit poem, *Madhumathana-vijaya*; It may be translated as follows :—

'How is it that this slender ornament of lotus-fibres is felt heavy by you who could playfully lift up at the tip of your tusks the weight of the entire earth?'

116 The friends in question are Spring, Youth, Malaya Breeze and others. Abhinava quotes one verse said by Youth—

I do overstep limits ; I am unbridled and devoid of discrimination.
Even in dreams, I shall not think of devotion for you !

117 Mahābhārata, XII. 153. The story is very interesting. The corpse of the son just dead is taken to the cemetary by the bereaved father and relatives for purposes of funeral rites. A vulture who wants to feed upon the corpse while yet it is day tries to persuade the men to go back early—'How terrible this cemetary is with vultures and jackals! Everywhere there are skeletons frightening living beings. There is none who can live on for ever and escape death. Whether it is a friend or a foe, death is the natural end of all creatures...' A jackal whose intent is to feed upon the corpse after nightfall, when the vultures would not trouble him, argues with the men that they should stay at least till it gets dark—'See, the sun is still shining! Be affectionate yet. This moment is most unholy and the boy may yet come back to life. Oh, how his body shines like gold! He has hardly stepped into youth. Are you like fools deserting him without a qualm on the words of a vulture?...'

118 Hanumännāṭaka, IX. 5. Quoted also by Hemachandra and Viśvanātha.

119 The references are to words in the original Sanskrit verse.

120 For the *taddhita* suffix *aṇ*, in *Tāpasa*, see Pāṇini, V. ii. 103.

121 Mahābhārata, I. 128. 6.

122 Meghadūta, 76,

123 Hāla, 706.

124 Hāla, 961.

125 Vikramorvaśīya, V. 73.

126 Śākuntala, III, 25.

127 Ibid. I. 9.

128 Sūryaśataka, 4.

129 Abhinavagupta has given the verse in full—

मनुष्यवृत्त्या समुपाचरन्तं स्वबुद्धिसामान्यकृतानुमानाः ।
योगीश्वरैरप्यसुबोधमीश त्वां बोद्धुमिच्छन्त्यबुधाः स्वतर्कैः ॥

'O Lord! Thou who canst not be easily known even by the best yogins, fools are wishing to know by their intelligence, as thou art pretending the behaviour of men.'

130 Kumārasambhava, III. 20.

131 Hāla, 675.

132 See p. 43 cf. also pp. 21-2.

133 Udbhaṭa's Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa, acording to Abhinavagupta.

134 Cf. "A Third sort of imperfection in the pathetic is that which Theodorus has named the Parenthyrse, or an ill-timed emotion. It is an attempt to work upon the passions, where is no need of pathos; or some excess, where modification is requisite. For some authors, as if from the efforts of intoxication, fall into passionate expressions, which bear no relation at all to their subject, but are whims of their own, or borrowed from the schools. The consequence is, as might be expected, that they meet with nothing but contempt and derision from their unmoved audience—transported themselves, whilst their hearers are calm and unexcited"—Longinus on the Sublime, p, 100.

135 *Vikramorvaśīya*, IV.

136 *Kādambarī*, p, 146. (Ed. Peterson)

137 See p. 40

138 See p. 36

139 See p. 23

140 *Mahābhārata*, XI. xxiv. 19. spoken by the wives of Bhūriśravas at his death in the battle.

141 *Mahābhārata*, XII, 174. 46; 177, 51.

142 Cf. Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*, I.

143 Attributed to Vyāsa in Kṣemendra's *Aucityavicāracarcā*.

144 Cf. Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*, ch, XX.

145 See p. 35

146 See p. 60

147 Perhaps the sphoṭavādins are meant.

148 See p, 43

149 See p. 15

150 Buddhist logicians also may be understood by this reference since they hold that the relation of word to its meaning is non-eternal.

151 See p. 11

152 See p. 44

153 Abhinavagupta explains the suggested sense as follows :—'Lakṣmī or wealth is related to Hari and Gaṅgā on the one hand and to Moon and Nectar on the other. That is to say, wealth can be obtained through devotion to Hari and bathing in the Ganges ; and once wealth is got one can enjoy the pleasures of the Moon and Nectar. In other words, the wealth is best spent on wine in the company of women on moonlit nights'. Though beautiful in itself, this suggested sense is suppressed by the contextual primary meaning, viz. 'The family of the mighty main is extraordinary'.

154 See *Kumārasambhava*, I. 28.

155 Veṇīsaṁhāra, I.

156 Hāla, 417.

157 *Kumārasambhava*, VII, 19.

158 *Kirātārjunīya*, VIII, 14.

159 See p. 43

160 See p. 79

161 Ascribed to Dhrmakīrti by Vallabhadeva also.

162 See p. 17

163 See p. 43

194 Hāla, 983.

165 See p. 20

166 See p. 76

167 *Veṇīsaṁhāra*, V.

168 See p.25

169 *Meghadūta*, 32

170 Hāla, 560.

171 Vāmana, I ii. 9.

172 The work is *vivṛti* or gloss on Dharmottara's *ṭikā* or commentary (*Dharmottarī*) on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa-viniścaya, according to Abhinavagupta,

173 *Amarus'ataka*, 82

174 *Vikramorvas'īya*, See p. 14

175 This verse is not available in full.

176 *Harṣacarita*, p, 127

177 See p. 43

178 *Kamārasambhava*, VI, 84

179 See p. 46

180 Hāla, 954

181 See p. 57

182 Rāmāyaṇa, I. i. 40.

183 Cf. *Mahābhārata*, I, i. 49; ii. 238 ; I. i. 92 and ii. 365.

184 *Mahābhārata*, I. i. 256.

185 Ibid, I. i. 256 ff.

186 *Kumārasambhava*, I. 49.

187 Ibid, III. 53.

188 Ibid, VII, 13 ff.

189 Cf. *Mahābhārata*, XII, xiii, 4

द्व्यक्षरस्तु भवेन्मृत्युः त्र्यक्षरं ब्रह्म शाश्वतम् ।
ममेति च भवेन्मृत्युः न ममेति च शाश्वतम् ॥

190 The ideas in this chapter have been elaborated by Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvyamīmāṁsā*, chs. XI, XII and XIV

191 The concluding verses show that Ānandavardhana was himself a poet of no mean order.

GLOSSARY

(Sanskrit technical terms and English equivalents)

Aṅga	an accessary, a part.
aṅgin	the principal, the whole.
akavi	poetaster
anirdeśyatva	Indefinability
atiśayokti	Exaggeration
ativyāpti	fallacy of too wide.
atyantatiraskṛtavācya	An expressed sense completely lost or concealed in the suggested.
anitya	non-eternal.
anityadoṣa	temporary or occasional defects
adbhutarasa	the sentiment of wonder.
anubhava	experience
anubhāva	emotional response.
anugrāhyānugrāhakabhāva	governor-governed relationship.
anumāna	inference
anurodha	a governing force.
anuvāda	indirect speech or quotation.
anusvāna	resonance.
anyonyāśraya	fallacy of Circular Definition.
apaśabda	solecism
aprastuta	extraneous.
aprastutapraśaṃsā	Indirect Expression, a figure of speech in Indian rhetoric.
abhidheya	same as *artha* below.
abhineyartha	dramatic work
artha	sense, meaning, content, subject, object, significance, theme, import.
arthāntaranyāsa	Illustration (of a universal with a particular or *vice versa*) : a figure of speech in Indian Rhetoric.

arthāntarasaṅkramitavācya	an expressed content completely merged in the unexpressed.
alaṅkāra	a figure of speech or ornament
avamarśa	one of the five major divisions of the dramatic plot roughly corresponding to *denouement*.
avāntarabheda	sub-division.
avivakṣitavācya	unmeant expressed sense.
avinābhāva	the inseparable relation of inherence.
avyāpti	fallacy of too narrow.
avyutpatti	imperfect education.
asaṁlakṣyakrama	with unnoticeable temporal sequence.
asambhava	fallacy of too narrow.
ahaṅkāra	egotism
Ākhyāyikā	historical novels in prose.
ākṣepa	a figure of speech in Indian rhetoric roughly corresponding to Paraleipsis.
ātman	soul, essence, life, body, entity.
ādhāra	substratum.
ādhikārika	the main plot.
ādheya	the attribute in a substratum.
āśraya	same as *ādhāra* above.
itivṛtta	theme, plot.
Utprekṣā	poetic fancy, a figure of speech in Indian rhetoric.
utsāha	highspiritedness.
upacāra	metaphorical application.
upanāgarikā	The urban or the cultured, one of the Literary *Vṛttis* or dictions in Indian rhetoric.
upalakṣaṇa	synecdoche.
upādhi	adventitious circumstance.

Ojas	Floridity.
Aucitya	propriety.
aupādhika	coloured by adventitious circumstances.
Kathā	prose romance.
karaṇa	proximate cause.
karuṇa	the pathetic sentiment.
kalāpaka	Run on lines up to twelve in poetry.
kavinibaddhapraudhoktisiddha	Existing only in the ornate expression put into the mouth of character created by the poet.
kavipraudhoktisiddha	Existing only in the ornate expression of the poet.
kāku	Ironic tone.
kārikā	Verse text.
kārya	effect, action or plot.
kāvya	poem, poetry, literature.
kāvyaprabheda	forms of literature
kulaka	run on lines running to 16 and above in poetry.
kṛtrima	conventional, natural.
khaṇḍakathā	short stories in verse.
Gamaka	evidence
garbha	a division of dramatic plot corresponding to climax.
guṇa	Quality, merit, excellence.
guṇavṛtti	Indication.
guṇībhūtavyaṅgya	poetry containing subordinated suggestion.
grāmyā vṛtti	The pallid diction.
Caturasra	well-balanced.
camatkāra	strikingness.
cāṭu	quatrain containing sweet flattery.

cārutva	artistic excellence, beauty.
cittavṛtti	state of mind, temperament.
citra	portrait, portrait-like poetry.
cchāyā	shade of beauty.
Jātyatva	preciousness.
Tātparya	purport, implication, intent
tulyayogitā	combination of equals, a figure of speech in Indian rhetoric.
Dayāvīra	compassionate heroism.
dīpaka	Ellipsis implying a simile.
dīpti	brilliance
dṛṣṭānta	Analogy, a figure of speech in Indian Rhetoric.
doṣa	defect, blemish, flaw.
dharma	characteristic.
dhīrodātta	the bravely noble 'hero'.
dhīroddhata	the bravely haughty 'hero'.
DHVANI	the function of suggestion, suggestive expression or meaning, suggested content, poetry with principal suggestion.
Nitya	eternal
nityadoṣa	permanent defect
nidarśanā	Corroboration, a figure of speech in Indian rhetoric.
niyata	constant.
nirvahaṇa	conclusion.
naisargika	natural
Padārtha	word import
parikathā	didactic stories in verse.
paruṣā vṛttiḥ	the harsh diction.
paryanuyoga	objection.
paryāyabandha	several stanzas in one or different metres describing a single topic.

paryāyokta	a figure of speech in Indian rhetoric corresponding to periphrasis.
prakṛti	status of characters, primordial Nature.
prakāra	variety.
pratipattṛ	connoisseur.
pratipādya	same as *abhidheya* above.
pratibhā	genius, creative imagination, vision.
pratimukha	a major division of the dramatic plot corresponding to Rising Action.
pratīti	apprehension.
pratīyamāna	the implied or suggested content
pramāṇa	instrument of knowledge.
prasiddhi	conventional usage.
prasāda	perspicuity.
prasthāna	canon, theory.
preyas	Sweet flattery which is recognised as a figure of speech in Indian rhetoric.
prauḍhokti	ornate expression.
bandha	construction.
bandhacchāyā	beauty of construction.
bādhya	foil.
bībhatsa	sentiment of disgust.
bhaṅgī	an artistic turn.
bhaṇiti	expression.
bhaṇitivaicitrya	strikingness of expression
bhayānaka	the Terrible, a sentiment.
bhāva	emotion.
bhāvanā	aesthetic contemplation.
mahākavi	a master poet.
mahākāvya	a great poem.
mādhurya	sweetness

mukha	a major division of the dramatic plot corresponding to 'Introduction'.
muktaka	single stanza forming a self-complete unit.
Yathāsaṅkhya	Relative enumeration, a figure of speech in Indian Rhetoric.
yukti	argument
Rasa	Sentiment
rasabandha	delineation of sentiment.
rasavadalaṅkāra	figurative sentiment.
rasābhāsa	semblance of sentiment.
rīti	style
raudra	the furious sentiment.
lakṣaṇa	definition, theory.
lakṣaṇā	secondary sense
liṅga	the probans of an inference.
liṅgi	the probandum of an inference.
vakrokti	artistic turn of speech, evasive speech, indirect denotation.
vastu	idea, subject.
vākyārtha	purport of a sentence.
vācaka	word.
vācakatva	the power of denotation.
vācya	the expressed or denoted sense, conventional meaning.
vikaṭabandha	bombastic construction.
vidhi	construction, direct assertion.
vibhāva	stimulus or stimulii of setting, excitants.
vipralambha-śṛṅgāra	the sentiment of Love-in-Separation.
vipratipatti	divergent view
vimati	conflicting opinion.
virodhin	the opposite.
vivakṣā	intent, intention of communication.

vivakṣitānyaparavācya	meant but further extending expressed sense.
viśeṣaka	Run on lines extending up to four lines.
viṣaya	object, content, literary medium, poetic theme, instance.
vṛtti	procedure, literary modes of diction or ways of characters represented, gloss.
vyakti	suggestion, conveying.
vyatireka	Fancied contrast, a figure of speech in Indian rhetoric.
vyapadeśa	designation.
vyabhicāribhāva	passing moods.
vyājastuti	veiled praise, a figure of speech.
vyāpāra	function or power of words.
vyañjakatva	suggestiveness or suggestivity.
Śabda	sound, word.
śabdavyāpāra	the power of words to communicate meaning.
śṛṅgāra	the erotic sentiment.
śravyatva	sound-harmony.
śruti-duṣṭa	Indecent sound.
sakalakathā	full-fledged stories in verse.
samāsokti	condensed metaphor.
samuccaya	conjunction of agents with common actions, a figure of speech in Indian rhetoric.
sargabandha	epics running to several cantos.
sahṛdaya	cultured critic.
sāmarthya	power of implication.
sārūpya	similarity.
sthāyibhāva	abiding emotion.
svataḥsambhavi	naturally existing.
saṅkara	merging or intermingling of figures.

saṅghaṭanā	composition.
sandānitaka	two stanzas forming one unit with run on lines.
sandeha	fancied doubt, a figure of speech in Indian rhetoric.
sandhi	major divisions of dramatic plot
sandhyaṅga	major subdivisions of dramatic plot.
saṁlakṣyakrama	of noticeable sequence.
saṁsṛṣṭi	collocation or co-existence.

APPENDIX

ARTICLES OF THE AUTHOR ON DHVANI AND RELATED TOPICS

1. The Sanskrit Conception of a Poet—*The Hindusthan Quraterly*, Calcutta, Vol. I, No. 2

2. The Office of the Sanskrit Poet in Theory and Practice—*Ibid*, Vol. II, No. 11.

3. Sanskrit Theories of Poetry—*The Poona Orientalist*, Vol VIII, Nos. 1 and 2.

4. Observations of Sanskrit Literary Critics on Poetic Imagination—*Ibid*, Vol. IX. Nos. 3 and 4.

5. Bharata's Theory of *Rasa*—*Ibid*, Vol. XII, Nos. 1 to 4.

6. Ānandavardhana's Classification of Poetry from the Stand-point of *Dhvani*—*Ibid*, Vol. XIII, Nos. 1 and 2.

7. The Indian Theory of suggestion and some Western parallels—*Ibid*, Vol. XIII, Nos. 3 and 4.

8. The Doctrine of *Doṣas* in Sanskrit Poetics—*The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Sept. 1944, Vol. XX.

9. Bhāsa as a Prakrit Poet—*Ibid*, Vol. XXII, No. 1.

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11. Abhinavagupta's Contribution to the theory of *Dhvani*—*Ibid*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 4,

12. The Chief Varieties of *Dhvani* according to Ānandavardhana.—*Ibid*, Vol, XXXIX, No. 1.

13. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's Theory of *Rasa* and Censure of *Dhvani* as reviewed by Abhinavagupta—*Journal of the University of Bombay*, Arts Number, 23, Vol. XVII, Part 2.

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15. Ānandavardhana's Defence of *Dhvani*—*The Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol, V, Pt. 3

16. Ānandavardhana's Treatment of *Alaṅkāra* in relation to *Dhvani*—*Indian Culture*, Vol. V, Pt. 3.

17. Some Critics of the Theory of *Dhvani*—*Ibid*, Vol. XV.

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19. Ānandavardhana's Treatment of *Pratibhā* (with an appendix on " Poets who show open recognition of the theory of *Dhvani* ")—*Ibid*, Vol. XXVI, pp. 143-151.

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22. The Concept of Suggestion in Sanskrit Poetics—*Ibid*, Vol. XI, Nos. 1 and 2.

23. Ānandavardhana's Theory of *Dhvani*—Proceedings of the XIV All India Oriental Conference.

24. Effect of Criticisms on the Development of the Theory of *Dhvani*—*Journal of Oriental Studies*, Vol. I, No. 1.

25. A Critical estimate of Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*—*The New Indian Antiquary*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 7-12.

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27. Mahimabaṭṭa's Strictures against the *Dhvanyāloka*—*The Half-yearly Journal of the Mysore University* (New Series) XIX, Arts, Vol. IX, No. 3.

28. Some Thoughts on Sanskrit Literature—*The Hindustan Review, Patna*, June 1949.

29. Vyāsa and Vālmīki—*The Bharat Jyoti*, Divali Number 1947.

30. A Novel View of Mahimabhaṭṭa—on the place of metre in Poetry—*The Poona Orientalist*, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1 to 4.

31. Indian Poetics and T. S. Eliot's Threes Voices of Poetry—*Half-yearly Journal of the Mysore University*, Sept. 1954.

INDEX

ERRATA

Page	*Line*	*Incorrect*	*Correct*
13	26	indended	intended
62	16	*vdana midam*	*vadanamidam*
78	last	nuts	nuts[126]
81	21	fonnd	found
83	17&19	unwarranted for	unwarranted
95	10	Disgusting	Disgustful
105	6	play-lotus, etc.,	play-lotus, etc.[143]
108	5	*reap*	*reap*[149]
111	4	man-made	man-made[150]
117	7	has !	has ![153]
126	5	**41**	**41-2**
126	7	importantance	importance
132	15	*coaxing*	*coaxing*[169]
133	21	abidinß	abiding
133	25	giimmering	glimmering
144	last	embodp	embody
152	26	juct	just
155	16	Divsions	Divisions
156	3	my	may
,,	4	ofihas	of his
,,	9	itsel;	itself
,,	10	thfe	the
,,	19	much	such
157	11	*paca iti*	*pacatīti*
158	27	*kāvymālā*	*kāvyamālā*
159	last	Pinṇāi	Pāṇini
160	7	twlight	twilight
,,	30	in thc	the